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1. Introduction
A democracy’s electoral system is fundamental to its legitimacy.1 From the 
electoral system flow the form and style of representation, the relative strength 
of political parties, the formation of government and the development of policy 
positions. In a representative democracy, the structure of a state’s electoral 
system plays a critical role in determining the nature and form of political 
discourse and parliamentary representation. The electoral system establishes 
who may vote, how many representatives are to be chosen from which areas, 
who is in charge of the conduct of elections and how votes are counted. Because 
adjustment or manipulation of these elements can have severe positive or negative 
consequences for the viability of political parties, attempts to make changes are 
often fiercely debated. Electoral system reforms can also impact strongly on 
the ability of citizens to participate in a state’s general political discourse and 
democratic processes—as voters, candidates or as members of political parties. 
Beyond any formal barriers, the perceived fairness or unfairness of the electoral 
system can also affect citizens’ willingness to engage in democratic processes.
Australia has been at the forefront of electoral design and innovation over 
the past 150 years and, with nine legislative jurisdictions,2 there is ample 
opportunity for experimentation and diversity. Australia is one of the oldest 
continuing democracies in the world and the first to introduce the modern 
form of the secret ballot, the first country to vote itself into existence through 
popular referenda, and the first country in which women could both vote and 
stand for parliament.3 In the nineteenth century, Australian colonies introduced 
democratic innovations such as the use of government-printed ballot papers and 
written nominations for elections. By the late nineteenth century, Tasmania had 
pioneered the single-transferable-vote form of proportional representation for 
its lower house.
Since the 1980s, significant electoral reforms have continued at the national and 
sub-national levels; however, while nineteenth-century innovations such as the 
secret ballot, independent electoral officials and standardised ballot papers were 
seen as measures to improve the fairness of elections, reforms can often be viewed 
as providing a partisan advantage for the political parties in power. For example, 
1 In this book, the term ‘electoral system’ is used in a holistic sense to refer to all aspects of an electoral 
regime, including the voting system, electoral regulation, administration and management. The term ‘voting 
system’ is used to refer to the method of voting, such as proportional representation or majoritarian single-
member electorates.
2 Norfolk Island is an external Australian Territory with a legislature smaller than many Australian local 
councils and does not operate on party political lines, so is not considered in this assessment. 
3 Australian women (except Indigenous women in some States) were entitled to vote and stand for parliament 
from 1902. While New Zealand was the first country to give women the vote in 1893, women in that country 
were not entitled to stand for parliament until 1919.
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political scientist David Elkins argues that recent electoral experimentation, 
while promoted as improving democratic outcomes, is primarily designed to 
provide partisan advantage.4
This book looks at Australian electoral reforms from a political science 
perspective; however, the author’s experience as a parliamentarian and party 
administrator provides further insight into how and why reforms occur. The 
author was a Member of the Western Australian Legislative Council from 
1997 to 2001, representing the East Metropolitan Region for the Australian 
Democrats. During most of this term, the Democrats held the balance of power 
in the Council. After leaving parliament, he became a member of the party’s 
national executive, including a term as deputy national president. 
Much of the information in the following chapters is derived from the author’s 
doctoral study, when, as part of his research, he interviewed ministers and 
shadow ministers, electoral commissioners and others from all Australian 
jurisdictions. The institutional structures of Australia’s electoral administration 
are considered and, in particular, an assessment is made of the independence 
of the nine electoral commissions around Australia. A case study approach is 
then taken to assess several areas of electoral law. Reforms over the past 30 
years have generally served to tilt the electoral playing field in favour of one of 
the major parties or, at times, in favour of the major-party cartel against other 
players. Some areas that receive specific attention include entitlement to vote, 
closing of the electoral roll, political party registration regimes, public funding, 
malapportionment and postal voting.
Background briefing
Australia, with the rich diversity of electoral systems in its nine legislative 
jurisdictions (comprising the national federal—also referred to as 
Commonwealth—level, six States and two Territories), provides excellent 
material for comparative analysis. Most of these jurisdictions have long-
established representative democracies of more than 100 years. Only the two 
Territories—the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT)—have achieved self-government comparatively recently. Their first 
legislative elections under self-government were in 1980 and 1989, respectively. 
While there are many similarities between these nine jurisdictions, there is 
also significant diversity in their electoral systems, histories of reform and 
administrative procedures. This variation warrants detailed analysis. Australia is 
often held up as a shining example of electoral best practice, so it is worthwhile 
4 David J. Elkins. 1992. ‘Electoral Reform and Political Culture.’ In Comparative Political Studies: Australia 
and Canada, eds M. Alexander and B. Galligan. Melbourne: Pitman, p. 68. 
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examining whether that remains the case. This can be done by comparing 
Australian systems with each other and assessing them against internationally 
accepted norms for electoral management and fair elections. 
At the Australian national level, there have been two significant instances 
of electoral reform in the past 30 years. The first occasion followed the 1983 
general election, when the incoming Hawke Labor Government initiated 
sweeping changes. These included the introduction of ticket voting for the 
Senate; party identification on ballot papers and ballot order decided by lot 
(replacing alphabetical listing); the adoption of a modified Gregory system for 
the Senate count; public funding; party registration; and the establishment of 
a statutory electoral management body—the Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC)—which replaced the Australian Electoral Office. 
The second major set of reforms occurred in 2006 under the Howard Liberal–
Nationals5 Coalition Government, which was finally able to implement significant 
changes that it had pursued from the time it first won office in 1996. Having 
won a Senate majority at the 2004 election (taking effect from July 2005), the 
Howard Government enacted reforms in 2006 that impacted on many facets 
of electoral administration. These reforms included the disenfranchisement 
of all prisoners, the earlier closure of the electoral roll,6 more stringent proof-
of-identity requirements, increases in donation disclosure thresholds and an 
increase in the level of tax-deductible donations. 
Electoral systems at the sub-national level have similarly been subject to 
significant reform and amendment during this period. Queensland and Western 
Australia have moved to reduce malapportionment, Western Australia and 
Victoria have replaced legislative council single-member elections with regional 
proportional representation, Queensland and New South Wales have moved 
to optional preferential voting, and all jurisdictions have introduced and/or 
tightened party registration criteria. Tasmania has significantly reduced district 
magnitude in its house of assembly electorates—changing from seven-member 
to five-member seats. As a result, the assembly has been reduced in size from 35 
to 25 members. Even in Australia’s newest legislative jurisdiction, the Australian 
Capital Territory, the modified d’Hondt voting system of a single Territory-
wide electorate that was originally used has been subsequently replaced with 
a system based on three multi-member electorates using the Hare-Clark form 
of proportional representation. The Australian Capital Territory’s parliamentary 
terms have also been extended from three to four years.
5 The National Party, formerly known as the Country Party, changed its name to The Nationals in 2003.
6 The disenfranchisement of all prisoners and earlier closure of the electoral roll were subsequently found 
to be unconstitutional by the High Court. 
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
4
It can be argued that in electoral democracies there is an ongoing tension 
between voting systems and political parties, with each attempting to exert 
dominance over the other. This tension is explained by Ken Benoit as the 
mechanical functioning of voting systems against the psychological behaviour of 
political parties. Benoit argues that voting systems place mechanical restrictions 
on how votes are distributed and seats are awarded, while political parties use 
psychology to shape campaign strategies and thereby maximise results within 
the voting system’s constraints.7 Arend Lijphart assesses the institutional 
consequences of this tension, arguing that proportional voting systems produce 
stronger electoral institutions due to the tendency towards non-majority 
governments in such systems.8
The ongoing tension referred to by Lijphart and Benoit is described by Claus Offe 
as competing forces of institutional change and stability. Offe argues that there 
is an inherent institutional tendency to remain stable. Importantly, however, 
he also identifies the capacity for institutions to change from within, through 
legislated powers for institutions to alter their own lower-level operational and 
administrative mechanisms.9 This is pertinent for Australian electoral system 
design, where there can be tension between electoral commissions seeking 
to act independently in accordance with professional norms and governing 
political parties attempting to assert a preferred electoral regime for identified 
or perceived partisan advantage. Administrative changes that do not require 
legislative approval might have significant partisan impacts and the Australian 
experience has generally been that the governing political parties keep tight 
controls over this area of electoral regulation. 
There exists a large disparity in the capacity to contest elections, which is 
determined by access to incumbency benefits. The disparity between incumbents 
and contestants without access to incumbency benefits has developed in 
recent decades. Incumbency benefits include parliamentarians’ travel, staffing, 
printing and communication entitlements, media coverage (such as involvement 
in televised debates), publicity resources (including access to public service 
resources) and voter databases. There is a hierarchy of incumbency advantages 
(depicted in Figure 1.1), ranging from those enjoyed by the party in government 
and those enjoyed by parliamentary parties, by parliamentarians without party 
status and by parties without parliamentary representation to the relatively 
limited benefits available to Independents. While this skewing of the electoral 
playing field through incumbency advantages is mostly separate from Australian 
electoral system design, it is important to acknowledge the impact it has on the 
fairness of Australian elections. 
7 Ken Benoit. 2004. ‘Models of Electoral System Change.’ Electoral Studies 23(3): 363–89.
8 Arend Lijphart. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945–
1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Claus Offe. 1996. ‘Designing Institutions in East European Transitions’. In The Theory of Institutional 
Design, ed. R. E. Goodin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 207–9.
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Figure 1.1 Hierarchy of Incumbency
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The fact that the current two-party system has now been in place for more than 
a century10 suggests an entrenchment of the perception of the voting public that 
there are only two parties to choose from. This perception is reinforced by the 
two parties’ control of the political agenda, campaign funds and the electoral 
system itself, despite the occasional opportunities that arise for smaller parties, 
as previously mentioned. Minor parties can win more support at the expense of 
the two major parties where proportional representation exists. 




HoR Senate HoR Senate HoR Senate
1983 49 .5 45 .5 43 .6 40 .0 5 .0 9 .6
1984 47 .6 42 .2 45 .0 39 .5 5 .5 7 .6
1987 45 .8 42 .8 46 .1 42 .0 6 .0 8 .5
1990 39 .4 38 .4 43 .5 41 .9 11 .3 12 .6
1993 44 .9 43 .5 44 .3 43 .0 3 .8 5 .3
1996 38 .8 36 .2 47 .3 44 .0 6 .8 10 .8
1998 40 .1 37 .3 39 .5 37 .7 5 .1 8 .5
2001 37 .8 34 .3 43 .0 41 .8 5 .4 7 .3
2004 37 .6 35 .0 46 .7 45 .1 1 .2 2 .1
2007 43 .4 40 .3 42 .1 39 .9 0 .7 1 .3
2010 38 .0 35 .1 43 .6 38 .6 0 .2 0 .6
Source: Australian Electoral Commission.12
To illustrate this, on a national basis in the past 11 federal elections, Labor and 
the Coalition have always received a lower level of primary voting support in 
the Senate than in House of Representatives seats. In comparison, the Australian 
Democrats—successful at winning Senate seats from 1977 to 2001—have 
consistently received a higher vote when contesting more winnable positions 
in the Senate (see Table 1.1). Despite the growing success of the Australian 
Greens in recent elections, both in the Senate and, in 2010, in the House of 
Representatives, Labor and the Coalition continue to garner more than 80 per 
10 The development of a two-party system originates from 1909, when the Protectionist Party merged with 
the Anti-Socialist Party, creating the Commonwealth Liberal Party, also known as the Fusion. The party (not 
to be confused with the current Australian Liberal Party) opposed the Labor Party. 
11 Percentages are national averages, therefore they under-represent Democrats support when the party 
did not stand candidates in all House of Representatives seats. An accurate example of increased voter 
support in the Senate can be seen in the 1998 figures, when the Democrats stood candidates in all House of 
Representatives seats.
12 This book sources its election data from official electoral commission publications and web sites, as well 
as the Australian Government and Politics Database (AGPD), based at the University of Western Australia. Due 
to the number of sources used, only the organisations are listed.
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cent of the House of Representatives vote. The only time that the two major 
parties’ combined vote has dropped below the 80 per cent mark in the past 30 
years was in 1998 (79.6 per cent), when Pauline Hanson’s One Nation was able to 
attract votes away from the Coalition, winning more than 8 per cent of the vote. 
The history of Australian electoral institutions indicates that path dependency 
plays a critical role in electoral design and, as a consequence, impacts 
significantly on the representative nature of the democracy. For example, the 
Northern Territory’s self-governing legislation—the Northern Territory (Self-
Government) Act 1978—stipulates single-member electorates for a unicameral 
assembly. As a result, there has been only one change of government in more 
than 35 years, with the government always having an assembly majority. 
While the NT Labor Government’s electoral reforms in 2004 were extensive, 
the Commonwealth legislation prevented it from considering changes to the 
single-member majoritarian voting system, demonstrating that electoral reform 
is restricted to a particular path. 
In comparison, the Australian Capital Territory’s voting system, which was 
designed less than 15 years after the Northern Territory’s first election under self-
government, is regulated by the Commonwealth’s Australian Capital Territory 
(Electoral) Act 1988. This Act specifies a proportional representation system 
for a unicameral assembly. In the 12 years from 1989 there were four changes 
of government (including two changes of government between elections). 
In addition, only one government has held an ACT Assembly majority since 
1989 (the 2005–08 Stanhope Labor Government). When the Australian Capital 
Territory considered electoral reform in the early 1990s, a referendum was held 
to determine voters’ preferences for single-member electorates or proportional 
representation, with two-thirds of electors supporting the latter. The original 
Commonwealth legislation had set the Australian Capital Territory on a path of 
proportional representation. The reasons for such different approaches to the 
voting system design for the two Territories can be found in the timing of the 
legislation—for the NT legislation, the Fraser Coalition Government had control 
of the Senate. For the ACT legislation, in contrast, the Hawke Labor Government 
had a Senate minority, and therefore needed to negotiate with the Australian 
Democrats—a minor party that benefited from proportional representation. 
These brief examples are indicative of the importance of path dependency in 
the evolution of electoral systems. 
The next two chapters look at the administrative structures for conducting 
Australian elections, including electoral commissions and parliamentary 
oversight committees, and the degrees of independence that Australian electoral 
commissions operate under. From Chapter 4 through to Chapter 10, a case study 
approach is taken in assessing reforms in several contentious areas of electoral 
law. Chapter 4 considers the voting franchise—for non-citizen permanent 
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residents (specifically, British subjects); and for prisoners. Chapter 5 assesses 
enrolment procedures, turnout and informal voting; combined, these three 
factors influence how many eligible Australians actually make a formal vote in 
elections. Chapter 6 looks at the various party registration regimes operating 
around Australia, and how these regimes impact on who contests elections. 
Three specific political finance issues are addressed in Chapter 7: public funding, 
donation disclosure regimes and the tax deductibility of political donations. 
The issue of malapportionment (vote-weighting) is analysed in Chapter 8, using 
the recent history of Western Australia’s move to ‘one vote, one value’ as the 
main study. Chapter 9 illustrates the ways in which the major political parties 
have been intricately involved in postal voting processes, and finally in Chapter 
10, issues relating to increasing the size of parliaments are discussed, using 
examples from the federal, Tasmanian and ACT jurisdictions. 
9
2. Australia’s Electoral Administration
The institutional structure of an electoral system provides the environment in 
which electoral laws are administered and amended. An understanding of this 
environment is necessary to evaluate the fairness of a system, in terms of both 
democratic behaviour and electoral outcomes. Australia’s electoral management 
bodies have an international reputation for their professional, non-partisan and 
independent performance. Yet how strongly entrenched are that integrity and 
independence? Is the reputation deserved? Australian electoral administrations 
are relatively similar in terms of structure and responsibility; however, their 
powers vary depending on their enacting legislation. In most cases the legislation 
also limits the ability of commissions to act independently in the interests of best 
electoral practice and in providing a level playing field for election participants. 
In addition to their regular interactions with the government of the day, as 
in negotiating budgets and liaising with the responsible minister, electoral 
commissions are subject to different levels of parliamentary oversight, in terms 
of inquiries into the conduct of elections and other electoral matters. 
Australian electoral management bodies
The origins of Australia’s professionalised and independent electoral 
administration lie in nineteenth-century colonial society, with a lack of strong 
local authorities or precedent, which enabled professional, efficient and non-
partisan electoral systems to develop. As Marian Sawer describes, administration 
was initially the responsibility of public servants working in a government 
department, with greater independence later being achieved through the use 
of statutory bodies, or ‘offices’, and finally with the removal of ministerial 
direction and the establishment of commissions.1
At the federal level, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) was established 
in 1984 by Section 4 of the Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act 
1983. The AEC replaced the Australian Electoral Office, a statutory authority 
founded in 1973. As former electoral commissioner Colin Hughes notes, although 
the 1983 legislation effectively removed the minister from the principal Act for 
all matters except the tabling of reports in parliament, the government retained 
control over budgetary and legislative matters.2 At the State and Territory levels, 
all electoral administrations are commissions. 
1 Marian Sawer. 2001. ‘Pacemakers for the World?’ In Elections: Full, Free and Fair, ed. M. Sawer. Sydney: 
The Federation Press.
2 Colin Hughes. 2001. ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity.’ In Elections: Full, Free and Fair, ed. M. Sawer. 
Sydney: The Federation Press, p. 156.
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There are strong relationships between electoral administrations at the federal, 
State and Territory levels, and innovations in the management of electoral 
systems are regularly disseminated between the jurisdictions. The commissions 
regularly assist each other in the conduct of elections by, for example, 
providing pre-polling facilities and specialist staff, and exchanging information 
on technological advances, such as electronic voting. The names of the nine 
Australian administrations, and the years the administrations were established 
as commissions, are provided in Table 2.1 
Table 2.1 Australia’s Electoral Management Bodies
Jurisdiction Electoral management body Commission established
Commonwealth Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) 1984
New South Wales New South Wales Electoral Commission (NSWEC) 2006
Victoria Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) 1995
Queensland Electoral Commission of Queensland (ECQ) 1992
Western Australia Western Australian Electoral Commission (WAEC) 1987
South Australia Electoral Commission of South Australia (ECSA) 2009
Tasmania Tasmanian Electoral Commission (TEC) 2005
Australian Capital 
Territory
Australian Capital Territory Electoral Commission 
(ACTEC)
1992
Northern Territory Northern Territory Electoral Commission (NTEC) 2004
NSW Election Funding Authority
Typically, the commission is the sole institution with responsibility for the 
conduct and administration of elections in their jurisdiction (except for the 
drawing of electoral boundaries, which is determined by a separate statutory 
body administered by the commission); however, whereas other jurisdictions 
entrust their commissions with the task of administering party registration, 
public funding and other political finance matters such as financial disclosure, 
New South Wales in 1981 established a separate authority under the Election 
Funding Act 1981 for these purposes. This is the three-member NSW Election 
Funding Authority. While the establishment of a separate agency for political 
finance purposes is not in itself a problem in terms of fairness, the membership 
of the authority is problematic. 
Briefly, one of the authority’s responsibilities is the administration of public 
funding to parties and candidates, including the provision of public funds 
for ‘electoral education’. New South Wales is unique in Australia in providing 
funds to the parties for the production and dissemination of information about 
policies and party-related work. This expenditure may be used exclusively for 
2 . Australia’s Electoral Administration
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providing services to party members, if the party chooses. Funding is calculated 
on the results at the previous general election, with six of the 16 parties that 
contested the 2007 election receiving funding based on their 2003 election 
results.  
The electoral commissioner sits as the chair of the authority, with the other 
two members nominated by the premier and the leader of the opposition. 
The current members are Kirk McKenzie, a lawyer and Labor branch president 
who was nominated by the Labor government, and Ted Pickering, a former 
Liberal parliamentarian and minister nominated by the then Opposition Leader, 
Barry O’Farrell. The ability of the two major parties to nominate members of 
the authority makes New South Wales the only Australian jurisdiction in which 
appointments to an electoral management body are made on a partisan basis. 
This appointment process impacts on perceptions of the independence of the 
NSW Electoral Commissioner, who is required to preside over this authority 
and yet is outnumbered by political appointees. 
The authority has the power to initiate legal proceedings against candidates 
who do not comply with the requirements of the Act. This places the authority’s 
two nominated members in a position of potentially starting action against their 
own party colleagues—a clear conflict of interest. It can be argued that having 
an independent chair holding the casting vote might prevent blatantly partisan 
decisions that favour one party over the other; however, there is also the 
capacity for the two party appointees to act in collusion, as a cartel operating 
against fairness principles and against the interests of other parties and election 
candidates. For example, the two party appointees could support each other 
to avoid actions against their party colleagues. The authority’s 2006–07 annual 
report lists (mostly local government) candidates against whom proceedings 
were initiated. Of 47 separate actions, 43 were against Independent candidates, 
with the remaining four candidates representing minor parties (the Unity Party 
and the Christian Democratic Party).3
The fact that no candidates from the appointees’ parties were subject to 
proceedings against them might simply indicate the report’s focus on the local 
government level, at which party campaigning is less overt, or that the parties’ 
candidates had all complied with the law. The perception of a lack of independence 
remains, however, due to the presence of political appointees. In 2008, the NSW 
Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding (SCEPPF), which 
included Labor and Liberal party representatives, recommended that partisan 
appointments should cease, to remove any perception of bias.4 
3 Election Funding Authority. 2007. Annual Report 2006–2007. Sydney: Election Funding Authority, 
pp. 13–15.
4 Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding. 2008a. Electoral and Political Party Funding in 
New South Wales. Report no. 1. Sydney: Legislative Council, New South Wales Parliament, p. 213.
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It would appear to be a simple exercise to incorporate the functions of the 
authority with those of the Electoral Commission, as in other jurisdictions. At 
an administrative level, this would be a seamless transition, as the authority 
is essentially subsumed by the commission in any case; the authority does not 
employ any staff, with the commission providing all staffing and administrative 
resources. The fact that the corporate plan for the commission and the 
authority is a joint document is another indicator of the symbiotic nature of 
the relationship. The closeness between the two institutions is highlighted 
by a comment from the Commissioner that ‘it was very unclear to me, when 
I came into the position of Electoral Commissioner, who was running and 
administering the Election Funding Authority provisions’. The Commissioner 
has, however, expressed opposition to the commission taking on the authority’s 
responsibilities, stating that ‘I do not think it would be in the public interest to 
have one person effectively dealing with all of this’.5 
One official, however, stated in an interview that it would not be a major 
problem to integrate the authority’s functions with those of the commission, at 
the same time overcoming the commissioner’s concern about having one person 
responsible for funding and disclosure issues: 
One of the things that in time might eventually happen is the Election 
Funding Authority would get subsumed into the actual commission, 
with probably some sort of similar model to what Queensland has, 
where you have an augmented commission when you’re dealing with 
the funding stuff. So you could have a nominee of the auditor-general 
and a nominee from somewhere else.
As the SCEPPF found, there is merit and support for removing partisan 
appointments, based on internationally accepted norms for electoral 
management and concepts of independence (discussed more fully in the next 
chapter). At present, neither the Labor nor the Liberal leadership has expressed 
a willingness to give up their right to nominate members of the authority. The 
possible integration of the authority with the commission is less contentious, 
because in its current form the authority is essentially administered by the 
commission. Despite the partisan appointments, no allegations of corruption 
or partisan bias have been made, but the concern remains that the principle of 
fairness is diminished by the perception of partisan behaviour. 
5 Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding. 2008b. Hearing Transcript, 3 March. Sydney: 
Legislative Council, New South Wales Parliament, p. 21. URL: <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/
parlment/committee.nsf/0/02C2B246F4664981CA2573D8000D1077>
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Parliamentary oversight of electoral matters
Parliaments are made up of election winners. As the beneficiaries of the 
electoral system, parliamentarians have a clear vested interest in maintaining 
(or changing to their own further advantage) a system from which they have 
benefited. Therefore, their parliamentary activity requires close scrutiny to 
determine whether their actions are based on principles of fairness or on their 
own self-interest and partisan considerations.
Table 2.2 Parliamentary Oversight Committees
Jurisdiction Committee established Committee name
Commonwealth 1983 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM, 
formerly the Joint Select Committee on Electoral 
Reform, 1983–87)
New South Wales 2004 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (NSW 
JSCEM)
Victoria 2007 Electoral Matters Committee 
Queensland 2011 Legal Affairs, Police, Corrective Services and 
Emergency Services Committee
2009 Law, Justice and Safety Committee
1990 Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review 
Committee (LCARC, formerly Parliamentary Committee 
for Electoral and Administrative Review)
Four Australian jurisdictions have parliamentary oversight committees with a 
distinct role in overseeing and inquiring into electoral systems and the conduct 
of elections (see Table 2.2). As the larger parliaments have more members to 
draw on for issue-specific committees, it is not surprising that the three largest 
jurisdictions (in terms of parliamentary size) have committees dedicated solely 
to electoral matters. These three jurisdictions are the Commonwealth, with 226 
parliamentarians (150 MPs, 76 Senators); New South Wales, with 135 (93 MLAs, 
42 MLCs); and Victoria, with 128 (88 MLAs, 40 MLCs). In Queensland (with 
a parliament of 89 members), currently the Legal Affairs, Police, Corrective 
Services and Emergency Services Committee (LAPCSESC) has responsibility for 
inquiring into electoral matters, among its many other portfolio responsibilities 
including justice and policing matters. 
The remaining jurisdictions, with parliaments ranging from 17 (Australian 
Capital Territory) to 95 (Western Australia) members, tend to use their legislative 
or other committees to conduct inquiries into electoral matters. The issue in 
question often determines to which committee such matters are referred in these 
jurisdictions. For example, the Australian Capital Territory’s Standing Committee 
on Legal Affairs (SCLA) inquired into possible changes to the overall size of the 
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assembly and electorate magnitude in 2002, while in 2006–07, the Standing 
Committee on Education, Training and Young People (SCETYP) inquired into a 
proposal to lower the voting age. In Western Australia, the Standing Committee 
on Legislation inquired into the Gallop Labor Government’s ‘one vote, one value’ 
legislation in 2001. The larger jurisdictions also send certain electoral matters to 
other standing committees. The following sections explain the inquiry activity 
of these committees, with a focus on partisan influences at work. Four standing 
committees with specific references for electoral matters are examined, as well as 
two examples of other committees that have received electoral matter referrals 
(a Commonwealth Senate standing committee and a NSW upper house select 
committee). 
Commonwealth
The oldest Australian electoral committee is the Commonwealth’s Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM), formerly the Joint Select Committee 
on Electoral Reform (JSCER). The Commonwealth committee has developed a 
substantial history of conducting inquiries, with a total of 37 reports published 
in the past 29 years (a list of the committee’s reports is provided in Appendix 
A). The committee’s main focus is inquiring into the conduct of each general 
election. Additionally, the committee conducts inquiries into specific electoral 
issues, such as levels of representation (1988 and 2003), the integrity of the 
electoral roll (2001 and 2002) and political finance issues (2006). 
The depth of the committee’s election inquiries has grown in the 25 years since 
its inception. The growth in the number of submissions it receives after each 
election is evidence of this increasing depth, with 129 submissions for the 1987 
election inquiry, increasing to 221 submissions following the 2004 election. As 
Colin Hughes notes, the JSCEM election inquiries, which include extensive 
public hearings after initial submissions have been received, is possibly the best 
existing form of scrutiny into the electoral system, adding transparency that 
is lacking elsewhere.6 Being a joint committee—that is, drawing on members 
from both houses of parliament—means that there is some representation 
available for minor parties, with the Australian Democrats having a member 
on the committee from the initial formation of JSCER in 1983 through to 2008. 
From July 2008, the Greens have provided the minor party/Independent 
representative. The membership of the committee is currently made up of five 
Labor, four Liberal and a Greens member; however, for the inquiry into the 
6 Colin Hughes. 2001. ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity’, pp. 153–4. 
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funding of political parties and election campaigns (current at late September 
2011), the membership has been enlarged to accommodate a Nationals member 
and an Independent representative (Tony Windsor). 
In interviews, members of the committee expressed the view that the regular 
election inquiries are very important to the overall administration and conduct 
of elections. One member noted:
You get a good spread of witnesses. You get good opportunities for 
scrutiny and debate around the circumstances of what’s occurred 
in an election. In respect of reports, you get issues pretty reasonably 
canvassed in the body of reports. The report normally gives you a pretty 
good account of what’s occurred, the points of differentiation.
Concerns were raised, however, that the committee operates on an extremely 
partisan basis that is largely unavoidable, as in this observation from a committee 
member:
People should have no doubt that it is the most political of committees, 
given the nature of what it’s looking at, and so its recommendations 
are invariably often political. Invariably you end up with dissenting 
reports, practically more than any other committee that I’m aware of. 
The government of the day has a significant influence on the outcome. 
An electoral administrator commented on the partisan nature of the committee, 
noting the difference in approach when the Howard Government had a Senate 
majority from 2005 to 2007:
It’s in an environment where the government has a majority in the Senate 
and that changes the dynamics greatly because there is less need to come 
to a compromise, because the government members feel they’ve got their 
senior colleagues behind them. They can go for broke. 
It is understandable that there would be a close relationship between an 
electoral matters committee and the elections administrator. The JSCEM holds 
regular (twice yearly) private hearings with the AEC. Although these hearings 
are recorded by Hansard, the transcripts are not released to the public; they are 
regarded as briefings and an opportunity to discuss the mechanics of electoral 
administration away from public scrutiny. The AEC also provides substantial 
submissions to JSCEM inquiries—for example, more than 1000 pages of 
information and comment were submitted following the 2004 and 2007 elections. 
Typically, the AEC’s submissions present data on the conduct of the election, as 
well as providing information and comment on specific electoral issues that have 
been raised through the media or might have been foreshadowed or requested 
by the committee. 
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The 2004 federal election inquiry: the Richmond 
result 
One example of the partisan nature of the JSCEM is contained in the inquiry into 
the 2004 federal election. The issue was the outcome in the Richmond electorate, 
where the sitting member, Nationals Minister Larry Anthony, was defeated by 
the Labor candidate by 301 votes—a margin of 0.19 per cent. Significantly 
in such a close contest, the Liberals for Forests candidate received 1417 votes 
(1.8 per cent). The 10-member committee, with five government members, 
including the Liberal Party chair (who resolves any tied vote), decided to 
investigate this outcome in Richmond. The investigation was based on complaints 
from The Nationals and the Liberal Party on election day that the design of the 
Liberals for Forests’ how-to-vote cards, which gave preferences to Labor ahead 
of The Nationals, misled voters into thinking that Liberals for Forests were 
connected to the Coalition parties.7 The AEC provided advice to both Coalition 
parties on election day, based on legal advice from the government solicitor, that 
a breach had not occurred. 
In July 2005 the committee held a public hearing in the electorate and used 
some of the evidence given to this hearing in its final report. There appeared to 
be a clear intention by Liberal members of the committee to gather evidence that 
the Liberals for Forests’ how-to-vote cards were deceptive. The leading nature 
of the questioning, and the subsequent report, is typified by the following 
exchanges at the hearing:
Senator BRANDIS (Liberal): In any event, there is no doubt in your mind 
that you are not alone in being misled—that there were a substantial 
number of other people misled in the same way as well.
Bronwyn Smith: That is right. 
In reference to this exchange, the committee report stated that ‘Ms Smith 
characterised the number of people who were misled as “substantial”’.8 Although 
Ms Smith agreed with the comment, she did not use the word ‘substantial’; this 
was suggested by the Liberal senator. 
Senator BRANDIS (Liberal): What was it? Tell us.
7 Section 329(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 states that ‘[a] person shall not, during the relevant 
period in relation to an election under this Act, print, publish or distribute, or cause, permit or authorize 
to be printed, published or distributed, any matter or thing that is likely to mislead or deceive an elector in 
relation to the casting of a vote’.
8 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2005. The 2004 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 119.
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Mrs Flower: It was a bogus party, set up to steer votes away from the 
National Party.
CHAIR (Liberal): To deceive people.
Mrs Flower: To deceive them. Although someone in the room has 
another theory. 
The report printed the majority of this exchange, except for the final sentence 
referring to another theory. The committee’s report found that ‘Ms Elliot [the 
Labor candidate] was elected as a result of preferences on the basis of deceptions 
by Liberals for Forests’. The Labor members of the committee, however, 
included a minority report, attacking the majority report for its ‘inflammatory 
allegations’, concluding that ‘the allegations made in the Majority Report are 
nothing more than a political stunt on behalf of the Coalition’. The regular 
insertion of minority reports in the JSCEM reports indicates the political nature 
of the committee. The report was subsequently referred to in parliamentary 
debates on the Howard Government’s 2006 electoral reforms, which included 
the deregistration of parties such as the Liberals for Forests. The investigation 
into the Richmond result demonstrates inherent partisan biases in the inquiry 
process and committee reporting. 
NSW Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters
The NSW Joint Standing Committee is a seven-member committee that was 
established in 2004. Its terms of reference require it to have a majority of 
government members. The current membership is made up of four government 
members (two Liberal, two Nationals), two Labor members and one Shooters and 
Fishers Party member. Like its federal counterpart, the committee is developing 
a practice of inquiring into general elections, having conducted inquiries into 
the 2003 and 2007 elections. It has also inquired into voter enrolment issues 
(partly in response to reforms at the federal level). Unlike its federal counterpart, 
however, the NSW committee has not developed a partisan culture of majority 
and minority reports. Nor does it appear to have a comparable level of public 
interest in its inquiries, with only 14 submissions received for its 2003 election 
inquiry, and 19 in 2007. Two days of hearings were held for each inquiry. 
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Victorian Electoral Matters Committee 
Victoria’s Electoral Matters Committee was formed in mid-2007 and completed 
an inquiry into the State’s November 2006 general election. The inquiry received 
28 submissions and held two days of hearings. Between 2008 and 2010 it also 
conducted four other inquiries—into: political donations and disclosure; voter 
participation and informal voting; misleading or deceptive electoral content; 
and the administration of voting centres. The committee is currently inquiring 
into the 2010 general election, for which it has received 19 submissions. The 
five-member committee has a government majority, with three Liberal and two 
Labor members. The other parties in parliament, The Nationals and Greens, do 
not have representation. 
Although it is difficult at this early stage of the committee’s work to determine 
a particular culture of reporting, its first report is encouraging. The 269-page 
report provides an extensive analysis of various aspects of the 2006 election, 
including enrolment procedures, party registration, electronic voting and ballot 
paper design. It is interesting to note the absence of dissenting (minority) reports 
and the fact that, of the report’s 72 recommendations, 56 are directed to the 
Victorian Electoral Commission, with only 11 recommending legislative action.9 
Two later inquiry reports included relatively minor dissenting reports. This 
might indicate an emphasis on administrative detail rather than electoral system 
reform, but could also allude to the greater powers that the Victorian Electoral 
Commissioner holds in comparison with his Commonwealth counterpart. 
Queensland’s various electoral-related 
committees 
Queensland has a history of including electoral matters inquiries in the ambit of 
a committee with other justice-related portfolios. About 1990, the Parliamentary 
Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review (PCEAR) was created, in 
response to the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. PCEAR quickly 
became the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee 
(LCARC), which was in place for almost two decades, before evolving into the 
Law, Justice and Safety Committee in 2009, and, from 2011, the Legal Affairs, 
Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Services Committee (LAPCSESC). 
These committees examine electoral matters as part of their remit to inquire into 
broader issues of a legal and constitutional nature, not all of which are related 
9 Electoral Matters Committee. 2008. Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2006 Victorian State Election and Matters 
Related Thereto: Report to Parliament Electoral Matters Committee. Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. 
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to the electoral system. This wider focus is likely a reflection of the smaller size 
of the Queensland Parliament compared with the above three examples, rather 
than a lack of interest in electoral matters. As LCARC is easily the longest-formed 
of these committees, the following paragraphs concentrate on its performance. 
Queensland’s LCARC was a seven-member committee, with a government 
majority and representatives of the other parties in parliament. LAPCSESC has 
six members: three from the Labor Government, two Liberal National Party 
members and one Independent. The intention to hold regular election inquiries 
is clearly evident in the case of the three largest jurisdictions; however, the 
situation for Queensland is not as clear. LCARC’s remit was centred on reform, 
with four areas of responsibility: administrative review reform, constitutional 
reform, electoral reform and legal reform. Of the 66 reports published since 
1996, only nine specifically dealt with electoral reform issues: truth in political 
advertising; electoral legislation; how-to-vote cards and appeal processes; 
electoral fraud; young people engaging with democracy; and Indigenous 
participation. 
Because LCARC was concerned with issues beyond electoral matters, it was 
difficult to establish regular election inquiries, with only one report on the 1998 
election (receiving 25 submissions). In August 2008, however, the committee 
announced an inquiry into ‘Certain Contemporary Electoral Matters’, with a 
focus on the 2004 and 2006 general elections. Unfortunately, this appears to 
have lapsed with the change in committee in 2009 and a revised focus on local 
government elections.
Among the Queensland committee members interviewed, there were different 
views on the merit of having an automatic reference to initiate an inquiry 
immediately following each general election. One position was that a regular 
inquiry was necessary and this was best done as soon as possible after an 
election while issues remained fresh. It was also stated that the committee 
should not necessarily wait for a request from the attorney-general before an 
inquiry commenced—that ‘an inquiry immediately after an election should be 
a standing order’. An alternative view was that, as the committee dealt with 
other issues as well as electoral matters, a regular election inquiry would take 
up too much time and resources. This committee member also supported the 
incorporation of electoral matters into constitutional and legal issues based on 
the broader concepts of democracy and representation.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
20
Senate finance and public administration 
standing committees10
The committees discussed above have an ongoing responsibility to inquire into 
electoral matters. Other committees receive inquiry referrals on a ‘case-by-case’ 
basis. For example, the Commonwealth Electoral and Referendum Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2006 was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Finance 
and Public Administration in December 2006. The Bill was consequential to the 
major electoral reforms of the Howard Government, which had been passed 
earlier in 2006, and many of the amendments were considered to be ‘machinery’ 
in nature. The inquiry took just more than two months, received only three 
submissions (from the AEC, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission and the Department of Defence) and did not hold any public 
hearings. The eight-member committee delivered a unanimous 14-page report 
recommending that the Bill be supported in its entirety. 
In contrast, earlier in 2006 the Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Legislation Committee considered the highly contentious major Howard 
Government reforms. The inquiry received 53 submissions, held a day of 
hearings and was completed within an intensive seven-week period. Despite 
numerous concerns being raised in submissions and hearings, the report 
essentially rubber-stamped the government legislation, making only one 
recommendation—that the legislation be passed without amendment. Almost 
half of the 92-page report consisted of dissenting reports written by the Labor 
and Democrats members of the committee. These two examples of committee 
work demonstrate the diversity that can exist in the inquiry process. The latter 
example indicates that where partisan interests are at stake, an inquiry will 
more readily split on party lines instead of seeking a common view consistent 
with fairness principles and accepted norms for electoral management.
NSW Select Committee on Electoral and 
Political Party Funding
Political imperatives obviously play a role in how parliaments choose to 
inquire into electoral matters. A good example of this occurred in the NSW 
Parliament in mid-2007. Despite New South Wales having a dedicated electoral 
matters committee, the legislative council established a select committee, the 
10 Due to a restructure of Senate committees in 2006—combining legislation and reference committees into 
one committee—the two committees referred to in this section have different names but are essentially the 
same committee.
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Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding (SCEPPF), to inquire 
into political finance and public funding issues. The political manoeuvring 
involved in establishing the committee, and later in determining the committee 
membership, is obvious from the Hansard transcripts. 
The motion to establish the committee was debated on 27 June 2007, with 
the mover, Liberal Don Harwin, arguing that a select committee was a better 
option than the already established NSW JSCEM, as he envisaged ‘looking 
over the horizon and looking at policy issues…[not] getting bogged down in 
the administrative minutiae of particular elections, particular donations and 
particular items of expenditure’.11 Although the intention might have been 
genuine, the result was that by using an upper house committee the Labor 
government would not have a majority, as was the case on the NSW JSCEM. By 
winning support from other right-of-centre parties, the Liberal Party was also 
able to pass their motion to set up a committee ahead of another motion from the 
Greens, who sought to establish a similar (but joint house) inquiry. 
The committee membership was determined three months later, with agreement 
that there would be two Labor government members, two Coalition opposition 
members and two crossbench members. In what was obviously further 
manoeuvring by the parties, however, the council had to vote to appoint two of 
the three crossbench members who nominated from the Shooters Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDP), with the Greens candidate, Lee Rhiannon, 
losing out. As the Shooters Party and CDP are considered right-of-centre 
parties, this outcome could be perceived as being part of an agreement made to 
establish the committee. A positive aspect of the outcome, however, was that 
five parties were represented on the six-member committee, providing broader 
representation of minor parties compared with a joint house committee. 
The committee carried out a nine-month inquiry, receiving 189 submissions 
and conducting five days of public hearings. When compared with the NSW 
JSCEM’s 2003 and 2007 election inquiries, the SCEPPF attracted far greater 
public interest and media attention. It tabled an extensive 276-page report on 
19 June 2008, with 47 recommendations, including a $1000 limit on the size 
of donations, a cap on campaign expenditure and increasing the frequency of 
donation disclosures to every six months (currently every four years). There 
was general consensus on the recommendations, with only one brief dissenting 
report from the two Labor members, opposing one recommendation and 
suggesting a minor change to one other. 
The inquiry was, however, overtaken by revelations from the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption that Labor Party members had been involved 
11 D. Harwin. 2007. ‘Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding: Establishment.’ Hansard, 27 
June. Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, p. 1807. URL: <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au> 
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
22
in corruption at the local government level, with political donations from 
developers a critical factor (the ‘Wollongong scandal’). This created a major crisis 
for the government. In February 2008, Premier Morris Iemma announced the 
government’s intention to reform political finance legislation. The government 
introduced a Bill the day before the SCEPPF tabled its report. Among other 
changes, the legislation introduced six-monthly donation disclosures, with 
a disclosure threshold of $1000. The Bill was passed the following week, 
progressing through both houses in less than 24 hours. 
In terms of being an impetus for reform, the committee report, while substantial 
in its considerations and findings, was secondary to the media exposure of 
political finance issues and the willingness of the incumbent governing party to 
initiate reforms. The committee did not have a Labor majority, and the Iemma 
Labor Government chose to pursue a separate process of reforming electoral 
laws. There are, however, many issues raised by the SCEPPF inquiry that were 
not addressed by the government’s reform Bill, and the report remains useful as 
a potential driver of future reforms. 
The conduct of regular parliamentary inquiries also provides opportunities and 
forums for other organisations to make submissions based on their constituent 
concerns. For example, there were at least four submissions to JSCEM’s 2004 
federal election inquiry from organisations representing the interests of blind 
and vision-impaired citizens. All of these submissions advocated the use of 
electronic voting—an important advance when considering the secrecy of the 
ballot.12 The JSCEM’s report recommended an electronic voting trial at the 
2007 election, which was then conducted by the AEC. The trial had limited 
success, with only 850 vision-impaired and blind voters choosing to vote 
this way, at an administrative cost of $2597 per vote. As the AEC has noted, 
however, consideration must be given to the value of all voters having a secret 
and independent vote, and it has recommended that the trial be extended at the 
next election.13
Religious groups also use the inquiry process to reaffirm their positions. A good 
example is contained in the submission from the Association of Australian 
Christadelphian Ecclesia to the 2004 federal election inquiry, which reasserts 
the group’s conscientious objection to voting.14 At a brief hearing in July 2005, 
the association expressed satisfaction that its members were able to formally 
express their conscientious objection to voting, in response to letters from the 
AEC asking to explain their failure to vote. Interestingly, one Liberal senator 
cited the situation of the group’s members as an argument for the reintroduction 
12 Submissions 54, 101, 135 and 138. Without electronic voting, blind and vision-impaired citizens must 
rely on other people to assist them to vote and therefore cannot exercise a secret ballot.
13 Submission 169.
14 Submission No. 27, at <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/ committee/em/elect04/subs/sub027.pdf>
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of voluntary voting.15 Collectively, these contributions from civil society 
organisations are valuable instances of democratic engagement based on the 
principle of equal opportunity to participate. As previously discussed, however, 
the value of inquiries in this respect is tempered by the influence of partisan 
interests on inquiry outcomes.
The value of parliamentary committees on 
electoral matters
Australia’s electoral institutional structure is strongly focused on parliamentary 
activity, both in legislating for the administrative and operational regimes in 
which the electoral commissions operate and in creating forums for public 
debate on electoral matters. The legislative focus is not surprising, given that 
Australian parliaments and governments use legislation to maintain a tight 
control on the form of electoral systems and administration of elections. In this 
environment, the parliamentary committee inquiry process is a critical element 
of the institutional structure of Australian electoral systems. In the absence 
of independent agencies with the powers to implement reforms, committee 
inquiries have become the primary forum for public debate on electoral matters. 
Inquiries provide a conduit through which electoral commissions and citizens 
can reach the electoral lawmakers. Because the submissions are made publicly 
available on committee web sites, a wealth of information is disseminated to 
interested groups, media attention is raised and the wider public becomes aware 
of electoral issues. 
The governing party has a membership majority on all of the electoral matters 
committees, followed by representation from the opposition and typically 
one member representing minor-party interests. It is a concern, however, 
that the Victorian committee has only Labor and Liberal Party members, 
with no representation from the other three parliamentary parties. While the 
membership of these committees is generally representative of the composition 
of the respective parliaments, it does raise questions about the usefulness of the 
committee process and the outputs of the committees. By reflecting the make-
up of the parliaments, the committees simply reinforce any disproportionality 
or bias that is created by election outcomes. In doing so, they create a 
significant incumbency advantage—primarily for the incumbent government 
over the opposition and minor parties, but also for parties with parliamentary 
representation over non-parliamentary parties (reinforcing the hierarchy of 
incumbency structure depicted in Chapter 1). 
15 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2005. Official Committee Hansard, Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters, Wednesday 6 July, Brisbane. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 34.
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Governments’ dominance of these committees runs counter to the participation 
principle of fairness, which stresses equality of opportunity. While it is not 
feasible or necessarily ideal for all parties to have equal representation, an 
improvement on current structures consistent with the participation principle 
would be to have an equal number of government and non-government members 
on these committees. In regard to issues-specific committees, the establishment 
of the non-government-dominated SCEPPF in New South Wales is a good 
example of partisan interests at work. Although the SCEPPF membership was 
reflective of party numbers in that State’s upper house (albeit with minor parties 
over-represented), the debate over membership between parties is indicative of 
the importance that parties place on being involved in electoral matters that 
directly impact on their own future prospects.
Several committee members commented in the interviews that electoral matters 
committees are extremely partisan and are primarily a means for furthering 
parties’ interests rather than assessing the need for reform on the basis of fairness 
and equity consistent with international standards for electoral management and 
fair elections. It can be argued that much of the committees’ work is of limited 
value, as members are simply pursuing a predetermined policy agenda. This 
is particularly evident with the Commonwealth JSCEM, given its long history 
of reporting and with dissenting reports a common occurrence. While there 
are some encouraging signs of bipartisan cooperation occurring within State-
based committees, it must be remembered that all of the parliamentary oversight 
committees are dominated by Labor and the Coalition parties. Cooperation can 
be a sign of party cartelisation rather than working towards democratic values 
of fairness and equity. 
Benefits that flow from the advocacy of representative organisations, such as 
the trial of electronic voting, are indicative of the value of these consultative 
processes. There is also clear evidence, however, that submissions (and not 
only those from political parties) are used to seek partisan advantage. It is 
disappointing that all of these contributions, irrespective of motive, are often 
reduced to arguments for committee members to pursue their own partisan 
objectives in committee reports and dissenting statements. 
The experiences suggest that, on principles of fairness, a more appropriate 
process for inquiry into electoral issues could be the creation of a forum 
outside parliament that involves a broader range of political parties, electoral 
administrators, civil society organisations and other electoral experts, with 
processes and reporting not under the control of government or other 
parliamentary parties. Such a forum could be influential as a driver for electoral 
reform. Given that parliaments have the power to regulate almost every aspect 
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of elections and electoral administration, the recommendations of such a forum 
would, however, ultimately be subject to the wishes of governing parties and 
party cartels. 
With its partisan appointments, the NSW Election Funding Authority is an 
anomaly in the institutional structure of Australian electoral management. 
There appears to be no evidence of corruption or serious practical problems 
created by these appointments in the administration of funding, or in 
initiating proceedings against non-compliant candidates. With these political 
appointments in place, however, a perception of bias in the authority is created, 
and this could impact negatively in the future on the perceived independence 
of the NSW Electoral Commission and Commissioner. A simple solution would 
be to replace the partisan appointees with suitably qualified experts who have 
no party connections. 
Despite the strong governing-party control of electoral legislation, commissions 
have been established in all Australian jurisdictions to administer the electoral 
system ‘independently’ of government. The next chapter examines to what 
degree commissions are able to exercise that independence. 
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3. The Independence of Australian 
Electoral Commissions
In the literature on electoral system management it is widely accepted that, to 
ensure free and fair elections, electoral management bodies should be independent 
both of the government of the day and of any political partisan connections.1 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA) argues that legitimacy is enhanced if electoral authorities are perceived 
to be impartial and not subject to political interference or control, the argument 
being that election results are more likely to be accepted by the electorate if 
there is a strong perception of independence, irrespective of any basic measures 
of independence.2 Orr et al. identify electoral authority independence as being 
the single most important factor in ensuring free elections.3 
Models of independence
The Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral Knowledge Network 
distinguishes two different dimensions of independence. First, ACE identifies 
‘structural’ independence, in which the electoral management body is formally 
separated from the executive branch of government through constitutional or 
legislative mechanisms. Second, there is ‘fearless’ or ‘behavioural’ independence, 
which is a ‘normative independence of decision and action’ that does not allow 
government, political or partisan influences to alter behaviour or actions.4 ACE 
goes on to point out that while the two concepts of independence are linked, 
structural independence does not provide any assurance that an electoral 
management body will act as a fearlessly independent organisation. 
Different strategies can achieve such independence. In some countries, partisan 
balance is sought by allowing various parties to make appointments to electoral 
bodies. In other countries responsibility for electoral management is delegated 
1 Paul Dacey. 2005. ‘What Do “Impartiality”, “Independence” and “Transparency” Mean?—Some 
Thoughts from Australia.’ Paper delivered at the Improving the Quality of Election Management Conference 
of Commonwealth Chief Election Officers, New Delhi, India, p. 1.
2 Alan Wall et al. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook, p. 71. 
3 Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio and George Williams. 2003. ‘Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake.’ Election 
Law Journal 2(3): 399.
4 ACE [Administration and Cost of Elections] Electoral Knowledge Network. 2007. EMB Independence and 
the Origin of Independent Election Administrations. URL: <http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/
questions/replies/156664001>
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to a non-partisan body. Both of these strategies are used by governing and 
opposition parties as ‘structures of mutual constraint’ to achieve a neutral 
bureaucracy.5 
In Australia, delegation to a non-partisan body has been the typical method. The 
level of bipartisanship achieved in delegating control to a non-partisan public 
service bureaucracy has, however, been influenced by the degree of control the 
ruling party wishes to maintain over the electoral legislation, especially when 
the government has a parliamentary majority. One example of the control that 
governing parties can exert over electoral management is contained in Section 
90B of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. This section, which runs for 10 
pages, provides parliamentarians and registered political parties with privileged 
access to rolls and voting information, including identifying the polling booth 
where individual voters lodge their vote.
Rafael López-Pintor draws on the work of Garber6 and Harris7 to describe four 
approaches to organising electoral management bodies: a governmental approach, 
with elections conducted by civil (public) servants; a judicial approach, in 
which judges are appointed to administer the election; a multi-party approach, 
where the electoral body is composed of party representatives; and an expert 
approach, in which political parties, by consensus, delegate responsibility to a 
group of experienced individuals with a reputation for independence.8 
In another typology, Massicotte et al. identify three approaches to establishing 
electoral authorities. Their analysis focuses on who is appointed as the person 
responsible for making decisions about election administration.9 In their 
model, they differentiate between: the appointment of multiple commissioners 
to represent a diversity of (usually political) views; the practice of allowing a 
government minister to be in charge of the electoral process; and the appointment 
of a single commissioner. It is the last of these that is favoured in Australia.
As previously mentioned, Australia has a long history of professional electoral 
management bodies that administer elections in a relatively fair and non-
partisan manner. While each electoral commission is a statutory body under 
5 Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler. 2002. ‘The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance—An 
Introduction.’ International Political Science Review 23(1): 16.
6 Larry Garber. 1994. ‘Election Commissions: Responsibilities and Composition.’ Paper presented at the 
NDI-sponsored African Election Colloquium, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
7 Paul Harris. 1997. ‘An Electoral Administration: Who, What and Where.’ Paper prepared at IDEA for the 
South Pacific Electoral Administrators’ Conference, Fiji, October.
8 Rafael López-Pintor. 2000. Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance. New York: Bureau 
for Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme, p. 20.
9 Louis Massicotte, André Blais and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2004. Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election 
Laws in Democracies. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 83.
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the relevant legislation in its jurisdiction, the same legislation can also limit its 
ability to act independently and its capacity to provide a level playing field for 
participants in elections. 
Table 3.1 IDEA’s Model of Independent Electoral Management Bodies 
Aspect Independent electoral management body
Institutional arrangement Is institutionally independent of the executive branch of 
government
Implementation Exercises full responsibility for implementation
Formal accountability Does not report to executive branch of government but with 
very few exceptions is formally accountable to the legislature, 
judiciary or head of state
Powers Has powers to develop the electoral regulatory framework 
independently under the law
Composition Is composed of members who are outside the executive 
branch while in office
Term of office Offers security of tenure, but not necessarily fixed term of 
office
Budget Has and manages its own budget independently of day-to-day 
governmental control
Source: Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas, Joram Rukambe and Sara Staino. 2006. 
Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA, 9.
In research conducted for IDEA, Wall et al. identify three models of electoral 
authority. These models are sorted according to a range of criteria: institutional 
arrangements; implementation; accountability; powers; composition; security 
of tenure; and budget control (see Table 3.1). Briefly, the three models are: 
independent (being institutionally independent from the executive); government 
(within or under the direction of a minister and department); and mixed (a 
combination of the first two models, with a degree of institutional independence, 
but still within the direction and control of the government of the day). 
While IDEA identifies the Australian system as an example of the independent 
model, there is one important criterion that the AEC and other Australian 
commissions do not meet—namely, having the power to independently develop 
the electoral regulatory framework. In Australia, this power resides with the 
parliament and government of the day and is critical in limiting the commissions’ 
ability to operate independently. In this respect, Australian electoral authorities 
conform more to IDEA’s government or mixed models. As discussed later in 
the chapter, it is also questionable whether Australian commissions meet the 
independence criterion of having the ability to manage their budgets without 
day-to-day government control.
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The term ‘independence’ is often used interchangeably with ‘neutrality’, 
‘non-partisanship’ and ‘impartiality’; however, there are differences between 
the meanings of these terms. An electoral authority may be established as an 
independent body, but exhibit bias through partisan actions. Conversely, an 
authority that is not independent—for example, one that is an office entirely 
within a government department—might operate in a non-partisan and impartial 
manner due to a lack of partisan direction from the responsible minister and the 
neutrality of its public service bureaucracy. Paul Dacey argues that the AEC 
was created with the intention that it would be both independent (that is, not 
influenced by others and thinking for itself) and impartial (without allegiance 
or obligation to any political parties, candidates or other political players).10 
It cannot, however, be argued that the commission functions in a totally non-
partisan manner, as it is constrained by the legislative environment in which it 
is required to operate. 
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that electoral authorities should not only 
be independent and impartial, they should also not allow for any perception 
of dependence or partiality to occur. To this end, IDEA identifies five essential 
criteria for ethical electoral administration: respect for the law; non-partisanship 
and neutrality; transparency; accuracy; and service to voters. Under the ethical 
principle of non-partisanship and neutrality, it is the perception of neutrality 
that is seen as the critical factor in successful elections. IDEA argues that one way 
to maintain neutrality is for electoral administrators to refrain from expressing 
any view that could become a political issue in an election. When the electoral 
system, or a component of it, becomes an election issue, administrators can, 
however, be caught between the two options of remaining silent on a matter, in 
a way that might advantage a particular party or parties, or expressing a view 
that is based on the principle of electoral fairness for voters, but which might go 
against government policy. One commissioner expressed a preference to remain 
silent, as a way of both appeasing the government and not becoming a political 
pawn for the opposition. 
A different view, at least in the context of the Australian Commonwealth 
system, is given by Dacey, who argues that Section 7(1) of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 places the commission at the centre of political debates on 
electoral matters. Through this section, the commission is required to promote 
public awareness, provide advice to parliament and conduct and publish 
research. Dacey argues that, to maintain independence, the commission should 
comment from the viewpoint of improving the quality of the electoral process.11 
10 Paul Dacey. 2005. ‘What Do “Impartiality”, “Independence” and “Transparency” Mean?—Some Thoughts 
from Australia’, pp. 2–3.
11 Paul Dacey. 2005. ‘What Do “Impartiality”, “Independence” and “Transparency” Mean?—Some Thoughts 
from Australia’, p. 6.
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Dacey is a long-time senior administrator in the AEC, and his view is from 
the perspective of electoral professionalism, in which best electoral practice is 
seen as taking precedence over any partisan impacts that such practices might 
have. For example, independent commissions may aim to maximise both the 
comprehensiveness and the accuracy of the electoral roll. There could, however, 
be considerable tension between these dual goals. Improving the accuracy of 
the roll might occur at the expense of its comprehensiveness and, importantly, 
this could have partisan impacts whereby some groups of voters, who are more 
inclined to support certain parties, can become disenfranchised. 
In terms of independence, another aspect of electoral administration that 
has been debated in recent years is whether electoral commissions should be 
involved in policing ‘truth in political advertising’ legislation. Currently South 
Australia is the only jurisdiction with such legislation, which requires the 
electoral commissioner to initiate proceedings in cases of false and misleading 
advertising.12 One electoral administrator explained the impact on independence 
this way: 
If the commissioner then takes prosecutorial activity against MPs and 
candidates—does he prosecute if his job comes up in two years’ time, 
and the party has just won government, does he prosecute or not? It’s 
the ‘without fear and favour’ stuff. How can you act without fear and 
favour if you’re worried about your tenure?
An Australian Democrats proposal to replicate this power in the AEC for federal 
elections was opposed by the AEC on the basis that such powers would impact 
on the commission’s independence and ‘reputation for political neutrality’.13 
In its submission to a parliamentary inquiry, the AEC argued that if it had 
responsibility for monitoring advertising it would be accused of partisanship. 
As an alternative, it proposed that an ‘electoral complaints authority’, resourced 
by staff from other agencies including the AEC, be established for election 
campaign periods. In the same inquiry, however, the SA Commissioner stated 
that he ‘welcomed measures that reinforce the probity of the electoral and 
political systems’.14 The reluctance of the AEC to take on this role is a typical 
example of the tension that can exist in electoral administration—in this case, 
between voters being able to make an informed decision based on truthful 
information and having confidence that the election is being conducted by an 
independent and non-partisan authority. 
12 Section 113, Electoral Act 1985 (SA).
13 AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2001. Submission to the Senate Public Finance and Administration 
Inquiry into Bills Concerning Political Honesty and Accountability. Submission no. 14. Canberra: Australian 
Electoral Commission, p. 2.
14 Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee. 2002. Charter of Political Honesty Bill 
2000. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, pp. 89–90.
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Based on the models of independence described above and an examination 
of legislation, eight factors have been identified as being pertinent to the 
independence of Australian commissions. These are: commissioner experience; 
the size of commissions; appointment processes; political affiliations; length of 
tenure; security of tenure; reporting mechanisms; and budget processes. The 
following sections analyse these factors for their impact on the fairness and 
independence of electoral administration. 
Commissioner experience
Commissioner experience has not typically been included as a factor in models 
of electoral authority independence. It is clear from the Australian experience, 
however, that a group of electoral professionals exists for whom electoral 
administration is a lifetime career. In this environment, working to professional 
standards rather than to political or management direction is an important 
component of a culture of independence. A commissioner’s previous experience 
in electoral administration prior to appointment can impact on his or her ability 
to act in an independent manner. Generally Australian commissioners have 
each established a lengthy professional career based on the application of non-
partisan principles of fair elections (see Table 3.2). Of the nine commissioners, 
only one, Ed Killesteyn, came into the position with no previous electoral 
experience. Killesteyn’s professional background lies in senior public service 
administration, including time as a departmental deputy secretary and deputy 
president of the Repatriation Commission. This is the same career path followed 
by Killesteyn’s predecessor, Ian Campbell, whose lack of electoral experience 
was a concern for one observer:
I think he’s misunderstood his position to a degree. That is, he’s 
emphasised more the public servant role and the implementation of 
government policy due to his background, rather than his independence 
and guardianship of the system role, which is his as a statutory office 
holder.
The appointments of Campbell and Killesteyn have prompted some discussion 
among electoral administrators about the pros and cons of having the senior 
position held by a person with no previous electoral experience. While it is 
obviously beneficial for a commissioner to have previous electoral administration 
experience, good public administrators will ensure they draw on the experience 
they might be lacking themselves from within (and outside) their commissions. 
Another view, from a commissioner with a defence force background, is that 
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electoral administration is simply logistics and ‘significant event management’, 
and is similar to organising a military operation. In the same way that you cannot 
be a day late going into battle, you cannot be a day late in running an election. 
While commissioners’ previous electoral experience can and does have an 
impact on the independence exhibited by commissions, it is not included in 
the framework analysis of the independence of electoral administration. This is 
due to the transient nature of this factor. It is suggested that future comparative 
work on electoral management bodies should take into consideration the variable 
of professional versus generalist appointments to determine its relevance to 
independence.
Table 3.2 Electoral Experience of Current Australian Electoral 
Commissioners (as at 1 December 2011) 






Commonwealth Ed Killesteyn 2008 Nil Nil
New South Wales Colin Barry 2004 16 years Electoral Commissioner, 
Victoria
Victoria Steve Tully 2005 17 years Electoral Commissioner, 
South Australia 
(1997–2005)
Queensland David Kerslake 2006 4 years Assistant 
Commissioner, 
Industrial Elections, and 
Funding and Disclosure 
AEC (4 years)
Western Australia Warwick Gately 2006 3 years Deputy Commissioner 
(8 months), Acting 
Commissioner (2 years)
South Australia Kay Mousley 2006 20+ years Various—finally 
Director of Operations, 
AEC (South Australia)
Tasmania Julian Type 2011 25 years Commenced with AEC, 
international experience 
with United Nations, 




Phillip Green 1994 13 years Australian Electoral 
Office (then AEC), from 
1982 
Northern Territory Bill Shepheard 2005 26 years WAEC (7 years), 
Australian Electoral 
Office (then AEC)  
(c . 17 years)
NT Electoral Office  
(2 years)
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The size of commissions 
The number of commissioners to be appointed to commissions has not been a 
contentious issue in Australian electoral management. All jurisdictions operate 
with a single commissioner appointed in a full-time capacity as the chief 
executive officer of the organisation. In three jurisdictions—the Commonwealth, 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory—two other commissioners are 
appointed on a permanent part-time basis, and tend to be drawn from the legal 
profession (a senior judge) and the senior public service (usually with expertise 
in statistics and demographics). In the remaining jurisdictions, additional 
commissioners are appointed to a separate body when there is a need to conduct 
a redistribution of electoral boundaries. For the purposes of this study, unless 
otherwise specified, a reference to a ‘commissioner’ refers to the commissioner 
appointed as the full-time chief executive officer of the organisation. 
Current commissioners have differing views on the merits of having a single 
commissioner, as against a multi-member board commission. Some prefer 
autonomous decision making but there is also support for collaborative and 
consultative management. A preference for the latter was expressed in the 
following terms by a commissioner:
A commission can stand as three people and as a body, and it’s not like 
you’ve personally had any biased personal opinion. It’s not just me 
thinking this way because of any biases. This body of three people sat 
down and deliberated and decided this. What my personal views are, 
who knows. It gives it that air of independence.
Generally, there was agreement among commissioners that the size of the 
commission did not have an impact on the independent conduct of commission 
work and that an ideal model for the size of a commission depended on each 
commissioner’s personal preference. 
Commissioner selection and appointment 
processes
Clearly, the independence of an electoral management body is closely related to 
the method of appointment of its chief executive officer. Where the government 
controls appointment processes it might be difficult to sustain confidence in 
the impartiality of the process. Four general methods of appointment exist 
in Australia (see Table 3.3). In order of increasing accountability, they can be 
listed as follows. The first is appointment by the governor or governor-general, 
on the recommendation of the government of the day. This process is used 
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in the three largest jurisdictions, the Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
Victoria, where the entire selection and appointment process remains within 
the government’s control and oversight. A second type of process is used in 
the remaining six jurisdictions, which require consultation with other political 
parties represented in parliament. The third method, used in Queensland and 
South Australia, requires consultation with a parliamentary committee prior 
to the ratification of an appointment. Finally, the SA legislation also requires a 
resolution from both houses of parliament before the governor can appoint the 
electoral commissioner. 
Table 3.3 Appointment Processes for Australian Electoral Commissioners15
Jurisdiction Appointment process (section of principal legislation)
Commonwealth Governor-general appoints (s . 21)
New South Wales Governor appoints (s . 21AA)
Victoria Governor appoints (s . 12)
Queensland Governor in council appoints . The position is advertised nationally and 
the process includes consultation with all leaders of parliamentary 
parties and with parliamentary committee (s . 23) 
Western Australia Governor appoints, on recommendation of the premier, who is 
required to consult with parliamentary party leaders (s . 5B)
South Australia Governor appoints, on recommendation from both houses of 
parliament (s . 5)
Tasmania Governor appoints, on recommendation of the premier, who is 
required to consult with parliamentary party leaders and the president 
of the legislative council (s . 8)
Australian Capital 
Territory
Executive appoints . Consultation with leaders of all parties and 
Independents required . Appointment is disallowable (s . 22)
Northern Territory Administrator (equivalent to a governor) appoints, on recommendation 
of the chief minister, who is required to consult with parliamentary 
party leaders and Independents (s . 314)
In the three jurisdictions not requiring consultation, there is a danger that 
appointments might be perceived as partisan. One example of this was the 
Howard Government’s appointment of Ian Campbell as commissioner in 2005. 
One of Campbell’s initial tasks was to advise on the significant reforms being 
proposed by the government at the time, and to manage their implementation 
once they were passed in 2006. On one particular reform—earlier closing of the 
roll—Campbell made comments to a parliamentary inquiry that went against 
the long-held AEC position and were seen to be bowing to the wishes of the 
government.16 
In February 2008, the Rudd Labor Government announced a transparent 
and merit-based selection process for senior public servants, which involves 
15 References to section numbers in tables in this chapter relate to each jurisdiction’s primary legislation.
16 This issue is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
36
public advertising and involvement by the public service commissioner. This 
is, however, an administrative move, and there remains no requirement for 
the government to consult with other parties prior to appointing an electoral 
commissioner. 
Appointment by the government of the day, without reference to other parties, 
leaves such appointees open to claims of bias and partisanship. Typical was 
one comment that the commissioner’s ‘appointment allegedly had the Prime 
Minister’s tentacles all over it’.
Such allegations have accompanied both Labor and Coalition appointments. 
For example, former Tasmanian Liberal MP Michael Hodgman’s seat of Denison 
became more marginal in the 1980s due to a boundary redistribution. In a 2007 
interview, Hodgman remained critical of the treatment he received from Labor-
appointed Commissioner Colin Hughes, who was a member of the Redistribution 
Committee: 
I went along to that review expecting a fair hearing, and I walked out 
and they said, ‘How do you think you’ve gone?’ I said…‘My appeal’s 
going to be dismissed, absolutely…I’ve not had a fair hearing.’ I know 
I was causing [Prime Minister Bob] Hawke a lot of pain and angst, and 
I reckon he said to [Labor Special Minister of State Mick] Young, ‘Get 
rid of Hodgman’, and Young said, ‘The way to do that is change the 
boundaries.’
Labor perspectives on Coalition-appointed commissioners are similarly 
sceptical—a typical comment being that ‘he was seen to be partisan, being a 
particularly good mate of [the minister]’.
A clear majority of comments from politicians, however, emphasised the 
importance of maintaining perceived and actual non-partisanship. Commissioners 
were seen, almost universally, as honest and incorruptible, but concerns were 
frequently raised that if appointments were made without consultation, the 
subsequent decisions of those commissioners would be open to arguments 
that the appointment was partisan in nature. This was particularly the case 
where commissioners’ decisions resulted in measurable partisan advantages or 
detriments.
The requirement to consult
The requirement of consultation with other parties means it is less likely that a 
person with perceived partisan views will be appointed; however, while there 
is a requirement in six jurisdictions for some form of consultation to take place, 
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there is no requirement, except in South Australia (and to a lesser degree in the 
Australian Capital Territory), for the government to genuinely take the views of 
the other parties into account. One State minister stated that the premier was 
alleged to have said to the other parties that ‘we’re going to appoint so-and-so; 
you have now been consulted’.
In the case of the Australian Capital Territory, however, commissioner 
appointments are disallowable instruments. This means that a government 
without a majority in the legislative assembly may be exposed to the possibility 
of its appointment being rejected in a very public manner. It also means that 
an opposition that does have concerns about an appointment needs to decide 
whether such concerns warrant moving a disallowance motion. Although the 
ability to disallow an appointment is theoretically a safeguard mechanism that 
allows non-government parties a voice in the appointment process, it is a blunt 
instrument that is not likely to be used in practice. It would only be effective 
when opposition parties have the numbers in parliament and, irrespective of the 
outcome, moving such a motion in itself would call into question the office of 
commissioner. If a motion was successful, it would result in the commissioner 
being removed from office, damaging the public image of the office and labelling 
that person as partisan, without that person having a right to defend himself 
or herself. If a disallowance motion was unsuccessful, however, it would place 
the commissioner in a very difficult, or even untenable, situation. As one 
commissioner argued:
The other problem with that is if you have a disallowance motion it can 
be lost if the government has the numbers in the house, and you get a 
poor lame duck electoral commissioner who says the other side don’t 
want me. To engage them all in the first place is a much better way than 
people jumping up and down afterwards.
Instead of taking the negative and post-appointment approach that a disallowance 
motion entails, the SA process requires the positive and pre-appointment method 
of an affirmation resolution by both houses of parliament, following a multi-
party committee process outlined below. This is the most thorough and publicly 
accountable consultation process of all the Australian jurisdictions. It requires 
the governor to appoint a commissioner based on a recommendation made by 
both houses of parliament. When this requirement was imposed in 2005, for the 
first and so far the only time, the matter was considered by the Statutory Officers 
Committee (SOC), a joint house parliamentary committee that was established 
for the purpose of appointing electoral commissioners, auditors-general and 
ombudsmen. The SOC is made up of six members, three from each house, with 
only two parties (Labor and Liberal) and an Independent represented. Although 
not all parties are represented on the SOC, the subsequent requirement for 
parliamentary ratification by way of an affirmation resolution should ensure 
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that other parties are consulted prior to such a vote. Such consultation would 
not be expected to change the outcome (given the major parties’ representation 
on the SOC); however, it could assist in alleviating any concerns that other 
parliamentarians might have.
After advertising nationally for the position, an interview panel, made up 
of an electoral commissioner from another jurisdiction and senior public 
servants, interviewed a short list of applicants that had been drawn up by a 
personnel agency. This panel provided its recommendations to the SOC, which 
then interviewed the recommended applicants. Based on this second round 
of interviews, the SOC reported to parliament its recommendation, which 
was agreed to by both houses without debate. In 2006, the Victorian Public 
Accounts and Estimates Committee recommended that the SA model be followed 
in Victoria, whereby future appointments would be made by a resolution of 
both houses of parliament, following a recommendation from an appropriate 
parliamentary committee.17 
Queensland is the other jurisdiction that involves the use of a parliamentary 
committee in the selection process. In Queensland’s process, the requirement 
is to consult with the relevant committee—currently the Legal Affairs, Police, 
Corrective Services and Emergency Services Committee, but previously the Legal, 
Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee (LCARC), which also had a 
remit to inquire into broader electoral and other matters. When this requirement 
was activated in 2005 for the appointment of the current commissioner, the 
chair (Lesley Clark, Labor) and deputy chair (Fiona Simpson, Nationals) of the 
LCARC both sat on the selection panel (as did the Labor Attorney-General, 
Linda Lavarch). Although the Act does not require committee representation 
on the actual selection panel, the involvement of government and opposition 
parliamentarians also assisted in fulfilling the additional requirement to consult 
with other parties. As one parliamentarian stated:
My experience of [previously] interviewing for the information 
commissioner where it was just me really reinforced—where you have 
got the external accountability-type office holders—that you have 
bipartisan support in that early stage. Not just in the parliament, that’s 
really after the event.
It was acknowledged by some interviewees that there could be a benefit in the 
Commonwealth’s Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters having a role 
in the appointment of commissioners, either prior to or after the appointment. 
The dominant view, however, was that the pronounced partisan nature of 
the committee’s membership could politicise the process and jeopardise the 
17 Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. 2006. Report On—A Legislative Framework for Independent 
Officers of Parliament. Melbourne: Parliament of Victoria, p. 69.
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independence of the commissioner’s position. In contrast, Queensland’s use of a 
parliamentary committee in appointing the commissioner appears to have been 
successful, although it has only been used once so far. One theme that came 
through strongly from committee members in response to questioning on the 
suitability of using committees in the selection process was the importance of 
personal relationships and goodwill between committee members. Such goodwill 
appears to be evident in the Queensland situation but is clearly lacking in the 
federal committee. 
Political affiliations
Another mechanism in Australian legislation that guards against partisan 
appointments is the inclusion of rules preventing members or previous 
members of political parties or parliaments from being eligible for appointment 
(see Table 3.4). Four jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and 
the Australian Capital Territory) prevent people who have been members of a 
political party within the previous five years from being eligible for appointment 
to a commissioner’s position. Queensland limits the prohibition to existing 
members of political parties. In addition, four jurisdictions (Western Australia, 
Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory) place 
restrictions on current or previous members of parliament. Such requirements 
have generally been introduced as a result of one jurisdiction’s reforms being 
adopted by other jurisdictions. For example, the Northern Territory’s Electoral 
Act 2004 was heavily influenced by the Australian Capital Territory’s Electoral 
Act 1992. While such restrictions have merit in ensuring there is a check on 
overt partisan influence, if a partisan appointment were to be made, it is more 
likely to be of someone with less well-known or obvious political leanings. 
It is partly to counter this potentiality, and to encourage cross-party support 
for commissioner appointments, that recent electoral legislation often states a 
requirement for the government to consult with other political parties before 
deciding on a preferred candidate, as discussed above.
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Table 3.4 Prohibitions on Appointment of Party Members or 
Parliamentarians
Jurisdiction Party members Parliamentarians
Commonwealth No provisions in the Act No provisions in the Act 
New South Wales Members of political parties 
and any person who has been 
a member of a political party in 
previous five years are ineligible 
(s . 21AB[4])
No provisions in the Act 
Victoria Members of registered political 
parties and any person who has 
been a member of a political 
party in previous five years are 
ineligible (s . 12[3]) 
No provisions in the Act 
Queensland Members of political parties are 
ineligible (s . 23[4])
No provisions in the Act 
Western Australia Act is silent Any person who is or has been 
a member of a parliament or 
legislature anywhere in Australia 
is ineligible (s . 5B[10])
South Australia No provisions in the Act No provisions in the Act 
Tasmania Members of political parties 
and any person who has been a 
member of a party in the previous 
five years anywhere in Australia 
are ineligible (s . 8[3]) 
Members of parliament and any 
person who has been a member 
of parliament in the previous five 
years anywhere in Australia are 
ineligible (s . 8[3]) 
Australian Capital 
Territory
Any person who is or has been a 
member of a political party in the 
previous five years is ineligible 
(s . 12A)
Any person who is or has been 
a member of a parliament or a 
legislature anywhere in Australia 
in the previous 10 years is 
ineligible (s . 12A)
Northern Territory No provisions in the Act MLAs ineligible for appointment 
(s . 327)
Length of tenure
The length of a commissioner’s tenure can have significant impacts on his or her 
independence and ability to act without fear or favour. If a commissioner lacks 
long-term security then his or her actions could be, in a real or perceived sense, 
related to a desire for reappointment. The timing of a potential reappointment, 
irrespective of the length of appointment, can also have an impact, especially 
if this coincides with an election. As shown in Table 3.5, Australia’s electoral 
commissioners generally have reasonable lengths of tenure, with eight 
jurisdictions providing for appointments from five to 10 years. In seven of these 
jurisdictions, however, this is the maximum length, with the relevant Acts 
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allowing tenure ‘up to’ that term. The remaining jurisdiction, South Australia, 
has potentially longer security, with the appointments of commissioner (and 
deputy commissioner) lasting to the age of sixty-five. 
Table 3.5 Length of Tenure for Australian Electoral Commissioners
Jurisdiction Length of tenure
Commonwealth Up to seven years . Eligible for reappointment (s . 8)
New South Wales Up to 10 years . Eligible for reappointment, for no more than one 
further term of up to 10 years (s . 21AB[1])
Victoria 10 years . Eligible for reappointment up to a further 10 years (s . 12)
Queensland Up to seven years (s . 23[5])
Western Australia Up to nine years . Eligible for reappointment (s . 5B[4])
South Australia To age sixty-five (s. 7)
Tasmania Up to seven years . Eligible for reappointment (s . 17)
Australian Capital 
Territory
Up to five years. Eligible for reappointment (s. 25)
Northern Territory Up to five years. Eligible for reappointment (s. 320)
The ‘up to’ provision provides governments with flexibility in determining 
the length of an appointment, and it has been argued by ministers that 
appointing for a lesser term fits with standard practice for senior public service 
appointments. Shorter-term appointments could, however, be associated with 
weak independence, if the commissioner is seeking reappointment. At the 
Commonwealth level, the first Commissioner, Colin Hughes, was appointed 
for the maximum seven years (and served just less than six before resigning). 
All subsequent commissioners have been appointed for only five-year terms. 
Similarly, in Western Australia, where terms may be up to nine years, recent 
appointments have been for five years. The current Commissioner, Warwick 
Gately, who had already served two years as acting commissioner at the time of 
his appointment, was appointed as commissioner for only three years, to make 
a total of a five-year term. 
In the case of the current SA Commissioner, her appointment to the age of sixty-
five is effectively a 14-year term. Her deputy commissioner was appointed at a 
younger age, and therefore has an effective appointment in that position of 26 
years. Internationally, the only jurisdictions with a similar length of security are 
Ghana (to age seventy), Canada and Malaysia (to age sixty-five), India (six years 
or age sixty-five, whichever is earlier), and Poland (to age seventy).18
18 Alan Wall et al. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook, p. 93; Louis 
Massicotte et al. 2004. Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies, pp. 85–7.
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In the interviews, commissioners expressed a range of views on what they 
considered to be an ideal length of appointment. One argument in favour of 
five-year terms was that 
if you’re going to shake a show up then if you haven’t got everything 
accomplished that you want in five years, you’re not going to get it. 
Secondly, if you were a dud, five years of coasting along, they will have 
a chance of replacing you.
Generally though, commissioners expressed support for a longer term. Typical 
of such views were these commissioners’ comments.
Having tenure in the appointment of more than five years is desirable 
from a perspective of long-term planning in electoral matters. I think 
you need to plan over two election cycles, so eight to 10 years is about 
a good time in my view. Otherwise you just get short-term bites at the 
planning and no look above the horizon.
If you’re in a job around eight years, people are getting sick of you, 
you’re getting sick of them, and it’s good for the organisation and for the 
commissioner to do something else.
If you’ve gone through two elections, you’ve probably established more 
independence in the role, and perhaps a fairer decision can be made.
One commissioner supported appointment to the age of sixty-five, ‘with the 
right person’. Of course, the issue is ensuring the ‘right person’ is appointed. A 
dominant view from the interviews was that commissioners should be in place 
for more than one election and that five-year appointments, combined with 
three or four-year electoral cycles, often meant that a commissioner was in the 
position for only one election. This could result in a reduced ability to oversee 
the implementation of administrative reforms based on previous experience in 
that jurisdiction. The timing of appointments, and whether the end of the term 
was close to an election, was also an issue of concern for some commissioners. 
Interviewees argued that if a possible reappointment coincided with the conduct 
of an election, this could impact on the actions of the commissioner during the 
election period.
Security of tenure
Once a commissioner has been appointed, security of tenure can be enhanced or 
diminished by the conditions under which an appointment may be terminated. 
All jurisdictions provide for dismissal from office under specified circumstances, 
such as physical or mental incapacity, bankruptcy and misconduct. For such 
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a dismissal to take permanent effect, however, a resolution passed by each 
house of parliament is required in seven of the nine jurisdictions, with the 
Commonwealth and Queensland the only exceptions to this requirement (see 
Table 3.6). In these two exceptions, a government still needs to substantiate 
its reasons for dismissal (under separate employment legislation). The need for 
a parliamentary resolution, however, provides an obviously greater safeguard 
against governments acting vexatiously. Some jurisdictions specify a number of 
sitting days within which a resolution for dismissal needs to be passed for it to 
take effect. Depending on the parliamentary sitting schedule, and the timing 
of parliament being notified, this could equate to a period of several months. 
Some acts do not specify a time period, but a deadline for action may be covered 
in other legislation, such as constitutional Acts or in parliamentary standing 
orders. To date, no electoral commissioners have been dismissed from office. 
Table 3.6 Dismissal Processes for Australian Electoral Commissioners
Jurisdiction Dismissal—reporting to parliament
Commonwealth Governor may terminate, for specified reasons (for example, 
misbehaviour) (s . 25)
New South Wales Governor may suspend the commissioner . A statement from the 
minister explaining the suspension is to be provided to parliament 
within seven sitting days . Commissioner may then be removed by the 
governor if each house of parliament passes a resolution within 21 
days of statement being tabled (s . 21AB[3])
Victoria Governor may suspend the commissioner . The minister is then to 
notify the speaker, president and leaders of (parliamentary) political 
parties within two hours (s . 140) . Commissioner may then be 
removed by resolution of both houses of parliament (s . 12[4][e])
Queensland Governor in council may terminate (s . 26)
Western Australia Governor may suspend the commissioner . A statement explaining 
the suspension to be provided to parliament within seven sitting 
days . Commissioner may be removed on resolution of both houses of 
parliament within 30 sitting days (s . 5C)
South Australia Governor may suspend the commissioner under specified 
circumstances . A statement explaining the suspension is to be 
provided to parliament within three sitting days . Commissioner may 
then be removed by resolution of both houses of parliament (s . 7) 
Tasmania Governor may suspend the commissioner under specified 
circumstances . A statement explaining the suspension is to be 
provided to parliament within seven sitting days . Commissioner may 
then be removed by resolution of both houses of parliament (s . 21)
Australian Capital 
Territory
Executive may suspend . Minister is to present a statement to the 
assembly on the next sitting day . Assembly resolution within seven 
sitting days required for appointment to be ended (s . 29) 
Northern Territory Suspension by the administrator . Minister must present statement to 
assembly within three sitting days . Assembly must pass a resolution 
for dismissal to take effect (s . 323)
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Reporting mechanisms
The independence of electoral administrations is also influenced by the method 
with which they report to government and parliament. Reporting directly 
to parliament provides a transparent process that is accessible to all political 
stakeholders at the same time. Reporting only to the government can provide 
the political parties in government with the advantage of having earlier access to 
information on sensitive issues, thereby allowing the government to prepare its 
response prior to the public release of information. In Australia, there is a mix 
of reporting mechanisms for the various electoral administrations, as shown in 
Table 3.7. Although possibly not a major issue, delays between a government 
receiving a report and tabling it in parliament can lead to accusations of a 
closer relationship between the electoral administration and the government 
than is desirable. For example, the 15 sitting day period allowed in Section 17 
of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 could stretch out for several months, 
depending on parliament’s sitting schedule. 
Table 3.7 Reporting Mechanisms for Australian Electoral Administrations
Jurisdiction Reporting mechanism
Commonwealth Annual, election and financial disclosure reports to the minister, who 
then must table the reports in parliament within the next 15 sitting 
days (s . 17) 
New South Wales Not specified in Act. Election report sent to premier, with a request 
that it be tabled in parliament (from interview data)
Victoria To both houses of parliament, on elections and polls (s . 8) . Annually 
to both houses of parliament in relation to the provision of enrolment 
information (s . 35)
Queensland Not specified in Act. Report to parliament (from interview data)
Western Australia Annual report by 31 August to the responsible minister, who then 
presents the report to the parliament within 21 days of the auditor-
general’s report (ss . 62 and 64 of the Financial Administration and 
Audit Act 1985)
South Australia Not specified in the Act; however, s. 8 specifies that the 
commissioner is responsible to the minister
Tasmania Annual and other reports directly to both houses of parliament (s . 13)
Australian Capital 
Territory
Annual report to the minister responsible (attorney-general), who then 
presents the report to the assembly (s . 10)
Northern Territory To the speaker, then tabled in the assembly within three sitting days 
(s . 313)
Budget processes
Dundas and Wall et al. identify the budgetary independence of electoral 
management bodies as one of the primary guarantors of electoral commission 
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independence, pointing out that the manner in which a commission is 
funded can affect its independent status. Dundas argues that the need for an 
electoral authority to negotiate its budget can undermine its primary role as 
an independent agency.19 Wall et al. conclude that the electoral administration 
should be provided with its own budget and should be free of day-to-day 
government interference in administering that budget.20
All Australian administrations remain reliant on governmental budget processes 
for their budgetary allocations. Consequently, it is possible for governments to 
maintain a significant degree of influence and control over the ‘independent’ 
commissions. It is important to understand the processes through which 
the commissions receive their financial allocations. The standard method for 
Australian commissions is to negotiate funds through their parent departments 
or with the relevant finance or treasury department, as part of the whole-of-
government budgetary process. This process can diminish the commission’s 
independence, especially when compared with the practices of some other 
countries, such as Canada, where the electoral body has a portion of its budget 
guaranteed by law. 
Budgeting processes for electoral administrations are often contained within 
finance and public administration legislation, rather than in electoral 
legislation, and personal relationships between electoral officials and treasury 
officials can influence these processes. In order to understand budget processes, 
all commissioners and ministers interviewed were asked to describe how the 
budget process works in their respective jurisdiction. A summary of these data 
is provided in the following paragraphs.
Commonwealth 
The AEC undergoes the same process as all government agencies and is therefore 
subject to government-wide funding cuts. The AEC negotiates its budget with 
the Department of Finance and Administration (DoFA). Requests for funding 
of special programs go to the special minister of state. DoFA provides budget 
and policy advice (beyond just monetary matters) to the minister responsible. 
In 2005, the minister determined the AEC’s resources following a joint finance 
agencies review. 
19 Carl W. Dundas. 1994. Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections: Frameworks, Integrity, Transparency, 
Attributes and Monitoring. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, p. 40.
20 Alan Wall et al. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook, p. 9.
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New South Wales
The NSW Commission undergoes the same process as all government agencies. 
It negotiates its budget with treasury and, if necessary, the cabinet budget 
committee.
Victoria
The Victorian Commission negotiates its budget with the Department of Justice; 
its budget is an output within the department’s budget. There appear to be no 
restrictions on accessing funds to conduct general elections, as the following 
administrator’s comment attests:
The Victorian Electoral Commissioner has a bottomless pit to draw on 
to run a State election, but it’s accountable as to how it’s spent, after 
the election, and that’s rightly so. But there is no real impediment. The 
commissioner can’t say ‘there wasn’t enough money available’.  
Queensland
The Queensland Commission negotiates its budget with treasury, for both 
recurring and election budgets. Appropriations for special projects require 
ministerial (attorney-general) support. There are no restrictions on accessing 
funds to conduct general elections.
Western Australia
The WA Commission negotiates its budget with treasury and then seeks 
ministerial (attorney-general) support.
South Australia
The Electoral Commission of South Australia (formerly the SA Electoral Office) 
experiences the same budget discipline as other agencies. It must negotiate its 
budget with the Attorney-General’s Department and with treasury, and then 
seek ministerial (attorney-general) support. Special projects require cabinet 
approval. 
Tasmania
The Tasmanian Commission has a recurrent budget provided through the 
Department of Justice and is subject to government-wide funding cuts. It 
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must negotiate its budget with the department and seek the attorney-general’s 
support, if necessary. Budgets for general elections are ‘reserved by law’ and are 
therefore exempt from government restrictions. A commercial trust account is 
used for the conduct of local government and other elections.
Australian Capital Territory
The ACT Commission negotiates its budget with the Department of Justice and 
Community Safety, and then seeks the attorney-general’s support, before going 
to cabinet. Funding goes directly to the department, which then passes funds 
onto the commission, minus departmental expenses.
Northern Territory
The NT Commission must seek treasury approval for its budget, based on 
previous recurrent and election budget costs. It is required to seek cabinet 
approval for additional funds.
Budgetary independence 
Around Australia, commissioners expressed a range of views about the level of 
ministerial or departmental control over their ongoing and election budgets. 
Concerns included: being part of a departmental appropriation, rather than 
having a separate agency budget line; being susceptible to government-wide 
budget cuts; the potential for a government to interfere with an upcoming 
election budget; and having to argue with departmental officials, rather than 
the minister, for funding to be maintained for specific programs within the 
electoral commission budget. Typical of these comments were the following 
commissioners’ views:
So there is a line item in the budget for electoral services, but the amount 
of money that’s in electoral services is given to the department. They 
cream an amount from the top to use to fund their corporate things that 
they say are devoted to electoral services. You can have your budget 
fiddled with, and I always thought that was dangerous particularly 
where the CEO’s responsible to the minister, and therefore there’s a 
direct line with interfering with the election budget.
A further issue concerning whole-of-government budget cuts relates to the 
application of efficiency dividends, where a commission has to make savings in 
line with a government-wide standard. As two administrators stated:
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When the government says there’s a 7 per cent cut in the budget, well, 
they say they want your 7 per cent as well. They say you’ll have to 
be more efficient, because you’re getting less money. They’re taking the 
dividend now, and forcing you to be more efficient.
The trouble is, this has now been in operation for maybe 15 years, maybe 
18 years, so 1 per cent, 1 per cent, 1 per cent, 1 per cent. In round figure 
terms, we might be 20 per cent less of a budget than it would have been 
had it not applied. We’re the same as every other agency, though. 
A particular concern is where the government specifies which of a commission’s 
programs needs to be reduced or abolished to make savings. This occurred in 
1996 when the Howard Coalition Government abolished the AEC’s Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Election Education and Information Service (ATSIEEIS) 
program. The impacts of this decision are discussed in Chapter 5. A further 
example occurred under the Rudd Labor Government in 2009. The 2009 Federal 
Budget stated that ‘the AEC has been asked by Government to find savings 
measures of $6.1 million over four years including the closure of the Melbourne 
and Adelaide Electoral Education Centres’.21 
Government ministers provide an alternative perspective to budget decisions, 
and one minister acknowledged the potential for departmental interference in a 
commission’s budget: 
[The commissioner] puts forward all of his own proposals for funding. 
They are brought in through the portfolio and then brought to cabinet 
for the budget process. I want to see all the bids from the commissioner 
and statutory officers, so that they’re not filtered. 
Can a statutory officer like the commissioner communicate fully to the 
minister without it being filtered through the bureaucracy? I think, ‘Yes, 
he can.’ If a minister wasn’t on the ball about that, and if a department 
wasn’t playing by the rules, things could get filtered, I guess, potentially. 
The majority of commissioners expressed a reasonable level of satisfaction with 
the budgets they receive, but personal relationships with departmental and 
treasury officials were often mentioned as being very important in ensuring 
a smooth budgetary process. Typical of this view was a comment from one 
commissioner that as long as they conduct election programs cheaper than other 
States, treasury will be happy.
Other commissioners expressed concern that they could not necessarily 
implement the programs they felt were important. Instead of having 
21 Cited in Brian Costar. 2009. ‘Democracy Under Siege for the Sake of a Few Pennies.’ The Age, 29 May. 
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‘a bottomless pit to draw on’, the situation is quite different. As one commissioner 
said, ‘nobody has a blank cheque. No Western country gives any organisation 
a blank cheque.’ 
In 2006, the Victorian Public Accounts and Estimates Committee recommended 
that in the future, the Electoral Matters Committee should review the Electoral 
Commission’s budget and report to parliament ahead of the appropriation being 
passed. Such a process would open the commission’s budget to the scrutiny 
of non-government parties, and therefore could assist in maintaining the 
independence of the commission. This proposal, however, which models the 
process already in place for the Victorian Auditor-General, is yet to be adopted 
or implemented.
Summary
This chapter has provided an insight into various aspects of the performance of 
Australia’s electoral management bodies. The results of the best-practice analysis 
are most useful as a comparative guide between the jurisdictions assessed. This 
framework analysis of factors of independence is a valuable guide and can be used 
as a tool for jurisdictions to improve their ‘true’ independence—if legislators 
have the political will to devolve responsibilities for the administration of 




By international standards, Australians enjoy a relatively broad voting 
franchise. All adult citizens, eighteen years old and over, are entitled to vote, 
with a few exceptions, such as categories relating to mental capacity, treason 
convictions and long-term prisoners. And of course, eligible Australians are 
not only entitled to vote, they are compelled to vote. The definition of mental 
capacity does at times raise questions over the interpretation of Section 93 of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, which states ‘by reason of being of unsound 
mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment 
and voting’. While there are sound arguments to exclude those of ‘unsound 
mind’ from voting, determination of who is of ‘unsound mind’ is problematic, 
and electoral officials tend not to become involved in interpretation of the 
section, and rely on the medical evidence provided to them. Australia’s laws on 
mental capacity stem from British law, and it is interesting to note that it was 
only in 2006 that Britain abolished its law that ‘idiots’ could not vote (idiocy 
being a permanent and congenital state), while ‘lunatics’ (being an acquired and 
transitory condition) could vote only during lucid intervals.1 
The Australian franchise is citizen based, rather than resident based (with 
one significant exception, discussed below), unlike many countries that allow 
permanent residents, after they have lived in the country for a stipulated 
period, to vote. This becomes an interesting debate when compared with the 
right to vote for citizens living abroad. Australians living abroad, who might 
not be paying Australian taxes, may use their votes to influence Australian 
government policies and spending, while permanent, non-citizen residents who 
pay Australian taxes and are contributors to Australian society do not have 
a voice through the ballot box. This brings to mind the old phrase ‘taxation 
without representation is tyranny’. Countries where residents may vote include 
Uruguay (15-year residency qualification), Malawi (seven years), Chile (five 
years) and New Zealand (one year). In addition, numerous countries in the 
European Union (EU) provide reciprocal voting rights for residents from other 
EU countries, though generally only for local government elections. In countries 
with residency qualifications where there is a significant influx of migrants, 
the migrants’ views and policy priorities can have a significant impact on the 
conduct of elections. This forces political parties to consider the interests of 
ethnic groups, due to their voting power. 
For Australian citizens living overseas, voting rights are retained if there is an 
intention to return to Australia within six years; however, citizens who have 
1 Graeme Orr. 2010. The Law of Politics: Elections, Parties and Money in Australia. Sydney: The Federation 
Press, p. 59. 
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
52
not applied for enrolment as overseas voters within three years of departing 
Australia will be disenfranchised. In 2010, more than 16 000 citizens were 
enrolled as eligible overseas electors. Australian voting rights for expatriate 
citizens are considered to be generally in the middle of the international 
spectrum when compared with other countries.2 When it is time to vote in an 
election, eligible overseas electors and citizens temporarily away from Australia 
have the opportunity to attend polling stations set up at diplomatic posts, such 
as embassies, high commissions and consulates. For the 2010 election, more 
than 70 000 citizens used this service at more than 100 locations.
This chapter now concentrates on two aspects of the franchise that have 
attracted significant interest and discussion in recent years—that is, the right 
of certain non-citizen residents to vote in Australian elections, and prisoners’ 
voting rights. 
Non-citizen residents’ voting rights
In 1984 under the Hawke Labor Government, the qualification for the franchise 
was changed from British subjects who were Australian residents to Australian 
citizens. Because of the high levels of migration from Britain and other British 
Commonwealth countries to Australia, especially in the post–World War II 
period, this had the potential to disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of British 
subjects. So a ‘grandfather’ clause (Section 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918) was included in the legislation to allow British subjects who were on the 
electoral roll prior to 1984 to remain on the roll. There are 49 countries covered 
by the ‘British subject’ clause, including the United Kingdom, Canada, New 
Zealand, India, Singapore, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka. Interestingly, 
Ireland, which is not a British Commonwealth country, is included, while 
South Africa, which was not a member of the Commonwealth at the time of the 
legislation due to its apartheid policies, is not.
Although the impact of this exemption continues to dissipate over time, it 
remains significant, as an assessment of individual electorates indicates. In 
2008, more than 162 000 electors with the British subject notation remained on 
the Australian electoral roll, with 13 electoral divisions where ‘British subjects’ 
made up more than 2 per cent of the roll (see Table 4.1). In general elections 
there are invariably several seats decided on a small margin, making the number 
2 According to Graeme Orr, quoted in the JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. Report 
on the Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election and Related Matters Thereto. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
p. 298.
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of British enrolments significant. In the past two general elections, six of the 
26 results listed in the table were decided by a margin less than the number of 
British enrolments (in bold). 











2PP margin at 
2007 election 
(%)
2PP margin at 
2010 election 
(%)
Wakefield (SA) 3693 96 621 3 .82 6 .59 Labor 11 .95 Labor
Brand (WA) 2870 94 849 3 .03 5 .62 Labor 3 .33 Labor
Dunkley (Vic .) 2659 93 565 2 .84 4 .04 Coalition 1.02 Coalition
Kingston (SA) 2784 98 959 2 .81 4 .42 Labor 13 .91 Labor
Canning (WA) 2665 97 778 2 .73 5 .58 Coalition 2.19 Coalition
Flinders (Vic .) 2595 96 357 2 .69 8 .25 Coalition 9 .11 Coalition
Makin (SA) 2540 95 347 2 .66 7 .70 Labor 12 .20 Labor
Mayo (SA) 2522 97 630 2 .58 7 .06 Coalition 7 .35 Coalition
Hasluck (WA) 1923 83 412 2 .31 1.26 Labor 0.57 Coalition
Casey (Vic .) 1959 90 019 2 .18 5 .93 Coalition 4 .18 Coalition
Throsby (NSW) 1851 89 161 2 .08 23 .46 Labor 12 .11 Labor
La Trobe (Vic .) 1940 93 304 2 .08 0.51 Coalition 0.91 Labor
McMillan (Vic .) 1779 88 281 2 .02 4 .79 Coalition 4 .41 Coalition
The arguments against allowing this class of voter to be enrolled are that it 
is discriminatory against long-term Australian residents from non-British 
countries and also that it is possibly racist, if not in its intent, then at least in 
its outcomes, as the majority of the beneficiaries are white. Another argument is 
put forward by Daryl Melham, a Labor MP who has chaired the Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters for more than 13 years. Melham argues that since 
the reform occurred in 1984, many more countries now allow dual citizenship, 
thereby removing one argument that might have discouraged British subjects 
from taking up Australian citizenship.4
The High Court has stated that permanent residents should not necessarily be 
regarded as part of ‘the people’ to whom the Australian Constitution entitles 
voting rights, but the current situation is discriminatory. A fairer situation 
would be to allow all permanent residents (including a specified qualification 
regarding length of residency) to be entitled to vote, irrespective of their 
country of origin, or limiting the voting entitlement to Australian citizens only. 
3 From JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. Report on the Conduct of the 2007 Federal 
Election and Matters Related Thereto, p. 347. The final two columns are from AEC election results.
4 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. Report on the Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election 
and Matters Related Thereto, pp. 348–9.
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If the latter is adopted (that is, removing the British subject clause), there is a 
reasonable argument to retain an exemption for citizens of those countries that 
still do not allow dual citizenship, such as India and Singapore. 
The prisoner franchise
Supporters of prisoner enfranchisement argue that voting is a fundamental right 
and denial of the vote is racist, as Indigenous Australians are imprisoned at 12–
15 times the non-Indigenous rate. Also, it is argued that denying a right to vote 
is counterproductive to the rehabilitative aspect of incarceration.5 Detractors say 
that prisoners have broken the ‘social contract’ by committing serious crimes 
and therefore deserve ‘civil death’ by disenfranchisement.6 While prisoners 
account for only a small percentage of the total potential voting population, the 
range of views on prisoner voting entitlements ensures that this issue becomes 
a ‘political football’ whenever reforms are suggested.7
There are quite divergent voting entitlements for prisoners in democracies 
around the world, as Massicotte et al.’s comparative study of 63 countries reveals. 
In 16 of the 63 countries in the study (25 per cent), all prisoners have a right 
to vote. This group includes Denmark, Germany, South Africa and Sweden. A 
further 16 countries (25 per cent), such as the Netherlands, New Zealand and 
Spain, allow a partial franchise, dependent on the length of sentence or the type 
of offence committed. In 24 of the countries studied (38 per cent), including 
Brazil, India and the United Kingdom, all prisoners are disenfranchised.8 
A detailed analysis of the philosophical arguments for different countries’ 
approaches to the prisoner franchise is outside the scope of this book. Instead, 
the focus is on the variation that exists within Australia and the processes 
undertaken to determine prisoners’ entitlements at the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory levels. From this, an assessment is made of the motivating forces 
driving Australian prisoner franchise laws: the participation principle of 
fairness, partisan self-interest, or a mixture of both. 
5 Graeme Orr. 2007. Constitutionalising the Franchise and the Status Quo: The High Court on Prisoner Voting 
Rights. Discussion Paper 19/07. Canberra: Democratic Audit, The Australian National University, p. 2. 
6 Lisa Hill and Cornelia Koch. 2011. ‘The Voting Rights of Incarcerated Australian Citizens.’ Australian 
Journal of Political Science 46(2): 213–28.
7 Graeme Orr. 1998. ‘Ballotless and Behind Bars: The Denial of the Franchise to Prisoners.’ Federal Law 
Review 26(1): 56–82, discusses the symbolic politics of prisoner voting as a ‘political football’.
8 No information was provided for the remaining seven countries. Louis Massicotte et al. 2004. Establishing 
the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies, pp. 18–25. 
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Changes to Commonwealth laws
The Hawke Labor Government extended the prisoner franchise in its 1983 
reforms. The franchise had remained largely unchanged since Federation, 
with voting rights extended only to those imprisoned for an offence with a 
maximum penalty of less than one year. Labor extended the franchise to those 
imprisoned for offences with maximum penalties of less than five years. These 
provisions were difficult to administer, as State controllers-general of prisons 
needed to determine the maximum possible penalties for offences, irrespective 
of prisoners’ actual sentences. Subsequently, the Keating Labor Government 
changed the provision in 1995 so that all prisoners ‘sentenced’ to terms of less 
than five years could vote. This had the effect of further extending the franchise. 
When the Coalition came to power in 1996, there was an immediate push to 
not only restrict the prisoner franchise, but also remove it entirely. In 1997, the 
Coalition-dominated JSCEM recommended that no prisoners should be entitled 
to enrol or vote. The Coalition’s attempt to legislate for this change in 1999 
was defeated in the Senate; however, the Coalition was successful in restricting 
the prisoner franchise in 2004, reducing the ‘less than five years’ provision to 
‘less than three years’. While the Coalition’s legislation called for total prisoner 
disenfranchisement, Labor argued that a three-year qualification was a more 
suitable restriction as it coincided with a full term of the Australian Parliament. 
The Coalition agreed to this compromise in 2004 because it lacked the necessary 
numbers in the Senate to achieve its preferred outcome. 
After the Coalition gained a Senate majority in 2005, it returned to its previous 
position of removing the franchise for all prisoners in full-time detention—a 
change estimated to affect approximately 20 000 prisoners.9 While the Coalition 
has consistently argued against any prisoners having the right to vote, analysis 
of the interview data indicated some opposition to this stance within the 
Coalition parties. As one Liberal parliamentarian stated:
I was a minority in my own party. The majority of my party had the 
John Howard/Eric Abetz line that if you were in prison, you didn’t 
have a right to vote. I don’t take that view. I think that, as the law said 
previously, if you’re doing more than three years, you didn’t have the 
right to vote, which is probably fair enough.
9 Brian Costar. 2006. Submission (no. 2) to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee Inquiry. 
Canberra: Parliament of Australia, p. 4.
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But I was dead against taking the right away from someone who was 
doing a short sentence. I felt that was completely unjust. They’re in 
prison paying their debt to society. It’s not as though it’s a difficult 
matter to go and take their vote. They shouldn’t have lost [the vote].
In its 2000 report, the JSCEM stated that the prisoner franchise should not be 
removed ‘until there is sufficient and widespread public support for a change’. 
The government asserted that its 2006 move was supported by the Australian 
electorate; this is not, however, borne out by the submissions received by the 
Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee’s inquiry into the Bill. 
Of the 39 submissions that addressed the prisoner franchise issue, only three 
expressed support for the Coalition’s proposed change (from the Liberal Party, 
The Nationals and Festival of Light).10 While it would be erroneous to argue that 
these figures are representative of the general view of the Australian electorate, 
it is significant that there was minimal explicit support for the change outside 
the Coalition parties. 
There is very little information about public opinion on this issue; however, 
one newspaper poll in 2007 put public support for prisoners’ voting rights 
at 62 per cent (albeit only a small, unrepresentative sample). While such an 
unscientific survey might be inconclusive, some of the arguments put forward 
by the Coalition are even more so. During one parliamentary debate on the 
issue, senior Liberal Senator Nick Minchin argued that the government position 
stood up to the ‘pub test’—that is, the majority of people in a hotel bar would 
support the government’s position—suggesting perhaps that, apart from its 
ideological position on the issue, the Coalition also supported the change as a 
populist (and partisan) measure. 
Many of the submissions to the JSCEM inquiry opposing the change cited Article 
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
states that all citizens shall have the right and opportunity to vote at elections. 
This argument is consistent with developments in Canada and the United 
Kingdom in recent years. In Canada, no prisoners have been disenfranchised 
since the Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that disenfranchisement was in breach 
of the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the United Kingdom 
disenfranchises all prisoners, in 2004 and 2005 the European Court of Human 
Rights found this to be in contravention of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The ICCPR also refers to the purpose of prison being a place to rehabilitate 
offenders back into society. Some JSCEM submissions argued that the denial of 
voting rights removed the benefits of preparing prisoners for their transition 
10 The Festival of Light was a lobby group promoting ‘Christian values’ and ‘family values’. It is now 
known as Family Voice Australia. 
4 . The Franchise
57
back into society through the restoration of their responsibilities as members 
of the community. Furthermore, they pointed to the disproportionate impact 
on young males (the prison population is 93 per cent male) and Indigenous 
Australians.
The 2007 High Court challenge 
The Howard Government’s law disenfranchising all prisoners was challenged 
in the High Court in 2007 by Vickie Lee Roach, an Indigenous woman who 
had been sentenced to prison for a total of six years on five burglary-related 
offences. The Roach case11 was based on a number of arguments, but primarily 
that disenfranchisement of all prisoners was contrary to the constitutional 
requirement that parliament be ‘directly chosen by the people’. In addition, 
it was argued that disenfranchisement denied prisoners their implied right to 
freedom of political expression and communication. 
In September 2007, the High Court determined (by a 4–2 majority) that the 
blanket disenfranchisement was unconstitutional; however, it upheld the law 
previously in effect that prisoners serving sentences of three years or more 
would be disenfranchised. The reasoning of the High Court was that the blanket 
ban was an arbitrary disenfranchisement of a particular class of citizen, without 
regard to the circumstances in which those citizens became part of the prisoner 
class. 
Justices Gummow, Kirby and Crennan’s joint lead judgment refers to the 2004 
legislative change that restricted the franchise to prisoners serving sentences of 
less than three years. They argued that such a restriction still gave regard to the 
seriousness of the offence as a measure of fitness to participate in the electoral 
process. This view was supported by Chief Justice Gleeson, who also suggested 
that a more restrictive disenfranchisement based on a lesser term (for example, 
prisoners serving terms of one year or more) would not necessarily be invalid. 
Gummow, Kirby and Crennan, however, appeared to be less positive towards 
the prospect of a more restrictive disenfranchisement, noting that the three-year 
sentence threshold mirrors the three-year electoral cycle that is entrenched in 
the Constitution. 
11 Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
58
Prisoner franchise at the State and Territory 
levels
At the Australian sub-national level, there is a similar divergence of entitlements 
as occurs internationally. Three jurisdictions (Victoria, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory) adopt the Commonwealth standard—that is, following 
the High Court’s 2007 Roach decision that prisoners serving terms of three 
years or less are entitled to vote. The Australian Capital Territory had adopted 
the Commonwealth standard of disenfranchisement until 2006. An aspect of 
the Howard Government’s reforms, however, was that while prisoners were 
disenfranchised, they remained on the electoral roll. Section 128 of the Australian 
Capital Territory’s Electoral Act 1992 states that all enrolled electors are entitled 
to vote. The Howard reforms, perhaps unintentionally, actually extended the 
vote to all prisoners in the Territory. As one administrator noted: 
The ACT made it known to the Commonwealth that the ACT thought, 
given their human rights stance, that all prisoners should have the right 
to vote…I don’t know who came up with the idea…which was that 
everyone in prison can enrol, but if you’re in prison full-time you can’t 
vote for federal elections, which gives the ACT what it wanted. 
The effect of the 2007 High Court decision was to revert to the previous 
Commonwealth law (including the removal of prisoners from the roll). This 
therefore disenfranchised all prisoners for ACT elections. In response, the 
Stanhope Labor Government enacted its own legislation to enfranchise all 
prisoners. This was the first occasion on which the Australian Capital Territory 
administered an ‘ACT only’ category of enrolment separate to the Commonwealth. 
Tasmania independently enfranchises prisoners serving sentences of less than 
three years (Section 31[2], Electoral Act 2004). New South Wales (Section 25, 
Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912) continues to enfranchise 
prisoners serving sentences of less than one year. This was also the case for 
Western Australia (Section 18, Electoral Act 1907) until it amended its Act in 
2007 to completely disenfranchise all prisoners, in line with the Commonwealth 
change. In May 2008 the Carpenter Labor Government in Western Australia 
introduced new legislation to extend the franchise to prisoners serving sentences 
of less than three years, but the Bill lapsed on the prorogation of parliament ahead 
of the 2008 general election. Following a change of government in 2008, in mid-
2009, the Barnett Coalition Government amended the legislation, reverting to 
the previous one-year sentence provision. South Australia has long-established 
laws enfranchising all prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentences.
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In light of the High Court decision, and particularly Justices Gummow, 
Kirby and Crennan’s comments linking three-year sentences to the Australian 
Constitution’s requirement for three-year electoral cycles, there could be some 
scope to argue that New South Wales’ and Western Australia’s one-year sentence 
threshold, alongside four-year electoral cycles, could provide conditions for a 
constitutional challenge. For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission 
does not believe that denying the vote to long-term prisoners satisfies the 
‘reasonableness’ test at international law; however, there do not appear to be 
any moves in legal or human rights circles to mount such a challenge.
Partisan impacts of prisoner voting
There is a belief, repeatedly expressed in the interviews, that allowing prisoners 
to vote provides a distinct advantage to the Labor Party. As one parliamentarian 
noted:
Obviously that does benefit Labor. I was a scrutineer at a federal election 
at the remand centre and there were 14 people voting and I’m sure they 
all voted Labor or Green, but you’re not talking a lot of people.
While results from recent federal elections do tend to suggest that this is the 
case, the advantage does not appear to be substantial, or beyond what could 
be expected in the general population. As Table 4.2 illustrates, the number of 
prisoners voting is small, but their votes generally favour Labor (though voting 
was more evenly divided at the 2010 election).
Table 4.2 Prisoner Voting: Federal Elections 2001–10, Two-Party Preferred
Electorate and 
jurisdiction
2001 2004 2007 2010
Labor Lib/Nat Labor Lib/Nat Labor Lib/Nat Labor Lib/Nat
Fraser, ACT 10 4 3 2 5 2 - -
Bass, Tas . - - - - 3 1 - -
Franklin, Tas . - - - - 3 3 - -
Kalgoorlie, WA 90 16 144 46 20 13 - -
O’Connor, WA 1 0 1 11 13 12 18 22
Canning, WA - - 7 2 6 4 - -
Durack, WA - - - - - - 80 66
Pearce, WA - - - - - - 13 9
Lingiari, NT 77 10 90 9 - - 89 98
Total 178 30 245 70 50 35 200 195
Note: These are electorates in which separate prisoner voting statistics are available.
Source: AEC election results.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
60
Two electorates in which Labor appears to have obtained a large advantage are 
in the seats of Kalgoorlie and Lingiari in the 2001 and 2004 elections. These 
two seats have the highest proportions of Indigenous people in the country 
and, combined with the high imprisonment rate of Indigenous Australians, 
these are the likely reasons for such high Labor support in these seats. The 
91 per cent support for Labor from prisoners in Lingiari in 2004 is consistent 
with the non-prisoner support for Labor in remote booths of Lingiari that have 
high Indigenous populations, such as Ti Tree Station (98.35 per cent Labor, 
two-party preferred), Titjikala (93.33 per cent), Kintore (86.99 per cent) and 
Willowra (84.19 per cent).
Analysis of interview data and parliamentary debates suggests that, although 
Labor might receive some electoral advantage from entitling prisoners to vote, 
their support for the prisoner franchise is based on genuine philosophical 
grounds rather than the prospect of partisan advantage. Likewise, the Liberal 
Party might see some small electoral advantage in denying prisoners the vote, 
but also tends to base its position on ideology. Comments by Liberal politicians 
such as Senator Minchin suggest, however, that populist positioning could also 
be a factor in the Liberal Party’s policy. The participation principle of fairness 
supports the broadest possible franchise; however, Australia’s mix of prisoner 
enfranchisement laws appears to be consistent with the diversity of laws applied 
internationally.
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5. Enrolment, Turnout and  
Informal Voting
As the previous chapter discussed, adult Australian citizens enjoy a broad 
entitlement to vote at elections. That entitlement is not only a right, it is also a 
responsibility, due to Australia being one of only a small number of countries 
that enforces a compulsory voting regime. Three factors can, however, work 
against citizens being able to exercise this civic duty: first, getting onto the 
electoral roll; then getting a ballot paper (either at a polling booth or through 
the mail); and finally, making a formal vote. 
Closing the electoral roll
Ease of enrolment is an important element of access and equity for voters in the 
electoral process. Early closure of electoral rolls has the potential to impact in a 
negative way on such access, particularly for people who are in the process of 
moving location or are living in a remote area, and for young people wanting 
to enrol for the first time. Australia does not have fixed-date elections at the 
federal level. The prime minister is able to call an election, within a specified 
time frame, without notice. The writs for the election are issued shortly 
thereafter. In February 1983, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser called an election 
for which the rolls closed ‘almost immediately’ after the announcement. The 
combination of an election being called with almost no warning and the sudden 
closure of the rolls meant that many citizens who would normally be eligible 
to vote were disenfranchised. As a result of this, the JSCER recommended that 
the rolls remain open for at least seven days following the formal announcement 
of an election. This seven-day period was duly brought into legislation in late 
1983. During the seven days, citizens were able to newly enrol or update their 
enrolment if they had moved address or changed their name. 
As a result of the Howard Coalition Government’s 2006 legislation, however, the 
electoral rolls closed for new enrolments at 8 pm on the day that writs were issued, 
and three business days after the issuing of the writs for enrolment changes. 
The Howard Government’s stated justification for this change was that it would 
enhance the integrity of the roll by preventing people from making fraudulent 
enrolments after an election is called. The government argued that by closing 
the roll earlier, the AEC would have additional time to verify new and updated 
enrolments. The government majority on the JSCEM recommended this change, 
with one of its arguments being that significant numbers of voters delayed 
updating their enrolment although legally required, waiting for the calling of 
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an election to be prompted into action. Labor members of the committee argued 
otherwise, stating that the proposed change would reintroduce the problems 
that had occurred with the sudden close of rolls in 1983, when many potential 
voters were turned away at polling booths because they had been deleted from 
the roll or were enrolled at the wrong address. 
A number of academics and human rights activists also mounted campaigns 
against this reform. For example, former Australian Electoral Commissioner 
Colin Hughes and Melbourne academic Brian Costar were vocal in opposing the 
change. Criticising the JSCEM arguments that the change would prevent fraud 
and ensure proper scrutiny of enrolments, Hughes and Costar argued that there 
was minimal evidence of fraud, and that the Australian National Audit Office 
had reviewed the roll and found it to have ‘high integrity’. They also noted that 
the AEC had confirmed that all enrolments were equally scrutinised, irrespective 
of timing.1 The Democratic Audit of Australia, based at The Australian National 
University, also promoted debate on the reform.2
At the 2004 election, during the seven-day period following the issuing of 
the writs, the AEC processed 78 816 new enrolments and 345 159 updated 
enrolments.3 A further 150 000 people applied after the seven-day period, but 
prior to the election, and therefore were prevented from being placed on the 
roll, or having their enrolment amended, in time for the election.4 The Howard 
Government provided the AEC with additional funding for a public awareness 
campaign to alert people to the earlier cut-off date. As a result, for the 2007 
election, there was a combined total of 279 469 new enrolments and enrolment 
updates between the calling of the election and the close of the roll5—a reduction 
of 34 per cent from the 2004 figures. 
The close of rolls for the 2010 general election was complicated by two court 
decisions that were handed down following the official close-of-rolls date. On 6 
August (just two weeks prior to the election), the High Court ruled (the Rowe 
decision) in a 4–3 decision that the provisions for the earlier close of rolls was 
unconstitutional.6 This required those people who had applied to be enrolled 
following the issuing of the writs, but within seven days of the issuing of writs 
(the pre–2006 period allowed), to be added to the roll. In addition, just eight 
1 Colin Hughes and Brian Costar. 2005. ‘Fiddling the Ballot Books.’ The Age, 3 November.
2 For example, see Marian Sawer. 2006. Damaging Democracy? Early Closure of Electoral Rolls. Canberra: 
Democratic Audit of Australia, The Australian National University.
3 AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2004. ‘Over 13 Million Australians Have the Right to Vote in the 
2004 Federal Election.’ Media Release, 10 September. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission.
4 Ian Campbell. 2006. ‘Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee Hearing.’ 7 March, 
Hansard. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, pp. 1–26.
5 AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2008. Submission to the Inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters into the 2007 Federal Election. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. 
6 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner [2010] HCA 46.
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days before the election, and after pre-poll voting had commenced, the Federal 
Court ruled that electronically completed enrolment forms were acceptable, 
requiring further changes to the roll (the Getup! decision).7 To accommodate 
these rulings, supplementary rolls were created, with more than 57 000 electors 
being added to the roll for the election. 
Despite the confusion that had been created, and the administrative difficulties 
the AEC had in creating new rolls in the midst of an election period, these 
court decisions highlight the importance of having an independent arbitrator 
overseeing legislative reforms that are often driven by political self-interest. 
The Howard Government change to an earlier close of rolls is viewed as 
favouring the Coalition electorally, with groups more likely not to be enrolled, 
or correctly enrolled, at the calling of an election being the young, itinerant 
and Indigenous—all groups seen as more likely to vote Labor. The Australian 
Election Study figures from 2004 show that only 43 per cent of young people 
(under twenty-five years, the age cohort with the lowest proportion of eligible 
citizens enrolled) supported the Liberal and Nationals parties, while 49 per 
cent supported the left-wing parties (Labor, 32 per cent; Greens, 17 per cent).8 
A State Labor MP succinctly stated the argument to the author:
It is a travesty of our democratic system that the Commonwealth committee 
pushed these changes through. It is nothing more than a deliberate 
attempt by a Liberal conservative government to disenfranchise further 
all of those people who may be Labor voters.
Over time, the AEC has adopted varying positions on the close-of-rolls issue. In 
a submission to the JSCEM in 2000, it noted that neither it nor the JSCEM had 
uncovered any organised or widespread attempt to defraud the roll through false 
enrolments in the previous 15 years. The AEC went on to state that the proposed 
early closure of the rolls would not improve the accuracy of the rolls for an 
election, and in fact the rolls would be less accurate, as electors would not have 
enough time to correct their enrolments or to apply for new enrolments. The 
AEC also stated that the change would have a negative impact on the franchise, 
that it would delay election results due to an anticipated rise in declaration 
voting, that it would have a particularly negative impact on young people 
seeking to vote for the first time, and that it would cause public confusion due 
to different systems operating at the State and Territory levels.
During questioning before the committee in 2005, the AEC reasserted the above 
position. At a hearing in March 2006, however, the newly appointed AEC 
Commissioner, Ian Campbell, stated that the earlier closure of the roll would 
7 Getup Ltd v Electoral Commissioner [2010] FCA 869. 
8 Clive Bean. 2005. ‘Young People’s Voting Patterns.’ Paper prepared for the Youth Electoral Study Workshop, 
Old Parliament House, Canberra, June.
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not create any difficulties and would actually ‘make our life easier’.9 Under new 
leadership, the AEC’s focus appeared to have switched from accuracy at election 
time to ongoing accuracy between elections; however, the current Commissioner, 
Ed Killesteyn, appears to be more circumspect with his comments on this issue. 
In 2010, the Rudd Labor Government had tried to reintroduce the seven-
day period between the issuing of the writs and the closing of the rolls, but 
was blocked by the Coalition’s opposition. Following the court decisions and 
the 2010 election, the Gillard Labor Government reintroduced legislation in 
November 2010. This was passed in May 2011, with the support of the Greens 
senators and Independent Senators Steve Fielding and Nick Xenophon. During 
the parliamentary debate, the Coalition continued to oppose the seven-day 
period, using arguments from the dissenting High Court judges, and in one case 
arguing that, in reference to the AEC’s advertising campaign, 100 000 people 
being left off the roll in 2007 was actually a positive outcome: 
In 2004 168,394 people missed the deadline of seven days after the writs 
were issued. Yet in 2007, when the deadline fell at 8 pm on the day the 
writs were issued, only 100,370 people missed the deadline.10
Automatic enrolment
There is growing concern as to the accuracy and completeness of electoral rolls 
in Australia. Although enrolment is compulsory for eligible Australians, an 
estimated 1.1–1.4 million people are not enrolled.11 In the Howard Government’s 
2006 reforms, more stringent ‘proof of identity’ requirements were introduced 
(arguably to prevent fraudulent enrolments) for people wishing to enrol or to 
change their enrolment. The new identification rules made it more difficult 
for the AEC to enrol people, even when the commission was aware of an 
enrolled person’s new address (for example, when the commission receives 
updates of motor vehicle registrations and rental agreements). Under current 
Commonwealth rules, the AEC may send an enrolment form to a person’s new 
address, but the person has to fill out, sign and return the form to the AEC 
before becoming enrolled. The AEC and State commissions operate ‘joint roll’ 
agreements, where information is shared to make enrolment easier for voters, 
but differing rules between jurisdictions can create confusion. 
9 Ian Campbell. 2006. ‘Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee Hearing.’ 7 March, 
Hansard.
10 Senator Mitch Fifield, Senate Hansard, 11 May 2011.
11 Australian National Audit Office. 2010. The Australian Electoral Commission’s Preparation for and Conduct 
of the 2007 Federal General Election. Report 28/10. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
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An alternative to the current system is ‘automatic enrolment’ (also known as 
‘direct enrolment’ or ‘smart enrolment’), which takes advantage of modern 
technologies and database sharing, and is extensively used in many modern 
democracies, especially in Europe (see ACE Encyclopaedia). Under automatic 
enrolment a commission automatically enrols citizens when they turn eighteen 
years of age, and updates a person’s enrolment once it is notified by government 
agencies that a person has changed address. The person is then informed that 
they are enrolled and is asked whether they have any objection to this. This 
changes the emphasis, requiring the person to take action to un-enrol, rather 
than to enrol. 
Automatic enrolment would address, in particular, the relatively low enrolment 
of young people who tend to be highly mobile and either drop off the roll or 
never get on it. This, in turn, would give young people greater political voice. 
As with all attempts to achieve a more comprehensive roll, however, this might 
be seen as having partisan effects. Young people are less likely to vote for the 
conservative parties and more likely to vote for Labor or the Greens. In 2009, 
the NSW Parliament passed legislation for automatic enrolment, which was in 
place ahead of that State’s 2011 election. The Victorian Parliament passed similar 
legislation in 2010. Nearly 60 per cent of Australia’s voters live in these two 
states, and to avoid major disruption from having separate rolls for federal and 
State elections, it makes sense for the Federal Government to adopt automatic 
enrolment. 
During debates on the close of rolls and automatic enrolment issues, reference 
is often made to the integrity of the roll, with Coalition politicians arguing 
that sufficient time is needed to verify new enrolees to prevent fraudulent 
enrolment. The Coalition has also argued for the introduction of ‘proof of 
identity’ requirements on the same ‘integrity’ grounds. Another integrity 
issue, however, is the integrity of the election result, which requires the largest 
possible participation of eligible voters in an election. While the two sides of 
politics in Australia’s inherently two-party system see a partisan advantage 
in regulating enrolment, it will continue to be difficult for international best 
practice to be adopted in Australia. 
Voter turnout
The level of voter turnout in democratic elections is an indicator of the health 
of a democracy. An election is the primary interaction between citizens and 
government, and a decline in turnout levels can undermine the legitimacy of 
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a democratic system.12 With compulsory enrolment and voting in place for all 
Australian jurisdictions, it could be expected that voter turnout would not be a 
significant issue. An assessment of turnout at the 75 general elections that have 
been conducted in Australia from 1983 to 2011 demonstrates this is the case, 
except in the Northern Territory. As Table 5.1 shows, turnout at NT elections 
is consistently more than 10 per cent lower than all other jurisdictions, which 
regularly have a voter turnout of more than 90 per cent. It is also important to 
note that turnout figures compare the number of people who actually voted 
with the number of people enrolled, and not with the number eligible to be 
enrolled, which will be a larger figure, thereby reducing the turnout rate. With 
otherwise consistently high rates under compulsory regimes, a drop of a few 
per cent can be a cause for concern. The figures therefore indicate that there is 
a serious issue to be addressed in the Northern Territory. 
Table 5.1 Turnout Rates, Australian Elections, 1983–2011
Jurisdiction
Turnout (%)






94 .6 - 94 .2 - 93 .8 - 95 .3 - 95 .8 - 95 .8 - 95 .0 - 94 .9 - 94 .3- 94 .8 -93 .2 94 .7
New South 
Wales
92 .5 - 93 .6 - 93 .6 - 93 .8 - 93 .1 - 91 .9 - 92 .6 - 92 .6 93 .0
Victoria 93 .2 - 92 .4 - 95 .1 - 94 .1 - 93 .2 - 93 .2 - 92 .7 - 93 .0 93 .4
Queensland 91 .7 - 91 .3 - 91 .2 - 91 .5 - 91 .4 - 92 .9 - 92 .6 - 91 .4 - 90 .5 - 90 .9 91 .5
Western 
Australia
89 .0 - 91 .4 - 90 .7 - 93 .5 - 90 .0 - 90 .6 - 89 .8 - 86 .5 90 .2
South 
Australia
93 .5 - 94 .4 - 93 .6 - 91 .8 - 93 .6 - 92 .3 - 92 .8 93 .1




88 .8 - 90 .3 - 89 .5 - 92 .6 - 90 .9 - 92 .8 - 90 .4 90 .8
Northern 
Territory
81 .6 - 71 .2 - 81 .6 - 80 .7 - 79 .0 - 80 .6 - 80 .1 - 75 .7 78 .9
Sources: Various electoral commission reports and web sites.
12 Andrew Ellis, Maria Gratschew, Jon H. Pammett and Erin Thiessen. 2006. Engaging the Electorate: 
Initiatives to Promote Voter Turnout from Around the World—Including Voter Turnout Data from National 
Elections Worldwide 1945–2006. Stockholm: International IDEA, p. 12.
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Indigenous enrolment and turnout
A comparison between NT Assembly election turnout and voting in the 
Northern Territory at federal elections (Table 5.2) shows that turnout is 
consistently lower at assembly elections. There has, however, also been a notable 
drop in federal election turnout figures in the Northern Territory during the 
2000s (average 84.9 per cent), compared with the 1990s (average 89.4 per cent). 
The Northern Territory has the highest proportion of Indigenous people in 
Australia (31.6 per cent)—significantly higher than the second-highest ranking 
jurisdiction, Western Australia (3.8 per cent).13 One possibility for the drop in 
turnout at federal elections in the Northern Territory could be the abolition of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Election Education and Information 
Service (ATSIEEIS).14 
Table 5.2 Northern Territory Voter Turnout, 1983–2010 (per cent)
Year Federal House of Representatives NT Assembly
1983 81 .4 81 .6
1984 85 .5 -
1987 79 .9 71 .2
1990 89 .4 81 .6
1993 88 .8 -
1994 - 80 .7
1996 89 .1 -
1997 - 79 .0
1998 90 .3 -
2001 86 .1 80 .6
2004 84 .3 -
2005 - 80 .1
2007 86 .5 -
2008 - 75 .7
2010 82 .7 -
Sources: AEC; Northern Territory Electoral Commission; Australian Government and Politics Database.
13 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2007. ‘4705.0—Population Distribution, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians, 2006.’ Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics <http://www.abs.gov.au>
14 Although the ATSIEEIS was abolished in 1996, it can be argued that the positive impact of its programs 
remained for the 1998 election. 
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The ATSIEEIS program was concentrated in the federal electorate of Lingiari, 
which takes in all areas of the Northern Territory outside Darwin. Lingiari, 
established when the Northern Territory was split into two seats for the 2001 
federal election, has the highest concentration of Indigenous voters in the country 
(43.5 per cent). This is more than double the next highest concentration—18.2 
per cent in Kalgoorlie, Western Australia.15 Since Lingiari’s creation, it has 
recorded turnout figures of 80.6 per cent (2001), 77.7 per cent (2004), 81.3 per 
cent (2007) and 75.9 per cent (2010). Lingiari’s are the lowest turnout rates in 
Australia. 
Figure 5.1 Turnout at the 2005 NT Assembly General Election
Note: See Appendix B for electorate data.
An analysis of elector turnout at NT elections presents a similar story, and, with 
its smaller electorates (about 4000–5000 enrolled), provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the issue. Figure 5.1 shows the correlation between Indigenous 
population and voter turnout at the 2005 general election. The six electorates 
with the lowest Indigenous populations (average 6.6 per cent Indigenous)16 have 
an average turnout of 84.2 per cent, while turnout for the six highest Indigenous 
15 Paul Nelson. 2007. Electoral Division Rankings: Census 2006 First Release. Research Paper 12 2007–08. 
Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, p. 33.
16 Port Darwin, Wanguri, Nelson, Nightcliff, Fannie Bay and Casuarina.
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population electorates (average 70.7 per cent Indigenous)17 averages only 64.4 
per cent. The lowest voter turnout was in the Stuart electorate, with an 84.3 per 
cent Indigenous population and only 59.3 per cent turnout. Generally, voter 
turnout at by-elections tends to be lower than that for general elections, and at 
a by-election for the seat of Stuart in 2006, turnout was down to 53.9 per cent. 
It is an added concern in the context of the legitimacy of election results if low 
turnout figures are compounded by high levels of informal voting, resulting 
in a significant gap between the level of formal votes and the number of 
people eligible to vote. It can be anticipated that there would be a correlation 
between literacy levels in remote Indigenous populations and the number of 
informal votes, and there is a trend over time towards higher informality in 
high-Indigenous electorates. The average informality rate at the 2005 general 
election for the six low-Indigenous electorates was 3.3 per cent, compared with 
an average 5.3 per cent for the six high-Indigenous electorates. Another factor 
in high-Indigenous areas could be the number of candidates contesting seats. 
Results from the assembly seat of Stuart emphasise this. In 2005, when only 
two candidates stood, the informal rate was 4.6 per cent. The following year six 
candidates contested the Stuart by-election, and the informality rate increased 
to 13.6 per cent.
Abolition of ATSIEEIS
The abolition of the ATSIEEIS in 1996 is a good example of a government impacting 
directly on the ostensibly independent operations of an electoral management 
body, and potentially providing partisan advantages to the governing parties. 
The ATSIEEIS was a unit of the AEC that had been established in 1979 to 
target remote and urban Indigenous communities, with an ongoing focus on 
encouraging enrolment. In the nearly two decades for which it operated, the 
unit was seen as instrumental in improving the rates of Indigenous enrolment 
and voting, especially in remote areas. The value of ATSIEEIS was explained by 
one commissioner:
They used to rip these poor Indigenous people off the roll, send out an 
objection letter, wouldn’t matter if you couldn’t read the bloody thing, 
you’re off the roll. In the early ’80s they were ripping them off the roll. 
It was a shocker. Then ATSIEEIS came along and started rectifying a 
lot of the stuff to quite a meaningful extent, but then when ATSIEEIS 
stopped, the capacity to send people out with non-voters’ notices also 
stopped.
17 Stuart, Arnhem, Arafura, MacDonnell, Barkly and Nhulunbuy.
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It is argued that since the abolition of the unit, enrolment rates for Indigenous 
people have dropped markedly.18 This is seen as a distinct advantage for the 
Coalition, due to the high level of support for Labor in remote Indigenous 
communities. As one administrator stated:
The issues are: we’ve got a high Indigenous rate, we’ve got a lot of people 
living in remote areas, it’s a very young population, we’ve got a highly 
mobile population—so the more people you get on the roll, the more 
people you educate to participate in a meaningful way in elections. [It] 
would tend to advantage the ALP. That’s not the reason we do it. 
The Howard Government’s move to abolish this unit was the first time that the 
AEC had been given an explicit instruction about how it may spend its budget. 
This instruction therefore raises the issue of whether such an intervention is 
a challenge to the AEC’s independence. The impact of removing the ATSIEEIS 
program is summarised by two electoral commissioners as follows: 
Taking away ATSIEEIS’s program in ’97 had a significant impact on the 
delivery of education services and enrolment potential. In 10 years, you 
can actually see how it’s affecting the roll.
The best example of political interference in funding of electoral 
authorities is the fate of [ATSIEEIS]. It was a separate line item in the 
budget and they said, ‘No, we’re not giving you that any more, and 
you’re not allowed to spend any other part of your budget on it. If you 
do, we’ll take it off you.’ I think that’s entirely inappropriate and it 
should never have happened.
It was confirmed in interviews that if the AEC wished to reinstate a program 
such as the ATSIEEIS, it would not do so independently, but instead would 
make a request to the government to fund what is considered by the AEC as a 
politically sensitive program. As one administrator said:
If there’s sensitivity about it then you go through the minister’s office…
given that it was a program that was abolished by government then, 
yeah [it was politically sensitive]. No matter how independent you are, 
everybody is dependent upon somebody for money. 
The AEC’s dependence on government approval to undertake a program that 
could improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of electoral rolls diminishes 
the independence of the electoral administration. That such a program was 
18 Warren Snowdon. 2004. ‘Senate Victory Used to Silence Voters.’ Media Release, 20 December. 
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considered politically sensitive indicates that decisions might not be made in 
the interests of best electoral practice, but in response to the political leanings 
of the government.
Following the 2007 federal change to a Labor government, the AEC received $13 
million in the 2009 Budget to establish the Indigenous Electoral Participation 
Program. The program has four objectives: electoral education, increased 
enrolment levels, increased election turnout, and reduced informal voting. This 
is a well-intentioned response to the declining participation rates shown above, 
but also will have electoral benefits for Labor. If an independent body could 
make budgetary decisions (as the AEC would have done if it had the power) 
then perceptions of partisanship would be removed. 
Administrative response to Indigenous 
enrolment and turnout
As discussed above, the manner in which Indigenous voter enrolment and 
turnout are dealt with by administrators and legislators provides a good 
insight into the drivers of reform—that is, whether reforms are driven by the 
interests of governing parties or are based on accepted norms for good electoral 
management. Interviews in jurisdictions with high proportions of Indigenous 
people consistently identified Indigenous enrolment and turnout as major and 
ongoing issues. This is especially so in remote areas with low accessibility, which 
are among those most likely to have high proportions of Indigenous people. 
A 2003 JSCEM report noted that the AEC, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission and the Labor Party had all expressed concerns about the 
under-enrolment of Indigenous people. The Labor submission to the inquiry 
estimated that Indigenous enrolment was only 54 per cent of those eligible, 
compared with 95 per cent of non-Indigenous Australians.19 JSCEM stated in its 
2003 report that it would pursue this issue, but the committee’s report into the 
2004 election did not refer to it. 
A number of reasons have been suggested to explain low Indigenous turnout. 
Kate Alport and Lisa Hill cite antipathy, largely brought about by a lack of 
efficacy in terms of the relevance and impact of votes in determining election 
outcomes. They argue that the lack of enforcement of compulsory voting in 
remote areas is another key factor.20 It is important to note that seats with 
19 The ALP estimated 140 000 enrolled out of a possible 260 000 Indigenous people. Australian Labor Party. 
2002. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the 2001 Federal Election: Submission by the 
Australian Labor Party. Submission no. 153. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
20 Kate Alport and Lisa Hill. 2008. ‘Voting Attitudes and Behaviour Among Aboriginal Peoples: Reports 
from 29 Anangu Women.’ Refereed paper delivered at the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, 
Brisbane, 6–9 July, p. 3. 
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high Indigenous populations tend to be safe Labor seats. For example, the six 
high-Indigenous NT seats referred to earlier are held by Labor with margins of 
62–76 per cent of the two-party preferred vote. There is therefore no electoral 
advantage for Country Liberal Party governments to encourage greater levels of 
Indigenous enrolment and participation, and in fact there is a disadvantage. One 
electoral administrator expressed a view on this issue:
I said here’s where we think we should be going with mobile polling 
places, what do you think? Well, the conservative side of politics don’t 
like that idea, but they’re not going to come out and say ‘we don’t want 
to see these people voting’. 
Aspects of the Howard Government’s 2006 reforms—especially the earlier 
close of rolls and the need for proof-of-identity for enrolment and provisional 
voting—were seen as additional barriers to higher levels of participation among 
Indigenous people. As Alport and Hill point out, ‘[m]any Aboriginal people 
do not carry a wallet, therefore there is nowhere to keep any cards and they 
are easily lost’.21 Furthermore, because these are such safe seats, there is little 
incentive for Labor governments to take action to encourage participation. 
Low voter turnout can also be a reflection of protest against government 
authority and can further explain low participation for this social group. This 
view was supported by one interviewee:
You would have to work out how much of it was the abolition of the 
[ATSIEEIS] program and people going around, and how much was a 
general disillusionment with a particular section of the community with 
the government of the day. And certainly in the first six to eight years of 
[the Howard] government there’s been quite a bit of tension between the 
Indigenous community and the government.
NT Assembly elections: time frame
As shown in Table 5.2, voter turnout for NT Assembly elections is consistently 
and significantly lower than that for federal elections in the Northern Territory. 
A reason for this difference appears to be the short election campaign period 
between the calling of an assembly election and polling day. The Territory’s 
Electoral Act 2004 (Section 28, amended in 2009) requires that polling day 
must be 19 days after the issuing of the writ. This is the shortest timetable in 
operation in Australia and, as a result, all procedural aspects of NT elections 
21 Alport and Hill go on to suggest, however, that photo identity cards could be useful to encourage 
enrolment and turnout, as a form of civic engagement.
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need to meet tight deadlines. For example, rolls close two days after election 
writs are issued, nominations close a further two days later, and postal and 
mobile voting commences three days after that.
In addition to the short timetable for campaigns, until 2009 elections could 
be called at any time after the first three years of an assembly first sitting, 
enabling the chief minister to call an election with little warning. Together, 
these two factors would make it logistically difficult to conduct an election 
in any jurisdiction, but this is especially so in the Northern Territory, which 
has a large geographic area of dispersed settlement. The previous 18-day time 
frame was more than a week shorter than other Australian jurisdictions without 
fixed election dates. As one administrator noted in an interview, ‘the ALP in 
opposition were very critical of the cramped timetable…certainly a government 
of any colour prefers to have control’.
The Minter Ellison report commissioned by the Labor government in 2003 was 
opposed to this short election period and recommended extending the timetable 
to 33 days. In addition, the NT Electoral Commissioner recommended that either 
fixed-date elections be introduced or the election time frame be lengthened by 
at least seven days.22 It is evident that the short election campaign period can 
impact on voter turnout. Problems include accessing people in remote areas for 
enrolment, especially when they might have only one chance to vote at a mobile 
polling booth less than two weeks later, and having enough time for postal voters 
to receive and return their completed ballot papers. In some instances, election 
dates are known well in advance based on comments from the government. 
The 2008 general election, however, held on 9 August was considered to be a 
‘snap’ election, with the announcement made only 19 days earlier. Turnout at 
the election was 75.65 per cent—the lowest for more than 20 years. 
In 2009, the NT Government amended the Electoral Act, introducing fixed dates 
for future elections; however, the government extended the election period 
by only a day, from 18 to 19 days, to fit in with a timeline based on a five-
day working week. The government’s argument for not extending the period 
further was that with the introduction of fixed-date elections, people will have 
more warning. It does not, however, address the logistical issues of printing and 
distributing ballot papers, issuing postal voting papers, and voters not knowing 
the full field of candidates until, in some cases, a couple of days prior to voting.
22 Northern Territory Electoral Commission. 2007. 2005 Legislative Assembly General Election Report: Part 
1 of 2. Darwin: Northern Territory Electoral Commission.
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Informal voting
Any level of informal voting diminishes the legitimacy of election results 
and alienates voters through disaffection. The pattern and extent of informal 
voting provide insight into the health of an electoral system on a number of 
levels. Informal voting can be either deliberate (when voters choose not to 
make their vote count, for example, to make a protest) or accidental (as when 
voters inadvertently make a numbering mistake). Both deliberate and accidental 
informal voting are concerns for electoral administrators, the former because 
it signifies citizens’ disconnection and disillusionment with the democratic 
system, and the latter because it indicates that voters do not understand the 
voting method, or that the process is too confusing or burdensome. Accidental 
informal voters are disenfranchised because the system has failed to provide an 
adequately simple method of voting. 
In their study of informal voting in the 1987 and 1990 elections, McAllister 
et al. note that among established liberal democracies, Australia has one of 
the highest rates of informal voting.23 Their study identified Australia’s social 
structure as being a key determinant of informal voting. In particular, ethnicity 
is a significant indicator of informal voting levels, with a lack of English language 
proficiency increasing the likelihood of informal voting. In recent years, the 
AEC has published a number of reports assessing informal voting rates. The 
reports on the 2001 and 2004 elections24 support McAllister et al.’s argument 
that proficiency in English is a significant determinant of informal voting. In 
addition, Gina Dario identifies two other important factors that influence levels 
of informal voting: the use of optional preferential voting at the State level (for 
New South Wales and Queensland) and the number of candidates contesting an 
election. These factors are discussed in relation to federal, State and Territory 
elections.
Informal voting at federal elections
The high levels of informal voting in Senate elections were identified as a concern 
by the JSCER, which published the results of two informal voting surveys in its 
first report in 1983. These surveys—of the Senate elections in 1977 (Australia 
wide) and 1983 (14 selected divisions)—showed that more than 50 per cent 
of all informal Senate votes were a result of incorrect numbering caused by 
23 Ian McAllister, Toni Makkai and Chris Patterson. 1992. Informal Voting in the 1987 and 1990 Australian 
Federal Elections. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
24 Rod Medew. 2003. Informal Vote Survey, House of Representatives, 2001 Election. Research Report no. 
1. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission; Gina Dario. 2005. Analysis of Informal Voting During the 2004 
House of Representatives Election. Research Report no. 7. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission.
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either a break in the sequence or duplicating numbers. A further 25 per cent of 
informal votes resulted from voters not numbering all the squares. The Hawke 
Government’s introduction of above-the-line Senate voting, which was used 
by more than 85 per cent of voters at the 1984 election, was instrumental in 
lowering the rate of informal voting for the Senate (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Senate and House of Representatives Informal Voting Rates  
(per cent)
1980 1983 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Senate 9 .7 9 .9 4 .7 4 .0 3 .4 2 .6 3 .5 3 .2 3 .9 3 .8 2 .6 3 .7
HoR 2 .4 2 .1 6 .3 4 .9 3 .2 3 .0 3 .2 3 .8 4 .8 5 .2 4 .0 5 .6
The relaxation of the requirement to number all boxes for those voting below 
the line was another intervention that further lowered the informal rate. From 
1984, Senate ballot papers were formal if they clearly identified a sequence of 
preferences against at least 90 per cent of the candidates listed. For example, 
where there are 50 candidates on the ballot paper, numbering the ballot paper 
from 1 to at least 45 constitutes a formal vote. 
While the 1983 reforms were successful in lowering the Senate informal rate, 
informal rates for the House of Representatives increased markedly following 
the same reforms. The AEC identified in its 1988 report that first preferences 
were clearly indicated in more than 62 per cent of all informal House of 
Representatives votes cast in the 1987 election. A relaxation of the rules to allow 
these votes to be added to the count would have reduced the informal rate from 
4.9 per cent to 1.9 per cent.
Table 5.4 Informal Voting Rates: 2004 House of Representatives Election
No . of 
candidates No . ofseats Highest rate (%) Lowest rate (%)
Average rate 
(%)
4 3 5 .53 3 .61 4 .31
5 18 9 .11 2 .87 4 .44
6 29 9 .24 2 .76 4 .68
7 39 9 .10 2 .77 4 .89
8 30 11 .71 3 .40 5 .64
9 18 8 .43 4 .22 5 .70
10 6 7 .45 4 .49 5 .81
11 5 8 .53 5 .89 6 .64
12 1 7 .41 7 .41 7 .41
13 0 - - -
14 1 11 .83 11 .83 11 .83
Total 150 11 .83 2 .76 5 .19
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
76
As previously mentioned, the number of candidates contesting an election is 
a determinant of informal voting. The 2004 election figures show a positive 
correlation between candidate numbers and informal votes, with a steady 
increase in the informal rate as the number of candidates increases (Table 5.4). 
An examination of the highest and lowest informal rates for each category 
(of number of candidates) highlights the influence of other factors, such as 
ethnicity. For example, the high rate of 11.71 per cent of informal votes with 
eight candidates contesting occurred in the seat of Reid, an inner metropolitan 
electorate in Sydney. Reid has the highest proportion of people born overseas of 
all Australian electorates (49.5 per cent), and the second-highest proportion of 
people from non–English-speaking countries (35.5 per cent).25 This relationship 
is further illustrated in Table 5.5, which presents electorates with the highest 
informal rates per candidate by location and ethnicity. 
Table 5.5 2004 House of Representatives High Informal Rates: Ethnicity
No . of candidates Highest informal rate (%) Electorate NESC ranking
4 5 .53 Throsby 62
5 9 .11 Fowler 8
6 9 .24 Prospect 12
7 9 .10 Watson 1
8 11 .71 Reid 2
9 8 .43 Kingsford Smith 25
10 7 .45 Lindsay 65
11 8 .53 Parramatta 16
12 7 .41 Dobell 124
13 - - -
14 11 .83 Greenway 48
Note: NESC = born in a non–English-speaking country. Ranking is of 150 electorates; 1 indicates the 
highest proportion of NESC.
Of the 10 seats with the highest rates of informal voting per number of 
candidates, more than two-thirds (seven) are ranked in the top third of 
electorates for numbers of people born in non–English-speaking countries. 
It is also significant that all of these 10 electorates are in New South Wales, 
where an optional preferential voting system is used at State-level elections. In 
an assessment of informal votes in New South Wales, Dario found that 35.65 
per cent were made informal by the voter numbering ‘1’ only, with a further 
10.71 per cent of voters having incorrectly used a tick or cross. In all, 46.36 per 
cent or more than 116 000 voters in the State attempted to vote correctly but 
25 Paul Nelson. 2007. Electoral Division Rankings: Census 2006 First Release.
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were accidentally disenfranchised.26 All of these votes would be formal under 
State election voting rules. It is important to note that the informal rate at the 
2003 NSW Legislative Assembly election was 2.6 per cent—less than half of 
the 6.1 per cent the State recorded at the 2004 Federal House of Representatives 
election in New South Wales. This disparity is further evidence that confusion 
about different voting rules and making voting unduly burdensome contribute 
to informal voting. 









(% of total 
informal)




14 .06 Blaxland 29 .6 12 .0 8 3
12 .83 Fowler 36 .8 20 .9 4 8
12 .80 Watson 38 .6 16 .7 4 1
11 .16 Chifley 31 .4 14 .5 7 18
10 .84 McMahona 34 .1 22 .5 4 12
10 .35 Werriwa 33 .5 18 .8 3 26
10 .27 Greenway 23 .9 8 .6 11 48
9 .82 Barton 42 .8 16 .6 3 7
8 .80 Reid 39 .7 14 .1 5 2
8 .65 Parramatta 31 .5 14 .8 7 16
a formerly Prospect
Note: NESC = born in a non–English-speaking country. Ranking is of 150 electorates; 1 indicates the 
highest proportion of NESC.
Analysis of informal voting at the 2010 election reaffirms the influence of 
ethnicity and having a different voting system at the State level. Of the 150 
House of Representatives seats, the 10 highest levels of informal voting were 
in contiguous electorates in western metropolitan Sydney, New South Wales 
(see Table 5.6). All of these seats also ranked in the top third of voters from 
non–English-speaking countries. The number of candidates contesting appears 
to have less influence in the 2010 election, with half of these seats having 
only three or four candidates. In analysis conducted by the AEC, it is shown 
that more than half of informal voters in these seats had shown a clear first 
26 Gina Dario. 2005. Analysis of Informal Voting During the 2004 House of Representatives Election, 
pp. 15–16.
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preference on their ballot paper, by marking a ‘1’ only, or using a tick or cross.27 
This equates to nearly 48 000 voters being accidentally disenfranchised in these 
10 electorates. 
Proposals to introduce optional preferential voting have lacked support at 
the federal level. Parliamentarians have raised concerns about the potential 
impacts of relaxing the rules to allow ‘1 only’ votes or votes using ticks and 
crosses. Concerns are largely based on the difficulty in discouraging voters 
from intentionally voting this way. The JSCEM report on the 1990 election 
highlighted this difficulty, with the committee stating that a change to the rules 
would encourage optional preferential voting, as well as ‘Langer’-style voting.28 
The concern that a change to optional preferential voting would become a de 
facto first-past-the-post voting system has been confirmed by the experience of 
Queensland elections since optional preferential voting was introduced in that 
State. 
In Queensland, a significant unforeseen impact of the reform to optional 
preferential voting is the change in how political parties run their campaigns. 
Prior to the 2001 election, the major parties advocated filling out all preferences. 
From 2001, however, parties have increasingly advised voters to ‘just vote one’, 
with all major parties now advocating this option on their how-to-vote material. 
As a result, approximately two-thirds of voters—63.03 per cent—used the ‘1 
only’ option at the 2006 election. This is confirming that the system is turning 
into a de facto first-past-the-post system, where seats are determined by a 
minority of votes and voters are not appropriately informed of their options. 
Consequently, while the reform is an improvement on fairness in regard to ease 
of voting, voters’ ability to make an informed choice is diminished due to the 
limited information provided in parties’ how-to-vote material. 
Informal voting at State and Territory levels
Analysis of informal voting at State and Territory elections provides an insight 
into the impacts of the voting systems in use. Using data for the lower house 
(or single house in unicameral systems) from the past three elections (Table 5.7), 
it is evident that the optional preferential voting system in place in New South 
Wales and Queensland consistently produces lower rates of voting informality. 
27 AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2011. Analysis of Informal Voting: House of Representatives, 2010 
Federal Election. Research Report no. 12, 29 March. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, p. 30.
28 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 1991. 1990 Federal Election: Report from the 
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, pp. 
41–2. Langer-style voting was promoted by Albert Langer so that voters could avoid directing preferences to 
one major party over the other by duplicating a number in their preferences—for example, by numbering the 
ballot paper 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5. 
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Table 5.7 State and Territory Informal Rates: Lower/Single Houses
Jurisdiction Voting system








New South Wales OPV 2 .51          2 .62          2 .77 2 .63 2 .37
Queensland OPV 2 .27          1 .99          2 .08 2 .11
Victoria FPV 3 .02          3 .42          4 .56 3 .67 4 .26
Western Australia FPV 4 .39          4 .54          5 .24 4 .72
Northern Territory FPV 5 .17          4 .27          3 .75 4 .40
South Australia FPV-Ticket 4 .04          3 .12          3 .60 3 .59 3 .59
Tasmania Hare-Clark 3 .91          4 .87          4 .49 4 .42 4 .04
Australian Capital 
Territory
Hare-Cark 4 .32          3 .97          2 .68 3 .66
Notes: OPV = optional preferential voting; FPV = full preferential voting; FPV-Ticket = a ‘1 only’ vote is 
formal, with full preferences distributed according to a ticket lodged by the candidate.
South Australia is the only Australian jurisdiction that uses ticket voting as 
an option for single-member electorates. Where voters make a ‘1 only’ vote, 
preferences flow according to a ticket lodged by the candidate of their first (and 
only) choice. This could partially explain why South Australia’s informal rate is 
lower than the other jurisdictions with full preferential voting. Ticket voting, 
however, makes up less than 5 per cent of all votes in SA Assembly elections, 
so its effect on informal voting cannot be substantial. The two jurisdictions 
operating under the Hare-Clark system of proportional representation, with no 
ticket voting, also record relatively high levels of informality. At the federal 
level, the average House of Representatives informal rate over the same period 
is 4.2 per cent—in line with other jurisdictions with full preferential voting. 
Table 5.8 Informal Voting: Queensland State Elections
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2006 2009
1 .47 2 .17 3 .00 2 .25 1 .75 1 .45 2 .27 1 .99 2 .08 1 .94
Sources: Electoral Commission of Queensland; Australian Government and Politics Database.
The introduction of optional preferential voting in Queensland for the 1992 
election appears to have had little impact on the rate of informal voting, 
which has already been at a low level since the 1980s (see Table 5.8). Optional 
preferential voting is usually expected to reduce rates of informal voting (as 
discussed above in the Victorian case study). There are two reasons this has 
not occurred in Queensland. First, the rate of informal voting was already low 
prior to the change; second, voters fill out only one ballot paper on election day, 
removing the confusion experienced by voters in bicameral jurisdictions. 
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Another interesting aspect of the State and Territory figures is the decreased 
rate of informal voting when electronic ballots are used in the Australian Capital 
Territory, which has been partly a result of the introduction and increasing use 
of electronic voting. The use of electronic voting can have significant democratic 
benefits, including increased accessibility for people with a disability and 
voters living in remote areas. It also enables more rapid and accurate counting 
of votes. Electronic voting was introduced as a trial for the 2001 ACT general 
election. The almost accidental initiation of the reform process that occurred 
for the introduction of electronic voting provides insight into the importance 
of personal relationships in achieving reforms, especially when there are no 
apparent partisan advantages to the reform. The Australian Capital Territory’s 
Electoral Commissioner described the process as follows: 
Electronic voting and counting was a huge coup…The main reason we 
succeeded was that after the 1998 election we had to do a recount in 
Molonglo, when we had three or four votes difference between two 
candidates and we did a full recount, and actually worked out we got 
it wrong the first time around. I was wanting to do something that was 
more accurate and Kate Carnell got in as chief minister at that election. 
At the declaration of the poll, we started talking about electronic voting 
and counting. I said I would love to do electronic voting and counting 
but it’s going to cost a bomb. I can’t imagine you would be prepared to 
pay that. She said, ‘Yes, we would—do it.’ 
Table 5.9 Use of Electronic Voting and Informality Rates in the Australian 
Capital Territory
Election Paper votes Informal rate (%) Electronic votes Informal rate (%)
2001 182 162 4 .3 16 559 0 .6
2004 181 580 2 .9 28 169 1 .1
2008 176 199 4 .1 43 820 2 .6
Sources: ACT Electoral Commission, 2002, 2005, 2009.
At the 2004 election, 13.4 per cent of all votes were lodged electronically—an 
increase from 8.3 per cent at the 2001 election. The 2008 election saw a further 
increase in electronic votes to 19.9 per cent of all votes. While the electronic 
voting system allows voters to make an informal vote, accidental informal 
voting is almost entirely eliminated, as the system issues a warning to the voter 
that their vote will be informal if they continue. The impact of electronic voting 
can be seen in the reduced level of informal voting in the past three elections 
compared with votes cast by paper ballots (Table 5.9). 
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The reduction of informal voting has democratic implications for voters: with 
unintentional informal voting being virtually eliminated, fewer voters are 
accidentally disenfranchised. It has been suggested by Elections ACT that the 
particularly low level of informal electronic voting in 2001 (0.6 per cent) was 
due to electronic voters in 2001 being a self-selecting sample of voters who 
opted to use the new system, who were possibly more committed to lodging a 
formal vote than other voters. In 2004, electronic voting was the more common 
form of voting at booths where this was possible; the informal rate in the 2004 
election therefore more accurately reflects the impact of electronic voting on the 
general population. The level of informal electronic voting at the 2008 election 
was significantly higher than in previous elections. Part of the reason was that 
about one-quarter of the informal votes (295 of 1152) were due to barcodes 
being discarded by electors prior to their votes being lodged. This could be 
intentional informal voting or, more likely, a problem with inadequate voter 
education. 
Reducing the level of informal voting
It can be seen from the examples in this chapter that there are several 
mechanisms available to reduce the relatively high levels of informal voting in 
many Australian jurisdictions. While shifting from a bicameral parliament to a 
unicameral system simply to reduce the informal rate by a couple of per cent 
would understandably be viewed as an extreme measure, easier solutions are 
readily available to legislators. 
First, a move from full to optional preferential voting would not only reduce the 
informal rate, but also quash the argument that voters should not be compelled 
to number all boxes when they are also compelled to vote. Positions on optional 
preferential voting tend to be based on political pragmatism. In brief, although 
Labor governments introduced optional preferential voting in New South 
Wales and Queensland, the party currently supports full preferential voting 
because it means they receive the majority of preferences from Greens voters, 
ahead of the Coalition. Under an optional system, many of these votes would 
likely be exhausted prior to reaching the Labor candidate. Interestingly, the 
Coalition also supports full preferential voting as it allows Liberal and Nationals 
candidates to support each other in contests against Labor candidates. Some 
Coalition members, however, are now supporting optional preferential voting as 
a means of limiting the preference flow from the Greens to Labor. 
JSCEM’s report on the 2010 federal election provides interesting political 
arguments for reducing informal voting. While the Labor members were opposed 
to optional preferential voting, they did support a saving provision (which 
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currently exists in SA state elections) where ‘1 only’ votes would be directed in 
a way determined by the ‘1’ candidate/party. This is incorrectly called a saving 
provision, which implies an accidental mistake made by the voter filling out the 
ballot paper. It actually enables the candidate/party to capture first-preference 
votes and direct them to other candidates in a way that might go against a 
voter’s wishes. The Coalition committee members were strongly opposed to this 
recommendation.
A simpler and more effective solution would be to have a genuine saving 
provision that captures ‘1 only’ votes, with those votes exhausted once the 
candidate is eliminated. To prevent elections becoming pseudo first-past-the-
post contests, candidates and parties could be prohibited from advocating ‘1 
only’ voting in their campaigning material. This would be a fairer outcome, as 
it would not be subverting informal voters’ preferences to candidates/parties. 
The use of electronic voting in the Australian Capital Territory has clearly shown 
its value in reducing the rate of informal voting. While electoral commissioners 
around Australia have shown genuine interest in implementing similar systems, 
their difficulty, as with many innovations, is in getting legislative reforms 
to allow this to be used. The ACT jurisdiction has an ideal geographic and 
demographic profile to implement electronic voting, with a small, well-educated 
population situated in the northern half of the Territory. Ideally, the computer 
hardware could be used for trials in other jurisdictions, as a step towards more 
widespread implementation. 
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6. Registration of Political Parties
Political parties play a critical role in healthy democracies. One of their main 
functions is to provide an organised way of developing policy that represents 
societal cleavages. In addition, parties cultivate a democracy’s future leaders, 
they give a sense of order and stability to parliamentary organisation and 
debate, they bring together disparate groups and individuals into processes of 
democracy, they recruit political activists, and they provide defined choices in 
election campaigns.1 In modern democracies, it would be hard to imagine an 
organised and stable political environment without some form of political party 
structure. 
While there might be a tendency for parties to naturally form to embrace new 
or existing social views, the institutional design of electoral systems allows for a 
form of ‘political engineering’ to occur—either encouraging the formation of new 
parties (typically where a democracy’s party system is weak) or creating barriers 
to the continuation of existing parties or the formation of new parties. Barriers 
are typically erected in multi-party democracies where an excess of parties has 
created confusion for voters at elections or where there might be instability 
in government or parliament. Barriers can also be used as an anticompetitive 
measure in democracies where established parties seek to thwart potential new 
participants (or to deter non-genuine competition). A healthy democracy would 
normally provide a balance between encouragement and restriction in its party 
regulation regime. 
Organised political parties and other political bodies have existed in Australia 
for more than 100 years, but it is only in the past 30 years that significant 
reforms have occurred to recognise parties in a formalised sense for electoral 
purposes. These purposes include ballot paper design, funding and disclosure 
requirements, and the distribution of voter preferences. In addition to 
influencing the capacity for citizens to coalesce into political groupings, such 
reforms impact on the ability of candidates to compete on a fair and equal 
basis. The favoured status given to registered political parties—for example, in 
accessing public funding and identification on ballot papers—also impacts on 
the ability of political organisations to deliver messages to voters during election 
campaigns. Such messages are essential to enable voters to make an informed 
choice. 
1 Benjamin Reilly, Per Nordlund and Edward Newman. 2008. Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: 
Encouraging Inclusive Politics and Democratic Development. Policy Brief no. 2. Tokyo: United Nations 
University.
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Registration criteria
The formal registration of political parties in Australia commenced in New 
South Wales in 1981, and has generally been viewed as a necessary corollary to 
other reforms such as public funding, party identification on ballot papers and 
above-the-line ticket voting. All jurisdictions impose conditions concerning the 
name of a party. Consistent across all jurisdictions are requirements that
•	 party names are to have a maximum of six words 
•	 obscene names are prohibited.
•	 In addition, in every jurisdiction, party names are not to
•	 resemble the name of another, unrelated party
•	 be likely to cause confusion with another party
•	 contain the word ‘independent’ or ‘independent party’. 
Commonly, the following information is a condition of application for registration 
•	 the name of a person to be the party’s registered officer (in Western Australia, 
the party secretary)
•	 an abbreviated form of the party name, for ballot paper purposes 
•	 a copy of the party’s constitution (except Tasmania). 
In Queensland, the constitutions of registered parties must include rules 
stipulating that preselection ballots are to be based on ‘principles of free and 
democratic elections’. In addition, four jurisdictions require a fee for registration: 
$500 for the Commonwealth, Victoria and the Northern Territory; and $2000 for 
New South Wales. 
All Australian jurisdictions also require a minimum membership size before 
a party may be registered. The minimum number of members differs widely, 
especially when compared with the total number of people enrolled in the 
jurisdiction. As Table 6.1 illustrates, the variation currently extends by a 
multiple of approximately 47, from the Commonwealth’s one member per 28 
174 enrolled to the Northern Territory’s one member per 599 enrolled. Apart 
from these two outlier jurisdictions, however, the remaining seven jurisdictions 
are reasonably consistent, with a ratio of about 2400–7200 enrolled per party 
member. The capacity of citizens to form into political groupings is evident from 
Table 6.1. The Commonwealth, with a relatively low threshold, has the highest 
number of parties; conversely, the Northern Territory has the lowest number of 
parties contesting elections. 
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Commonwealth 500 14 086 869 (2010) 28 174 23
New South Wales 750 4 635 810 (2011) 6181 14
Victoria 500 3 582 232 (2010) 7164 10
Queensland 500 2 660 940 (2009) 5322 6
Western Australia 500 1 330 399 (2008) 2661 10
South Australia 150 1 093 316 (2010) 7289 15
Tasmania 100 357 315 (2010) 3573 4
Australian Capital 
Territory
100 243 471 (2008) 2435 8
Northern Territory 200 119 814 (2008) 599 3
*  Separate divisions of a party (for example, Liberal NSW, Victoria; Labor, Country Labor, and so on) or 
cooperative alliances (for example, Australian Greens, Greens NSW) are counted as one party.
Sources: Electoral Commission election data.
The Commonwealth has a relatively low party membership requirement, 
given the size of the Australian electorate. Understandably, there have been 
suggestions that the threshold should be increased, possibly to 1000 members.2 
Based on the ‘members to electors’ ratio, and given the number of parties 
contesting recent elections, this suggestion appears to be reasonable. It is not 
unusual, however, for parties to have a distinct geographical base. Indeed, for 
Commonwealth registration, the major parties register separate parties based on 
State and Territory divisions. 
A 500-member requirement assists the formation of parties based on local or 
regional issues, an example being the Save the ADI Site Party (SAS) in the 2001 
and 2004 elections. SAS was registered in October 2001 to campaign for the 
retention of government-owned bushland in Sydney’s western suburbs. The 
land had previously been used by Australian Defence Industries (ADI) and the 
government was proposing to sell it for residential development. In 2001, SAS 
fielded candidates in four House of Representatives seats, achieving a substantial 
vote of 3.29 per cent (in Chifley). In the 2004 election, SAS contested three lower 
house seats (receiving a strong vote of 2.67 per cent in Lindsay) and stood two 
candidates for the Senate. Once the ADI bushland was sold to developers, SAS’s 
reason for existence was eliminated, and the party was voluntarily deregistered 
2 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2005. The 2004 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, p. 91. 
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in August 2005. An increased threshold for registration would limit local-issue 
groups having a democratic voice via mobilisation as a political party in this 
way. 
Parliamentary representative alternative for 
party registration
As an alternative to meeting the membership requirement to register a party, 
four jurisdictions allow that a party may be registered if it has a parliamentary 
representative. South Australia adopts a relaxed approach with its parliamentary 
representative rule, requiring only that the representative be a member of a 
parliament or assembly of any of Australia’s nine jurisdictions (Electoral Act 
1985, s. 36). The other three jurisdictions—the Commonwealth, Queensland 
and Western Australia—specify the parliamentary representative must be a 
member of that jurisdiction’s parliament.
In the case of Western Australia’s amending legislation in 2000, the Electoral 
Commissioner, Ken Evans, recommended that Queensland’s registration 
procedure be followed.3 This procedure included a provision that parties with 
current parliamentary registration did not have to satisfy the 500-member rule. 
As a preventative measure to preclude independent members of parliament 
from subsequently setting up their own separate party, the WA legislation 
(Electoral Act 1907, s. 62I) specifies that the ‘parliamentary representative’ rule 
applies only to pre-existing parties that had a parliamentary representative on 
14 June 2000, when the legislation was introduced to parliament. At the time, 
there were five independent parliamentarians, of whom four were originally 
elected as either Labor or Liberal party representatives, and this provision 
was considered to be a measure with those members specifically in mind. The 
provision also allowed at least one party, the Australian Democrats, to contest 
the general election six months later as a registered party at a time when it 
would not have satisfied the 500-member rule. 
The Commonwealth, Queensland and SA Acts do not contain any provisions 
to prevent a member of parliament from establishing his or her own party after 
being elected either as an Independent or as a representative of another party. 
At the Commonwealth level, this loophole was used by Senator Meg Lees to 
establish the Australian Progressive Alliance party after she resigned from the 
Australian Democrats in 2002. 
3 Norman Moore MLC. 2000. Electoral Amendment Bill 2000—2nd Reading Speech. Parliamentary Debates, 
Hansard, vol. 363. Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, pp. 8530–1.
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Where the legislation provides two separate ways to qualify for party 
registration—by either membership level or parliamentary representation—
there is a question of fairness based on equal opportunity. The membership-
level criterion requires identified membership support within the community, 
while the parliamentary representation criterion is based on having sufficient 
voter support for an individual to be elected. When a party is registered 
because it has an existing parliamentary representative, there is no requirement 
to demonstrate any minimum level of party membership support. It could be 
argued that having a representative elected demonstrates that such parties have 
a significant level of electoral or community support; however, this argument 
does not hold where the representative was elected as a member of another 
party and later resigned (as in Meg Lees’ case). 
The lack of equity in the registration of parties is compounded in the three 
jurisdictions that allow parliamentarians to form new parties after they have 
been elected. In those cases, the representative does not have to show that there 
is any level of support for the party, in terms of either membership or public 
support. The Northern Territory’s Minter Ellison report did not recommend a 
parliamentary representative criterion due to the inequitable effects of such a 
provision:
It is arguable that a political party that only has one member does not 
fall within the meaning of ‘political party’, which is usually taken to 
denote a collection of people sharing some common political principles 
or goals.4 
SA registration regime
South Australia has difficulties with its party registration regime, which was 
introduced as part of the State’s 1985 electoral reforms. Parties are able to lodge 
a voting ticket for the direction of preferences for both legislative council and 
house of assembly elections. This provides an incentive, as has occurred in New 
South Wales, for multiple parties to register and to then trade preferences for 
the ‘harvesting’ of votes. This incentive also appears to have driven the growth 
in registered parties in South Australia since 1985. 
4 Minter Ellison Consulting. 2003. Independent Review of the Northern Territory Electoral System: Final 
Report and Recommendations. Canberra: Minter Ellison Consulting, p. 85.
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1985 5 5 4
1989 10 7 7
1993 14 10 9
1997 24 12 8
2002 30 19 10
2006 28 10 8
2010 34 15 13
Sources: State Electoral Office. 2007. Election Report: South Australian Election: 18 March 2006. Adelaide: 
State Electoral Office; House of Assembly. 1986. General Elections 1985. Adelaide: Government Printer.
As Table 6.2 illustrates, a larger number of parties compete in council elections, 
where preference flows are especially important due to the proportional 
representation voting system. The incentive of directing preferences was 
described well by one legislator: 
Once again, the rules are written for one regime, but someone gets smart 
about it, and I think what happened [is] a large number of parties were 
registered when someone was going for an upper house seat.
Someone twigged that if they could set up enough parties, there’d be 
enough people who would vote for each named party that by the time 
those preferences flowed on—because someone with a bit of political 
nous figured out that I might pick up about 1 per cent if I called a party 
this, and half a per cent for this, and I might actually get over the line 
simply because of the preferences of those particular groups.
In South Australia, the legislation also enables a person to be counted as a 
member of more than one party, for the purpose of meeting the registration 
requirement. This provision underpins the groupings of parties that occur. The 
Australian Labor Party (which has also registered the New Labor Party and 
Country Labor Party) and the Nationals Party (and its Young Nationals Party) 
probably have a sufficiently high membership to have distinct members for 
each party. The most extreme overuse of this provision, however, is the Over-
Taxed Motorists, Drinkers, Smokers Association, which registered five other 
parties (four of which were registered on the same day): the Smokers Rights 
Association, the Over-Taxed Smokers Association, the Over-Taxed Drinkers 
Association, the Over-Taxed Motorists Association and the Over-Taxed Pokies 
Party. Despite repeated calls by the Electoral Commission for reform, the ability 
to use the same individuals to register multiple parties remains unchanged. As 
one administrator explained: 
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From time to time electoral commissioners have made 
recommendations—1997 election, 2002 election, and now the 2006 
election. There was a recommendation made that the same voters should 
not be used in reaching the membership thresholds of more than one 
party, and that’s perfectly sensible. 
Similarly, the commission has called for a restriction on the use of frivolous party 
names—again, without success.5 This recommendation appears to be directed at 
parties such as the Stormy Summers Reform Party and Albert Bensimon’s No 
Hoo Haa Party. 
Three other jurisdictions—Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory—also allow the same members to be used to register more than one 
party. In these jurisdictions, however, the incentive to use multiple parties to 
direct preference flows is absent. In Queensland (six parties at the past election), 
the system of single-member electorates and optional preferential voting 
removes this incentive, while in Tasmania (four parties) and the Australian 
Capital Territory (10 parties, including two ‘Independent’ groupings) the Hare-
Clark voting system precludes ticket voting. It is therefore more likely in these 
jurisdictions, compared with South Australia, that electoral outcomes will more 
accurately reflect voters’ wishes. 
Determining the Northern Territory’s party 
registration regime
Prior to reforms in 2004, political parties were not recognised in the Northern 
Territory’s Electoral Act. Reasons for this included the lack of a public funding 
scheme and the fact that party names were not shown on ballot papers prior to 
the 2005 election (candidates’ photographs were shown; see Figure 6.1).
The 2003 Minter Ellison review of the electoral system recommended that, 
as with all other Australian jurisdictions, ballot papers should show party 
affiliations, and therefore a party registration regime should also be introduced. 
The review considered the question of a reasonable membership level, drawing 
on examples in other Australian jurisdictions. In its report, the review team 
recommended that the threshold be 20 members, noting that they had received 
evidence that a higher threshold requirement of 50 members could prevent 
5 State Electoral Office. 2007. Election Report: South Australian Election: 18 March 2006, p. 61.
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some of the larger parties from registering.6 While the figure of 20 members 
might appear to be very low, this was at a time when there were only about 
112 000 registered voters in the Territory. 
Figure 6.1 NT Ballot Paper (from Katherine by-election, 2003)
When the government introduced its legislation in November 2003, it stipulated 
a 50-member registration requirement. The day before debate on the legislation 
commenced in February 2004, the government lodged an amendment, 
changing the figure to 200 members—a tenfold increase on the original number 
recommended by Minter Ellison. The only explanation that the government 
gave for increasing the proposed threshold was the need to protect access to the 
electoral roll, which was available to registered parties but not to other parties 
or candidates (except by viewing at electoral offices). The late change resulted 
in party registration being the most hotly debated issue of the new electoral 
framework, as the following Hansard extracts attest: 
6 Minter Ellison Consulting. 2003. Independent Review of the Northern Territory Electoral System: Final 
Report and Recommendations, p. 85.
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[N]ow the Labor Party has come to power, the power has seduced so that, 
by the utilisation of this mechanism with 200 required to formulate an 
official party, it basically takes it out of the reach of community groups 
and puts it largely into only the domain of more established parties such 
as the ALP or CLP. (Terry Mills, CLP)
This is a deliberate attempt to obliterate opposition by the Labor 
government. (John Elferink, CLP)
[T]his has been brought in to kill off political opposition. I just think this 
is a crying shame…This is anti-democratic…supporting this bill means 
that I will sign the death warrant for any small party that wants to start 
in the Northern Territory…This is putting politics ahead of principle. 
(Gerry Wood, Independent)
The high threshold required to register parties in the Northern Territory 
is reflected by the low number of registered parties, with only three—the 
Country Liberal Party (CLP), Labor and the Greens—contesting the 2005 and 
2008 elections. It can be argued that this registration scheme restricts citizens 
from being able to organise into political groups to access the political process; 
however, statistics from the NT elections held prior to the party registration 
legislation being passed in 2004 do not support this (see Table 6.3). Before party 
registration, an average of 3.8 parties contested each general election from 
1983—similar to the three parties contesting the two most recent elections. The 
number of candidates ranged from 63 to 85 during the earlier period, compared 
with 80 and 66 in 2005 and 2008 respectively. To date, the legislation has not 
resulted in any significant difference in terms of electoral competition by parties 
and candidates.7
Table 6.3 Candidates and Parties Contesting NT Elections
Election Seats Candidates Parties
1983 25 66 3
1987 25 85 3
1990 25 80 4
1994 25 63 3
1997 25 66 4
2001 25 86 6
2005 25 80 3
2008 25 66 3
7 It is also interesting to note that two candidates were elected unopposed at the 2008 election (in the seats 
of Arnhem and MacDonnell)—a rarity in modern Australian elections.
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With no evidence to the contrary—apart from Chief Minister Claire Martin’s 
claim regarding access to the electoral roll—it would appear that Labor’s move 
in 2003–04 to ignore the review’s 20-member recommendation and increase the 
threshold first to 50 members and then to 200 members was purely a manoeuvre 
to damage its major opponent: the CLP. This is borne out by the CLP’s strong 
criticism during debate on the legislation, and is supported by the comments of 
one electoral official: 
It’s a bit subjective. There was some suggestion that even the CLP was 
struggling to get 200. If they were governing for 27 years, and they’ve 
only been out of power for a few years, you’d have to say if that was the 
case, you should probably err on the side of not being too demanding.
While the Territory’s reform process appears to have been quite comprehensive 
and broadly consultative, it was restricted due to the powers that the 
Commonwealth retains over certain aspects of the Territory’s electoral system. 
Electoral issues beyond the scope of the Minter Ellison review included the 
manner of representation—the Commonwealth’s Northern Territory (Self-
Government) Act 1978 stipulates that there are to be single-member electorates, 
each having no greater than a 20 per cent variance (higher or lower) from the 
average enrolment. In addition, it is not possible for the Territory to specify the 
extent of the franchise (Section 14 of the Commonwealth Act) or extend the 
period between elections (Section 17). In 2003, the Territory’s Solicitor-General 
was unable to give a definitive position on whether the Territory could legislate 
for fixed-date elections.8 Fixed-date elections were introduced, however, in an 
amendment to the Electoral Act in 2009. There also appears to have been a desire 
for the Minter Ellison review to satisfy the Labor government. As one review 
team participant noted:
[The government] ended up adopting pretty much everything that was 
recommended, but the consultant team from Minter Ellison was very 
keen to put up proposals that would be smiled upon, so whenever we 
met anything that was likely to be contentious, we said: ‘Here are the 
options; you choose.’
In the Northern Territory, the primary catalyst for electoral reform in the past 25 
years was the 2001 change of government. Once Labor achieved government, it 
immediately set about reforming the system (and particularly the administration), 
which was viewed as being too close to the former Country Liberal Party. A year 
after the reform process was completed, Labor won the 2005 election with an 
increased majority. Whether the reforms serve to entrench Labor in power is 
8 Minter Ellison Consulting. 2003. Independent Review of the Northern Territory Electoral System: Final 
Report and Recommendations, p. 45.
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hard to determine. As the reforms were largely administrative, it is doubtful 
that there is any significant partisan advantage, except for the party registration 
regime, which is contrary to the participation principle of fairness. 
Too many parties: the 1999 NSW Legislative 
Council election
The March 1999 NSW Legislative Council election produced one of the largest 
ballot papers ever used in Australia (and possibly the world), with 81 groupings 
(including 78 parties) comprising 264 candidates. The ‘tablecloth’ ballot paper 
measured 102 cm by 72 cm. Its size created major logistical issues for the election, 
requiring the construction of wider voting booths and the use of larger planes 
for transporting papers. The election also produced some intriguing results, 
including the election of an Outdoor Recreation Party candidate, Malcolm 
Jones, who polled 0.19 per cent of the primary vote (a quota being 4.5 per 
cent). Jones was elected with the support of preferences from 21 other parties, 
including eight that had received a higher primary vote than the Outdoor 
Recreation Party.9 The problems associated with the 1999 legislative council 
election represented the culmination of a series of earlier reforms and provided 
the impetus for further reforms. 
From the mid-1980s, reforms were introduced by both Coalition and Labor 
governments, initially by Liberal Premiers Nick Greiner and John Fahey, and 
later by Labor Premier Bob Carr. Some Coalition reforms also required approval 
by referendum, with successful referenda being held in conjunction with the 
1991 and 1995 elections. Reforms affected many aspects of elections, including: 
the number of members to be elected and the length of terms; ballot paper 
design, including the use of above-the-line ticket voting (single vote and 
preferential) and group voting tickets; and party registration requirements.
Table 6.4 presents a summary of legislative council election results from 1984 to 
2011, and highlights several issues relevant to democratic principles of equity 
and access. As the table shows, the increase in parties and candidates at the 1999 
election is obvious; however, significant increases in both are apparent prior 
to this (in 1995). The success of A Better Future For Our Children candidate, 
Alan Corbett, in being elected in 1995 on a low 1.28 per cent primary vote 
and a favourable flow of preferences (requiring 4.5 per cent to achieve a quota) 
obviously encouraged the formation of many parties for the 1999 election. 
The electoral laws in place at the time facilitated the formation of new parties. 
9 Antony Green. 2003. Prospects for the 2003 Legislative Council Election. Background Paper no. 3/03, NSW 
Parliamentary Library Research Service. Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, p. 27.
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Although one of the party registration criteria was a requirement for 200 
members, a person could be a member of more than one party for registration 
purposes and it appears that several parties used petition lists to meet their 
200-member requirement.10 
Table 6.4 NSW Legislative Council Election Results, 1984–2011
Year Groups/parties1 Candidates Informal vote (%) Gallagher’s Least Squares Index2
1984 8 43 6 .66 3 .77
1988 13 56 8 .08 4 .84
1991 12 54 5 .67 4 .68
1995 28 99 6 .11 9 .47
1999 81 264 7 .17 8 .69
2003 16 284 5 .34 4 .88
2007 20 333 6 .11 5 .47
2011 16 311 8 .00 5 .78
1 Includes ‘Independent’ groupings and ‘Ungrouped’ column.
2 The smaller the index figure, the more proportional is the result. Data in Appendix C.
The Carr Labor Government responded quickly to the negative publicity 
received by the tablecloth ballot paper. The Parliamentary Electorates and 
Elections Amendment Act 1999 was passed in November 1999, driven by a 
desire to avoid the complexities and difficulties of the 1999 election. The Act’s 
amendments were targeted at ballot design and party registration, to reduce 
the number of parties contesting council elections. The main amendments were
•	 abolishing group ticket voting (removing the ability for parties to direct 
preferences)
•	 allowing voters to record preferences above the line
•	 increasing the membership requirement for party registration from 200 to 
750
•	 removing the opportunity to register a party based on having a member of 
parliament (rather than having a minimum number of members)
•	 removing the capacity for a person’s membership to be used to meet the 
membership requirement of more than one party
•	 requiring a $2000 registration application fee
•	 parties to be registered one year ahead of an election for party identification 
on ballot papers
•	 increasing the powers of the electoral commissioner to investigate whether 
party membership is genuine.
10 Antony Green. 2003. Prospects for the 2003 Legislative Council Election, p. 8.
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The impacts of these reforms can be clearly seen in Table 6.4. There was a 
significant reduction in the number of parties contesting the 2003 election (16, 
down from 81); however, there was an increase in the number of candidates (284, 
up from 264). This was due to the combined effect of removing ticket voting, 
introducing optional preferential voting above the line, and the pre-existing 
requirement for a voter to indicate preferences from one to 15 in order for a vote 
to be counted as formal. That is, parties needed to field at least 15 candidates for 
a vote that is recorded as a ‘1’ or a tick for the party to be counted. 
The final two columns of Table 6.4 provide evidence of other impacts that the 
system, and its reforms, has had. In regard to informal voting, it can be argued 
that reforms have had little impact, as the rate has remained consistently high 
throughout the study period. Reforms have, however, included the introduction 
of above-the-line ticket voting (from the 1988 election), being able to use a tick to 
record a formal vote (from 1995) and optional preferential voting (from 2003)—
all innovations that would be expected to lower the informal rate. One of the 
reasons these interventions have not reduced the informal vote is that the size 
of the ballot paper, especially since the 1995 election, has been intimidating and 
confusing to voters. This might be especially so as voters are confronted with a 
vastly different (and smaller) ballot paper for legislative assembly elections, and 
have to deal with different above-the-line rules for federal Senate elections. In 
addition, the changes that have occurred throughout the period have potentially 
made it difficult for voters to become familiar with any one format, or for voter 
education programs to make a long-term impact.
Using Gallagher’s Least Squares Index (LSI), the impact of the reforms is evident 
for the 1995 and 1999 elections, with disproportionality in these polls at its worst 
out of the seven elections during the study period. Proportionality improved 
at the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections, but remains at a level higher than pre 
1995. This could, however, be due to the general increase in legitimate minor 
parties in more recent times. Another factor is the methodology in calculating 
the index, which accentuates the impact of very small parties being grouped 
together.11 
In terms of fairness, the ultimate results of these reforms are positive for candidates 
and parties, with competition now more genuine. In addition, representation 
now more closely reflects voters’ choices, with an average proportionality index 
value of 5.38 for the three most recent elections, compared with an average of 
9.08 for the 1995 and 1999 elections. While it might now be easier to make an 
informed choice, the continuing high level of informal voting remains a serious 
concern.
11 For these calculations, all parties receiving less than 1 per cent were grouped together under ‘Independents 
and Others’.
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Party registration: achieving a balance 
A well-constructed party registration regime could assist the conduct of fair 
elections by organising election candidates into clearly identifiable groupings, 
providing genuine competition and allowing voters to make informed choices. If 
the regime does not strike the right balance, it could unfairly restrict competition 
or allow excessive competition, as seen in the 1999 NSW election. Generally, 
however, when asked about their party registration procedures, electoral 
administrators were satisfied with existing provisions, particularly in regard 
to membership requirements. Responses included the following commissioners’ 
comments: 
If they’ve got any worthwhile support, they can register quite easily. 
The reality is that after an election or two, if they don’t get many votes, 
they fade away. But it’s not that there’s a problem—it’s difficult enough 
so that you’re not going to get nutty parties too often.
If you’re serious about contesting then you should have…people who 
are prepared to say I support you publicly. I think if you can’t find…
members, how are you going to win seats?
An argument supported by several administrators is that systems with single-
member electorates create a disincentive for registration, as small parties do 
not see a great opportunity to win seats. This was particularly the case in 
Queensland and the Northern Territory, the two jurisdictions without any form 
of proportional representation. These jurisdictions had only seven (Queensland) 
and three (Northern Territory) parties contesting their most recent elections. 
This is consistent with research conducted by Duverger, Rae and others, who 
have argued that majoritarian systems support two-party systems.12
The 2004 NT parliamentary debate on party registration raised a further 
issue in relation to the benefits of registration: access to the electoral roll. It is 
common for members of parliament and registered parties to receive details of 
the electoral roll in electronic form. The main reasons cited for this are the need 
to promote their policies and to converse with the public. Access to the roll in 
this form is, however, denied to potential Independent candidates prior to an 
election being called, and this puts those candidates at a disadvantage, as they 
are not able to compete on an equal basis with party-nominated candidates. 
12 Maurice Duverger. 1951. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: 
Wiley; Douglas Rae. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Clinton, Mass.: Colonial Press.
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Deregistration of the Liberals for Forests
The ability of a government to use legislation to structure electoral competition 
is evident in the case of the Liberals for Forests party. One component of the 
2006 Howard Government’s reform package was deregistration of all parties 
that did not have existing or past parliamentary representation. This resulted 
in the deregistration of 19 parties in December 2006. It is believed that the key 
motivation for this aspect of legislation was to prevent the Liberals for Forests 
party from continuing to use ‘liberal’ in its name. The legislation was based 
on a recommendation by the JSCEM in its 2004 election inquiry report. The 
JSCEM recommendation reflected previous Liberal Party concerns about the use 
of ‘liberal’ and the Richmond electorate result in 2004. 
The Liberals for Forests was originally registered in 2001, following an 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia (AATA) ruling against the AEC’s 
decision not to register the party (which was in part based on objections from 
the Liberal Party). In support of its decision, the AATA referred to words such 
as ‘liberal’, ‘labour’, ‘progressive’, ‘national’, ‘socialist’ and ‘democrat’ as being 
generic and therefore not owned by one particular entity.13 The Liberals for 
Forests had registered its name in the lower case, to identify its ideological 
position as ‘small-“l” liberals’ and to differentiate itself from the Liberal 
Party. The Howard Government legislated14 to prevent the use of names that 
could be confused with existing parties, but could not apply this condition 
to parties already registered. A solution was to deregister all parties without 
parliamentary representation, requiring a reapplication under the new law. Of 
the 19 parties deregistered, eight have re-registered.15 Possible reasons other 
parties have not re-registered include an inability to meet the 500-member test 
or a lack of ongoing activity. 
While the Liberal Party has been successful in removing registration of 
the Liberals for Forests at the federal level, it has not had the same success 
at the State level. In Western Australia, Liberals for Forests was registered 
as a party from July 2001, and stood candidates in the 2005 state election. 
The process of deregistering the party at the Commonwealth level, 
however, raises two main concerns. First, it is through legislation that 
13 See paragraph 40, Woollard and Australian Electoral Commission and Liberal Party of Australia (WA 
Division) Inc [2001] AATA 166.
14 Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Enrolment Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2004, Amending 
Section 129 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.
15 As of December 2008, the parties that had re-registered were the Christian Democratic Party (Fred Nile 
Group), Citizens Electoral Council of Australia, Non-Custodial Parents Party, One Nation Western Australia, 
Queensland Greens, Socialist Alliance, The Australian Shooters Party and The Fishing Party. 
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governing parties have enormous power to limit electoral competition. 
This reflects the importance of the institutional structure of Australian electoral 
administration—a key theme in this thesis. 
Second, the AATA has raised the important question of whether existing parties 
should be able to control the use of names that are based on ideology or history, 
such as those mentioned above. The possibility of voter confusion is, however, 
a real concern. The AATA made its position clear: ‘It is unlikely that any elector, 
seeing the two names on a ballot paper, will draw the conclusion that “liberals 
for forests” is a political party related to the Liberal Party of Australia.’16 The only 
other debate on the issue has occurred in the highly partisan JSCEM inquiry. 
There does not appear to be any systematic assessment of whether voters are 
confused by subtle variations in names. 
This analysis of party registration regimes has shown that partisan interests 
have heavily influenced the development of party law. Some reforms have been 
initiated by governing parties for the purpose of eliminating opponents, such 
as the Coalition’s actions in deregistering the Liberals for Forests and Labor’s 
high threshold for registration in the Northern Territory. Other developments 
in this area have resulted from party cartelisation, as in Western Australia’s 
2000 reform. It can be seen from the examples discussed that the participation 
principle of fairness, under which citizens should have equal opportunities to 
form political parties, is diminished by the partisan behaviour of governing 
parties.
16 Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia. 2001. Woollard and Australian Electoral Commission and 
Liberal Party of Australia (WA Division) Inc [2001] AATA 166 (6 March 2001).
99
7. Political Finance
It is not surprising that money is one of the most critical factors in election 
campaigns. Access to money has become even more important in Australia in 
recent decades with the increasing role of electronic advertising, which consumes 
a significant share of the major parties’ campaign expenditure. Therefore, the 
ways in which parties may receive and spend money have been the subject of 
significant public debate. The Coalition and Labor are keenly divided on some 
aspects of regulation—for example, donation disclosures; however, they act as 
a cartel in areas where there is joint benefit, such as public funding.
By international standards, Australia is relatively unregulated in the ways 
political parties and candidates may raise and spend money. Australian 
jurisdictions have few limitations on who money may be received from, how 
much may be raised or how much may be spent on election campaigns. In 
addition to having virtually no limits on the amount that may be raised through 
private donations, most Australian jurisdictions also provide public funding of 
parties and candidates, based on their vote at elections. 
Many democracies place limits on the influence of private money in electoral 
contests. In IDEA’s 2003 survey of 111 countries, a majority had donation 
disclosure regimes, while a significant number (32 countries) placed caps on 
contributions to parties.1 Partially to compensate for these restrictions, and to 
limit the influence of private money, there are currently 112 countries (of 196) 
that provide direct public funding to political parties.2 It is unusual to allow 
unrestricted levels of private funding while also providing substantial amounts 
of public funding.
This chapter concentrates on three aspects of political finance in Australian 
electoral law, which have been the focus of debate and legislative reforms in 
recent years. First, the origins of public funding and its subsequent growth are 
examined. Second, the setting of a threshold for disclosures of private donations 
provides a good example of the major parties legislating for self-interest (and 
possibly with some ideological basis). Finally, the tax deductibility of donations 
raises questions of fairness and equity.
This is therefore not an attempt to cover all matters relating to political finance, 
but instead to explain some of the history of current political finance law and 
how regulation of political money is decided by those who stand to benefit. For 
1 Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernstrőm, eds. 2003. Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns. 
Stockholm: International IDEA.
2 ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, <http://aceproject.org>
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more comprehensive discussions on the role of money in Australian politics, 
the writings of Joo-Cheong Tham, Graeme Orr and Sally Young provide useful 
insight. 
Public funding
The importance of public funding for the fairness of political financing regimes 
is suggested by the Australian Democratic Audit assessment question ‘is 
there fair access for [candidates and parties] to the media and other means of 
communication with the voters’. With a few exceptions, the public funding of 
parties’ and candidates’ participation and campaigning in elections is a relatively 
recent democratic initiative, occurring in Australia since the early 1980s. 
The arguments for public funding put forward by American political 
scientist Michael Johnston are that some level of funding encourages electoral 
competition and strengthens parties both organisationally and for campaigning 
purposes.3 Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham contend that public funding can 
provide a way to introduce accountability measures, such as financial reporting 
and disclosure.4 Some parties, particularly those in government, are able to 
attract substantial private funding. Public funding provides a mechanism 
to cover basic administration and campaign costs for all parties, based on 
criteria such as registration, meeting reporting deadlines, voting support 
and party membership. Johnston goes on to argue that while partial public 
funding is beneficial for the health of a democracy, full public funding can be 
counterproductive, introducing disincentives for citizen mobilisation and the 
possibility of corruption.5 
The introduction of public funding at the Commonwealth level in 1983 changed 
the nature of electoral competition by providing a guaranteed source of income 
for parties and candidates who achieve at least 4 per cent of the formal vote. 
When introduced ahead of the 1984 election, funding was based on the 
reimbursement of election campaign expenditure, with the rate of funding (per 
vote) based on the cost of a postage stamp for each of the three years between 
elections, and indexed to the rate of inflation. This amount (originally 90 cents) 
was then divided, with two-thirds for House of Representatives votes and one-
third for Senate votes. Parties and candidates had to submit expenditure receipts 
3 Michael Johnston. 2005. Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Political 
Finance Policy, Parties, and Democratic Development. Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs, p. 9. 
4 Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham. 2006. Political Finance in Australia: A Skewed and Secret System. 
Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia, The Australian National University, p. 37.
5 Michael Johnston. 2005. Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Political 
Finance Policy, Parties, and Democratic Development, p. 15.
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for reimbursement from their public funding entitlement. The application of 
different rates for the House and the Senate was explained by arguing that MPs 
experienced greater constituency demands than Senators; however, it potentially 
disadvantaged those parties that targeted Senate elections and thereby gained 
greater numbers of Senate votes than House votes. 
In its first report in 1983, the JSCER stated that the Labor Party and the 
Australian Democrats were supportive of a public funding system. Labor’s 
support was based on the argument that elections should be decided on the 
quality of policies rather than the ability to raise campaign funds. Labor went 
on to argue that public funding would ‘narrow the differential in the financial 
resources available to the various competing parties’. The Liberal and National 
parties were initially opposed to public funding, citing the lack of public support 
and that public funding would entrench incumbent parties and disadvantage 
potential new entrants.  
In 1995, two major changes occurred to the public funding regime, following 
recommendations by the JSCEM. The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 
1995 removed the need to prove expenditure, thereby changing the nature of 
funding from a reimbursement to an entitlement. This change broke the direct 
connection between funding and election campaign costs. Second, the funding 
rate was substantially increased. There was a 50 per cent increase for House of 
Representatives votes, from $1.01 to $1.50, and, in a move to equalise funding 
between House and Senate votes, public funding for Senate votes was trebled 
from 50.4 cents to $1.50. The rationale put forward during the parliamentary 
debate for the Senate increase was based on the JSCEM recommendation that 
House and Senate votes should receive the same level of funding, because ‘as 
much effort is required to gain a Senate vote as a House of Representatives vote’.6 
While the JSCEM had recommended equal funding, it left unanswered the 
question of whether funding levels should be increased or simply redistributed 
equally between the two houses. 
The Hansard records show that both the Labor and the Liberal parties strongly 
supported the changes. In his second reading speech, the Labor Minister 
for Administrative Services, Frank Walker, referred to JSCEM’s rationale for 
equalising House and Senate payments, but made no reference to the fact that 
the rate was being substantially increased, and did not provide a supporting 
argument for the increase. In a similar vein, Liberal MP Peter Slipper simply 
stated: ‘The rate will be increased to $1.50 per vote and will be indexed. The 
Coalition will not be opposing this.’ Apart from Labor and the Coalition, the 
6 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 1994. Financial Reporting by Political Parties: 
Interim Report from the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters on the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 
1993 Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, p. 9.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
102
Australian Democrats were the most significant beneficiaries of the increase. 
Their spokeswoman, Senator Meg Lees, made no reference to the increase in her 
second reading speech. 
In contrast, the Greens received far less public funding during this period 
and were more vocal in their opposition to the increase. Greens spokeswoman 
Senator Christabel Chamarette stated that:
The amendments to the bill were not recommended by the joint 
committee…they were part of a private deal which appeared to 
be engineered by the Federal Secretary of the ALP and agreed to in 
letters to the Minister for Administrative Services from the Liberals, 
the Nationals and the Democrats…Everybody is going to have at least a 
doubling of their funding.7 
As a result, the cost of public funding has substantially increased since the 
1996 federal election, as Table 7.1 shows. Due to the funding rate being linked 
to the consumer price index (CPI), the rate has increased from $1.50 per vote 
in 1995 to its current (January to June 2012) rate of $2.42. In recent elections, 
public funding has accounted for about one-third of the total cost of conducting 
federal elections. 
Table 7.1 Public Funding Payments ($ million)
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
7 .81 10 .30 12 .88 14 .90 32 .15 33 .92 38 .56 41 .93 49 .00 53 .16
Sources: JSCEM; AEC. 
At the State and Territory levels, three jurisdictions—South Australia, Tasmania 
and the Northern Territory—do not have public funding. The other jurisdictions 
also use the 4 per cent threshold for funding, with rates of approximately $1.50 
to $1.70 per vote. Funding is provided as either full or partial reimbursement 
of electoral expenditure, whereas for federal elections, funding is provided 
automatically, irrespective of expenditure. 
In 2005, the JSCEM acknowledged the ability for candidates to profit from the 
public funding scheme. The committee’s concerns were raised after Pauline 
Hanson received nearly $200 000 in public funding as a Senate candidate at the 
2004 federal election, despite spending only $35 000 on campaign expenses. 
Labor claimed this was ‘blatant profiteering for personal benefit’.8 The committee 
7 Senator Christabel Chamarette. 1995. ‘Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 1995—Second Reading 
Speech.’ Hansard, 11 May. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
8 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2005. The 2004 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, pp. 325–6.
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did not recommend changes at the time, but in 2011 recommended reverting 
to a reimbursement-based scheme.9 The Gillard Labor Government currently 
(March 2012) has legislation before the Senate to return to a reimbursement of 
expenditure requirement.10 
New South Wales has the most progressive funding scheme, with funds also 
provided for the administration of registered parties ($80 000 per elected 
member, up to a maximum of $2 million). For registered parties without elected 
members, funds are available for policy development, based on 25 cents per vote 
received at the most recent election, up to a maximum $5000, paid annually. This 
scheme is in line with the recent electoral funding reforms in that State, which 
include caps on electoral campaign expenditure and political donations, as well 
as prohibiting political donations from specific sources: property developers 
and the gambling, liquor and tobacco industries. The need for such prohibitions 
highlights the influence that donations can wield and leaves open the question 
as to what influence legitimate donations might have. 
By their nature, public funding schemes ensure that the major vote winners 
at an election are the major funding recipients. Currently, the major parties—
Labor, Liberal and The Nationals—can be relatively assured of a certain amount 
of public funding, as can the Greens (and previously the Democrats), to a lesser 
extent. For other parties, particularly new parties, it is not easy to predict 
whether the 4 per cent threshold in votes, which is required to receive any 
public funding, will be achieved. It is difficult therefore for such parties to 
budget for an election campaign. Table 7.2 shows the level of funding received 
by selected parties and candidates over the past four federal elections. 
It can be seen from the table that for most parties, public funding provides a 
relatively reliable income stream. For parties that experience greater fluctuations 
from election to election, such as was the case for the Democrats, a drop in voter 
support can have serious financial implications in planning an election campaign. 
In the Democrats’ case, their vote dropped for the House of Representatives 
from 5.41 per cent (2001) to 1.24 per cent (2004), and then to 0.72 per cent 
(2007). For the Senate, the Democrats’ vote decreased from 7.25 per cent (2001) 
to 2.09 per cent (2004), and then to 1.29 per cent (2007). The amount received 
by parties or candidates without parliamentary representation is quite small, as 
can be expected. This might indicate that the public funding scheme is simply 
supporting existing parties, rather than new entrants. The growth of the Greens, 
One Nation and Family First since 1983 is, however, a counterargument to this 
proposition. The numbers of parties and candidates receiving public funding 
9 Recommendation 15, in JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2011. Report on the 
Funding of Political Parties and Political Campaigns. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 128.
10 Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations and Other Measures) Bill 2010.
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since 1993, shown in Table 7.3, suggest that there is no significant trend in the 
number of parties receiving support, but further analysis would be required to 
assess other factors in the number of parties receiving public funding. 
Table 7.2 Public Funding Payments: Selected Parties and Candidates  
($ million)
Party/candidate 2001 2004 2007 2010
Labor 14 .917 16 .710 22 .030 21 .226
Liberal 14 .492 17 .956 18 .134 21 .098*
Nationals 2 .845 2 .967 3 .240 2 .486
Democrats 2 .412 0 .008 0 .000 0 .000
Greens 1 .594 3 .317 4 .371 7 .213
Family First - 0 .158 0 .141 0 .407
Country Liberal Party 0 .139 0 .159 0 .169 0 .179
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 1 .170 0 .056 - -
Pauline’s United Australia - - 0 .213 -
Peter Andren MP 0 .073 0 .079 - -
Bob Katter MP 0 .064 0 .064 0 .068 0 .088
Tony Windsor MP 0 .064 0 .090 0 .111 0 .130
Nick Xenophon - - 0 .312 -
Other 0 .789 0 .418 0 .435 0 .336
Total 38 .559 41 .926 49 .003 53 .163
* Includes Liberal National Party of Queensland.
Table 7.3 Number of Parties and Independents Receiving Public Funding, 
1993–2010
1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Parties 11 8 12 13 10 7 10
Independents 17 12 16 21 15 15 17
Although the public funding rate was originally calculated on a three-year 
funding cycle, by-elections held between general elections also attract funding. 
The cost of this additional funding is currently about $150 000 per by-election 
(depending on the size of the electorate and results). The by-elections held in 
the seats of Mayo and Lyne in September 2008 had a combined cost of almost 
$299 000 in public funding. In December 2009, two more by-elections (Bradfield 
and Higgins) cost $260 000. The substantial cost raises the question of whether 
public funding should be provided for by-elections, especially where by-
elections are caused by the voluntary resignation of an MP, as was the case in 
these four examples, and especially as the original premise of public funding 
was based on postal expenses over a three-year electoral cycle. 
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In sum, public funding has produced mixed results in terms of fair access to 
communicate with voters. While the major parties are the significant beneficiaries 
of the regime, smaller parties have been able to compete and grow, with public 
funding an important component of their financial support. For the purpose 
of political parties playing an important role in informed public debate, the 
NSW reforms that provide funding for parties’ core administrative functions 
and policy development are refreshing. The primary driver of public funding, 
however, both in its implementation and in most subsequent amendments, is 
partisan self-interest. As one Labor politician commented to the author, ‘both 
the Liberal Party and the Labor Party could see that they were going to pick up 
an enormous amount of taxpayers’ money for nothing’.
Donation disclosure thresholds
As Ewing and Ghaleigh point out, the concerns of ensuring that political 
parties are adequately funded and that individuals’ rights to privacy in making 
donations are protected need to be balanced by the democratic state’s interest in 
having a political system free of corruption and with voters being able to make 
informed decisions.11 These informed decisions include knowing the causes and 
interests that a candidate is likely to represent in parliament. With these reasons 
in mind, there is a strong argument for establishing and maintaining an effective 
disclosure regime. 
Public funding schemes provide an opportunity to introduce accountability and 
transparency regimes. This is regarded as part of the social contract; if parties 
and candidates are to receive public money for campaigning purposes, they 
need to disclose to the public the amounts and sources of private money donated 
towards the same purpose. In 1983, the Hawke Labor Government introduced 
donation disclosure legislation, requiring donors and political parties to disclose 
donations above a specified amount. The threshold for disclosure was originally 
set at $1000, and increased to $1500 in 1991. The Howard Coalition Government’s 
2006 legislation increased the disclosure threshold from $1500 to $10 000, and 
introduced annual indexation based on the CPI.12 Due to inflation, the threshold 
currently (to June 2012) sits at $11 900. From the time the Coalition obtained 
a majority on the JSCEM in 1996, the committee recommended increases to 
the threshold—of $5000 in 1996 and to $10 000 following the 2004 election. 
In its submission to JSCEM in 2005, the Liberal Party noted that it would not be 
realistic to expect that amounts below $10 000 could create an undue influence 
11 Keith Ewing and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh. 2006. ‘Donations to Political Parties in the United Kingdom.’ 
Paper prepared for the Political Finance and Government Advertising Workshop, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 25 February, p. 9. 
12 Days after the legislation was passed by parliament, the threshold had already increased to $10 300.
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on government. The government argued that it is not in the public interest for 
donations below this amount to be disclosed. The Labor Party strongly opposed 
the increase to the threshold. 
With the change to a Labor government in 2007, and changed JSCEM 
membership, the committee supported the Rudd Government’s legislation to 
revert to a $1000 fixed threshold for disclosure. Without sufficient numbers in 
the Senate, the amendment was not successful; however, with a Labor/Greens 
majority in the Senate from July 2011, it is now expected to pass. This will 
bring the Commonwealth in line with most Australian jurisdictions, which have 
thresholds of $1000–2100. 
Individual but related entities (such as members of a family or directors of a 
company) are currently treated separately under the disclosure laws, as are State 
and Territory divisions of the same party. For example, a husband and wife 
could separately donate $10 000 to each of the nine State, Territory and federal 
divisions of a party—a total of $180 000—without any of the donations being 
disclosed. Although the ability to donate separately was already in the Act, the 
increased threshold makes this option more attractive to major donors. Countries 
such as Canada have managed to place stringent caps on total party donations, 
so the provision for separate donations appears to be a deliberate legislative 
loophole that advantages Australian parties with a federal administrative 
structure.13
Miskin and Baker highlight the impact that the increased threshold could have 
in monetary terms. In the 2004–05 financial year (an election year), $33.1 million 
in donations to the major parties was disclosed under the old $1500 threshold. 
That figure would have dropped to $25.2 million under the new regime.14 That 
is, an additional $8.1 million would be removed from public accountability, 
assuming that donating patterns remain the same. It can be expected, however, 
that political parties have adapted their fundraising and donation strategies, 
and donors who previously donated up to the old cap are now encouraged to 
donate up to the new threshold. The combination of the increased threshold 
and allowing foreign and corporate donations is also a cause for concern, as 
are the timing of disclosure and the absence of caps on donations or campaign 
expenditure. These are all areas where Australia falls far behind the practices 
of countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada. In terms of fairness, the 
13 The Gillard Government is proposing in the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Political Donations 
and Other Measures) Bill 2010 to remove the loophole that allows splitting donations between party divisions, 
but family splitting will continue to be allowed. 
14 Sarah Miskin and Greg Baker. 2006. Political Finance Disclosure Under Current and Proposed Thresholds. 
Research Note 27 2005–06. Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia. 
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current threshold results in a greater proportion of donations being hidden from 
voters, which is contrary to the principle of being able to make an informed 
choice. 
The timeline for reporting and disclosing donations is such that donations 
to registered parties made in 2006–07 for the 2007 federal election were not 
disclosed until 2 February 2009. The long period between donation and 
disclosure is a serious concern in terms of accountability and transparency, 
as media and public interest generally will have moved on from these issues. 
One of the underlying arguments in favour of a disclosure regime is to allow 
voters to make an informed choice at the time of an election. If information 
is provided only retrospectively then voters remain in the dark about what 
possible influences are affecting a party’s policy platform. Typically, the major 
parties argue in JSCEM inquiries that more up-to-date disclosure of donations 
would add an unreasonable administrative burden on parties; however, in these 
modern times of electronic transactions and Internet access, if a party has the 
ability to bank a donation, it has the ability to provide that donation information 
to the public at the same time. 
While the Labor and Liberal parties use ideological arguments to put their 
positions on disclosure thresholds, their real motivations are pragmatic. It is 
well known that the Labor Party’s major donors are trade unions, and therefore 
there is little to be lost in disclosing such donations (which often would be 
disclosed under the higher thresholds anyway). The Liberal Party, however, 
relies heavily on donations from the business sector, and a lower threshold 
could frighten off these donors, who might not want to be exposed as Liberal 
supporters, especially when they might need to deal with Labor governments at 
either the federal or the State level. 
Tax deductibility of political donations
Provisions exist in several countries, including the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada, Italy and Australia, to provide tax benefits for making political 
donations and contributions. Such schemes typically provide tax credits or 
treat the contributions as a tax-deductible expense. The reasoning behind this 
is to encourage political participation and broaden parties’ support bases. It is 
also viewed as a form of public funding of political parties. 
In Australia, tax deductibility for party contributions was introduced in 1991. 
Prior to 2006, political donations were tax deductible to a maximum of $100 
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per year, and for individuals only. In 2006, the Howard Government increased 
this limit to $1500 per year, and extended it to businesses. The government’s 
argument for this increase was that it would encourage participation in the 
democratic process, by providing tax relief. In its report on the 2004 election, 
the Coalition-controlled JSCEM recommended that the limit be increased to 
$2000, arguing that it would encourage small to medium donations, but the 
only submissions cited by the report as being in support of such an increase 
were from the Liberal and National parties. Labor was opposed to the proposal.
A counterargument to the JSCEM’s recommendation for higher levels of tax 
deductibility is that the ability of people to participate in political discourse 
should not be related to their capacity to pay. An increase to $1500 skews political 
influence to the wealthier in society, as not only do higher-earning individuals 
have greater capacity to make donations, they also receive a proportionately 
higher (taxpayer-funded) subsidy. Based on the tax scales in place at the time of 
the reform (2006–07 rates), an individual earning $20 000 per year who made a 
$1500 party donation would receive a $190 tax rebate. Another individual who 
made the same donation, but was earning $100 000 per year, would receive a 
$600 rebate—an additional $410 benefit.15
In early 2008, the Rudd Labor Government introduced legislation to remove 
tax deductibility for all political donations and contributions. This was a result 
of Labor’s policy platform of finding budget cuts in government expenditure. 
A JSCEM inquiry into the amending legislation was highly political, with 
Coalition members referring to the unrelated Wollongong Council donations 
scandal as a reason for not supporting the reform. Without the numbers in the 
Senate, Labor was unable to pass the legislation. Like many proposed reforms 
in the political finance area, however, the 2011 change in Senate numbers is 
expected to provide the opportunity for the reform to take place.
While the Labor government is seeking to remove tax deductibility for all 
donations and contributions, there remain good arguments for retaining a tax 
incentive for small-scale political activity, such as party membership fees. 
15 Norm Kelly. 2006. ‘The Howard Government’s Electoral Reforms—A Blight on Democratic Principles.’ 
Paper delivered at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, Newcastle, p. 12.
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8. One Vote, One Value
It is important to consider the values placed on electors’ votes. These can range 
from voting equality to massive malapportionment or vote weighting. When 
discussions on malapportioned systems occur, the term ‘gerrymander’ (or 
‘Bjelkemander’, after a former Queensland premier) is often mistakenly used. 
A gerrymander occurs when a dominant political party is able to dictate the 
drawing of electoral boundaries in a way that maximises the benefits for that 
party, even when all electorates have an equal number of enrolments. Typically, 
this would result in the non-governing party having large majorities in a 
minority of seats, while the dominant party holds smaller majorities, but in a 
greater number of seats. This maximises the value of the dominant party’s votes, 
while non-governing parties have excess votes ‘wasted’ in safe seats. 
Systems of malapportionment, however, establish electorates of different 
enrolment size according to the creation of zones, where areas receive a greater 
or lesser voting weight, or power, according to their location. In these systems 
it is usually the rural areas that receive additional voting power, with countries 
such as Australia, Norway, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa having 
used such weighting. According to William Mackenzie, typical arguments 
used to support malapportionment include the need to recognise the wealth of 
the farming estate for a nation’s economic prosperity and that the rural areas 
represent a nation’s patriotic values and virtues.1 
In considering malapportioned systems, it is pertinent to assess the ‘fairness’ 
of the system. As described above in relation to gerrymanders, voting parity 
can be corrupted through the drawing of electorate boundaries to unfairly 
advantage or disadvantage a certain party. In a malapportioned system, 
however, inequality of voting power does not necessarily translate to being 
an unfair system. Fairness can still occur if the parties’ overall number of seats 
is proportionate to their level of voting support, or at least in relative terms 
due to the magnification effect that occurs for the two major parties in single-
member seats. The geographic concentration of different parties’ voting support 
in different areas might balance out in an overall sense, thereby achieving a fair 
result. Despite this, it is usually possible to identify particular parties that are 
unfairly affected by malapportioned systems. 
Early examples of Australian electoral systems were generally a continuation of 
the British precedent of differentiating between rural and urban areas in terms 
of voting value, with there being a traditional bias, or vote weighting, in favour 
of rural and remote areas. These were designed, and have been successful, in 
1 William James Millar Mackenzie. 1967. Free Elections. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 110–11.
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working in favour of the conservative or non-Labor parties. A malapportioned 
system, however, can be subject to demographic change. For example, a rural 
constituency close to a metropolitan centre might experience rapidly changing 
demographics due to the spread of urbanisation, and thus shift the political 
balance of the electorate. 
Australian electoral systems have generally moved away from malapportionment 
to systems based on the principle of one vote, one value. In all cases, Labor 
governments have initiated these reforms. A tolerance of plus or minus 10 per 
cent variation from the average electorate enrolment is considered to be the 
uniform minimum standard for the principle of one vote, one value. Arguments 
are regularly put forward, however, for more generous tolerances to be allowed 
so that special interests can be accommodated, particularly in the case of remote 
areas and Indigenous communities.2 For example, the Northern Territory, with 
a significant Indigenous population living in remote areas, has adopted an 
electoral system based on vote parity, but allowing a plus or minus 20 per cent 
tolerance from the average enrolment. 
Despite the relative merits of such arguments, this study adopts the definition of 
one vote, one value having a tolerance of up to and including plus or minus 10 
per cent. It should also be noted that while ‘structural’ malapportionment can 
occur as explained above, it is also possible for vote weighting, or ‘incidental’ 
malapportionment, to occur in a system of one vote, one value, through the 
application of allowable tolerances and electoral laws. For example, while 
Australia’s House of Representatives is elected using a one vote, one value 
system, the value of a Northern Territorian’s vote is more than double that of a 
voter living in the Australian Capital Territory. There are only two Australian 
houses of parliament that use an electoral system where all voters are provided 
with an equivalent vote value. These are the NSW and SA legislative councils, 
where members are elected by proportional representation in a state-wide 
electorate.
One vote, one value at the federal level
The primary law for Australia’s federal electoral system is the Australian 
Constitution, which sets out the requirements for the form of representation 
for the two houses of the Federal Parliament. The Constitution also empowers 
the parliament to pass legislation amending the original representational 
and electoral requirements (for example, the number of senators, Section 7; 
qualification of electors, Section 30; conduct of House of Representatives 
2 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee. 2004. State Elections (One Vote, One Value) Bill 
2001 [2002]. Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
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elections, Section 31). The primary piece of legislation relating to electoral 
matters is the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. In the federal electoral system, 
while one vote, one value exists for the Senate and House of Representatives 
within each State and Territory, a wide disparity in the value of votes may occur 
between different States and Territories. 
The Senate
At the time of Federation, the smaller colonies were concerned that their 
interests would be swamped by the more populous larger colonies. As a way of 
protecting their interests, the Australian Constitution (Section 7) dictates that 
an equal number of senators is to be elected from each State, irrespective of 
the size of the State’s population. This currently results in malapportionment 
of up to 12.9:1, with the quota (based on enrolled voters) to elect a senator 
from New South Wales at the 2010 election being 658 685 votes, compared with 
only 51 230 votes to elect a Tasmanian senator. Table 8.1 shows the disparity in 
representation that occurs due to the constitutional and legislative requirements 
for Senate elections.






national average (%) Quota
1
New South Wales 4 610 795 768 466 118 .2 658 685
Victoria 3 561 873 593 646 68 .6 508 839
Queensland 2 719 360 453 227 28 .7 388 480
Western Australia 1 362 534 227 089 –35 .5 194 648
South Australia 1 104 698 184 116 –47 .7 157 814
Tasmania 358 609 59 768 –83 .0 51 230
Australian Capital 
Territory
247 941 123 971 –64 .8 82 647
Northern Territory 121 059 60 530 –82 .8 40 353
Australia—Total 14 086 869 352 172 - -
1 Quota = total enrolled ÷ (number of senators to be elected + 1).
Additionally, the Federal Parliament has the ability to influence the level of 
malapportionment through its constitutional powers to pass legislation that 
determines the manner and form of Australia’s electoral system. For example, 
the parliament’s law-making power under Section 122 of the Constitution 
allowed the parliament to legislate in 1973 for two senators to be elected for 
each of the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (Senate 
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[Representation of the Territories] Act 1973). Section 40 of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 ties increases in the number of senators for the Territories to 
population growth, through a correlation with the Territories’ entitlement of 
House of Representatives seats. The result is malapportionment of 16.3:1 when 
comparing the NT quota (40 353 votes) with the NSW quota. Using the Gini and 
Dauer-Kelsay indices, Figure 8.1 depicts the high levels of malapportionment 
that exist in the Senate, based on the 2004 election when 40 senators were 
elected.
Figure 8.1 Australian Senate: 2004 Half-Senate Election
The House of Representatives
While the electoral system for the House of Representatives is also primarily 
based on one vote, one value, the Australian Constitution enables two significant 
ways for vote weighting to occur. First, Section 24 of the Constitution requires 
electorates (districts) to be evenly divided within a State, and Section 29 stipulates 
that a ‘division shall not be formed out of parts of different States’. This has 
led to wide disparities in enrolment for jurisdictions with smaller populations, 
particularly within the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, 
when compared with other jurisdictions. At the 2010 election, for example, the 
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two NT seats had less than half the enrolment, with an average 60 530 enrolment, 
of the two ACT seats, which averaged 123 971 enrolments. Table 8.2 shows the 
disparities that exist. 
Table 8.2 Enrolment Numbers for House of Representatives Electorates, 
by State/Territory (2010 election figures) 
State/
Territory


















48 96 058 2 .3 90 059 101 464 –6 .2/5 .6
Victoria 37 96 267 2 .5 86 275 117 023 –10 .4/21 .6
Queensland 30 90 645 –3 .5 82 558 98 224 –8 .9/8 .4
Western 
Australia
15 90 836 –3 .3 85 782 93 892 –5 .6/3 .4
South 
Australia
11 100 427 6 .9 96 263 104 888 –4 .1/4 .4




2 123 971 32 .0 123 444 124 215 –0 .4/0 .2
Northern 
Territory
2 60 530 –35 .5 59 879 61 126 –1 .1/1 .0
Australia 150 93 912 - 59 879 124 215 –36 .2/32 .31
1 Deviation from national average. 
The second aspect of the Constitution that creates vote weighting for the 
House of Representatives is the Section 24 requirement that ‘five members at 
least shall be chosen in each Original State’. Western Australia and Tasmania 
were beneficiaries of this condition from Federation in 1901. In 1933, Western 
Australia’s population had grown sufficiently to no longer require this safeguard, 
however, Tasmania has continued to benefit, as the State would otherwise be 
entitled to only three seats based on its current population. At the 2010 election, 
Tasmania’s electorates had an average enrolment of 71 722, compared with an 
average of 94 678 for the other States and Territories.
Disparity also exists between the more highly populated states, due in part 
to redistributions taking place at different times for each State/Territory. Part 
IV of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 prescribes the manner in which 
redistributions are to be conducted, providing for a projected tolerance of 
plus or minus 3.5 per cent of a State or Territory’s average electorate enrolment 
(Sections 63A and 66). The timing of when redistributions are calculated can 
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significantly influence the degree of deviation that occurs. As Table 8.2 shows, 
actual deviations might be substantially outside the plus or minus 3.5 per cent 
range. 
The Federal Parliament is also able to override decisions of the AEC, as occurred 
with the passing of the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Representation in 
the House of Representatives) Act 2004. This legislation set aside the Electoral 
Commissioner’s determination in 2003, based on population figures, that the 
Northern Territory’s representation in the House of Representatives be reduced 
from two seats to one seat. Irrespective of the merits of such legislative changes, 
the impact on vote weighting can be quite pronounced, as presented in Table 
8.2. In the case of the Northern Territory, the Federal Parliament’s decision 
doubled the weight, or value, of each Northern Territorian’s vote. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates small levels of malapportionment for the House of 
Representatives (using 2004 election figures), especially when compared with the 
Senate (Figure 8.1). A comparison of the two graphs also highlights the impact 
that malapportionment has on the Dauer-Kelsay Index. The large deviations that 
exist for Tasmania and the Northern Territory, as outlined above, can be seen to 
have only a minor impact on the Lorenz Curve, as these special conditions affect 
only seven of the 150 House of Representatives seats. 
Figure 8.2 Australian House of Representatives: 2004 Election 
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Recent reform attempts at the federal level
There have been a number of attempts in recent decades to entrench the 
principle of one vote, one value into Australia’s electoral system. At the 1963 
federal election, size disparity within States for House of Representatives seats 
was as high as 3.1:1 (Victoria, seats of Bruce and Scullin) and 2.5:1 (New South 
Wales, seats of Mitchell and West Sydney). By the 1966 election, this disparity 
had increased to 3.8:1 and 3.4:1 respectively. In 1968, Senator Lionel Murphy 
QC, the Leader of the Labor Opposition in the Senate, introduced two Bills with 
the purpose of altering the Constitution to require one vote, one value for the 
States and the Commonwealth. Following Murphy’s second reading speech, the 
Bills failed to be progressed by the Coalition government.3 
In 1974, the Senate voted against Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s Constitution 
Alteration (Democratic Elections) Bill 1974, which sought to amend the 
Constitution to ‘ensure that the members of the House of Representatives and 
of the parliaments of the states are chosen directly and democratically by the 
people’.4 With the Governor-General’s approval (as provided for in Section 128 
of the Constitution; see Appendix A), the proposal was, however, put forward in 
a constitutional referendum on 18 May 1974. The proposal received no support 
from the Opposition and was defeated, with only 47.2 per cent of voters, and 
with only one State, New South Wales, in support. 
The High Court heard a case in 1975 relating to the alleged disparity in size 
of House of Representatives seats (the McKinlay case).5 In its decision, the 
High Court ruled that while ‘something approaching numerical equality’ 
was important, the Australian Constitution does not require this to occur. In 
its ruling, the High Court stated that Section 24 of the Constitution does not 
provide a ‘guarantee of equality in the voting value or weight of each vote cast 
in an election for the House of Representatives’. 
The Bob Hawke Labor Government was successful in passing legislation in 
1983—the Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act 1983—which 
amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, by setting three criteria for the 
redistribution of seats. These criteria are that redistributions must occur: at least 
every seven years; if more than one-third of the seats in a State deviates from 
3 Gough Whitlam. 2003. ‘One Vote One Value.’ The Whitlam Institute web site, URL: <http://www.whitlam.
org/collection/2000/ 20000406_onevoteonevalue/index.html>
4 Parliament of Australia. 2004. ‘Referendum Results 1974.’ Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth 
of Australia. Parliament of Australia web site, URL: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/handbook/referendums/
r1974.htm>
5 High Court of Australia. 1975. Attorney-General (Cwlth); Ex rel. McKinlay v The Commonwealth; South 
Australia v The Commonwealth; Lawlor v The Commonwealth [1975] HCA 53; (1975) 135 CLR 1 (1 December 
1975).
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the average enrolment by more than 10 per cent; or when a State’s entitlement 
to its number of seats changes (Section 59). These changes moved the Australian 
electoral system to one vote, one value, but as it was only a legislative change, 
there was no constitutional guarantee. 
Senator Michael Macklin (Queensland, Australian Democrats) introduced 
Bills in 1984, 1985 and 1987 for a constitutional amendment to enshrine the 
principle of one vote, one value. They were designed to improve on the 1974 
Whitlam model, which had based equality on the population of each electorate, 
rather than on the number of eligible people enrolled to vote. In his 1987 Bill, 
Senator Macklin sought a requirement for equality in electorate enrolments ‘as 
nearly as practicable’, but with a tolerance of plus 10 per cent, and with no 
lower limit. The Bill was referred to the JSCEM, which reported in April 1988, 
finding that ‘equity in voting power is a necessary first step in achieving a 
fair electoral system’. The committee recommended that electoral enrolments 
should be within 10 per cent of the average enrolment and that the issue be 
put to a referendum. Five months later, in September 1988, a referendum was 
held to amend the Australian Constitution to ‘ensure that democratic electoral 
arrangements would be guaranteed for Commonwealth, State and Territory 
elections’. This referendum was defeated, largely due to the Coalition parties 
campaigning against the proposal, on the basis that States should maintain 
control over their own electoral matters.6 It has also been argued that the Liberal 
Party was simply bowing to pressure from the National Party—traditional 
supporters of bias to rural electorates.
The WA case
Western Australia has had a historically high level of malapportionment 
favouring rural and north-west seats. For example, in 1917 the average enrolment 
in metropolitan seats was 6108, compared with 2642 for rural seats and 958 
for seats in the north-west of the State.7 In one particular case, the effects of 
malapportionment reached 65:1 in the late 1920s with the extremes of the seat 
of Canning, with 17 347 voters, and the seat of Menzies, with only 265 voters.8 
Reforms in 1929 (amendments to the Electoral Districts Act 1922) and 1947 
6 James Jupp and Marian Sawer. 2001. ‘Political Parties, Partisanship and Electoral Governance.’ In Elections: 
Full, Free & Fair, ed. M. Sawer. Sydney: The Federation Press, p. 219.
7 N. F. Byrne. 1959. ‘A Historical Survey of the Western Australian Electoral System, 1917–1956.’ Master of 
Arts thesis. Perth: University of Western Australia.
8 George Cash MLC. 2001. ‘Electoral Amendment Bill 2001—Second Reading Speech.’ Hansard, 18 
September 2001. Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, pp. 3806–24.
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(Electoral Distribution Act 1947) resulted in a lessening of malapportionment, 
but non-metropolitan areas generally remained favoured by about 2:1 for the 
legislative assembly and 3:1 for the legislative council.9 
In the 1980s, the Burke Labor Government proposed electoral reforms including 
the introduction of State-wide proportional representation for the legislative 
council. At the time, the council had dual-member electorates, with each vacancy 
elected every second election on a rotational basis. The Burke Government 
also proposed voting equality for the legislative assembly. In order to obtain 
National Party support for the legislation, which eventually passed in 1987, the 
Labor Party was forced to retain a level of zonation for the legislative council, 
with proportional representation based on three metropolitan and three non-
metropolitan regions, and abandon attempts to reform the assembly. 
While the council’s combined metropolitan regions now had representative 
parity with the country regions (17 members each), the population disparity 
meant that a significant level of malapportionment (2.8:1) was retained in 
favour of the non-metropolitan regions, and the National Party’s interests.10 In 
addition, malapportionment remained for assembly elections. Table 8.3 depicts 
the level of malapportionment that has existed for the WA Legislative Assembly 
over the past century, using the David-Eisenberg (most extreme example of 
malapportionment), Dauer-Kelsay (smallest percentage of enrolments to produce 
a majority) and Gini (zero being absolute voting parity) indices. The significant 
reduction in malapportionment of the assembly as a result of the 2005 reforms 
(discussed later in this chapter) can be seen with the increase in the Dauer-
Kelsay Index—from 38.14 in 2005 to 47.70 at the 2008 election. 
Table 8.3 Malapportionment in the Legislative Assembly, Western Australia 
Year David-Eisenberg Index Dauer-Kelsay Index Gini Coefficienta
1894 77 .46 18 .37 0 .514
1904 17 .37 29 .36 0 .337
1914 8 .95 29 .71 0 .326
1924 23 .89 25 .26 0 .402
1936 17 .04 32 .94 0 .282
1947 30 .37 28 .64 0 .351
1956 9 .70 34 .50 0 .239
1965 7 .21 33 .07 0 .250
1974 9 .64 31 .90 0 .244
9 Another good account of the history of malapportionment in Western Australia can be found in Harry 
Phillips and Kirsten Robinson. 2006. The Quest for ‘One Vote One Value’ in Western Australia’s Political 
History. Perth: Western Australian Electoral Commission.
10 Harry Phillips. 1991. ‘The Modern Parliament, 1965–1989.’ In The House on the Hill: A History of the 
Parliament of Western Australia 1832–1990, ed. Black. Perth: Parliament of Western Australia.
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Year David-Eisenberg Index Dauer-Kelsay Index Gini Coefficienta
1983 5 .79 36 .06 0 .194
1996 2 .78 38 .52 -
2001 4 .01 37 .80 -
2005 2 .45 38 .14 -
2008 2 .34 47 .70 -
a Gini coefficients not available for 1996, 2001, 2005 and 2008 elections.
Sources: Colin Hughes. 1977. A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965–1974. Canberra: 
Australian National University Press; Colin Hughes. 1986. Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 
1975–1984. Canberra: Australian National University Press; author’s own calculations.
The Gallop Government reforms
Following Labor’s victory at the 2001 election, and the subsequent changeover of 
council members in May 2001, for the first time in its history, the WA Parliament 
had a non-conservative majority in both houses.11 Therefore, Labor finally had 
the opportunity to legislate for significant electoral reform. With the election 
of a Labor president and the support of the five Greens council members, Labor 
could secure a 17–16 majority on the floor of the council. 
Within a month of Labor winning the 2001 election, Labor’s Electoral Affairs 
Minister, Jim McGinty, approached the Greens to seek their position on the 
government’s proposed electoral reforms. Labor’s proposal was for one vote, one 
value to be adopted for both the assembly and the council, with an allowable 
10 per cent tolerance for assembly seats. For the legislative council, Labor was 
open to the idea of either amalgamating existing regions into a single state-wide 
electorate or retaining regionalism, but with revised boundaries drawn using 
voting equality principles. As explained by a Greens interviewee: 
They [Labor] were very keen on a straightforward model for the 
assembly and they seemed to be more flexible about the upper house, 
but basically they wanted the upper house to be on a one vote, one value 
system. Either you went to a model where there was one State-wide seat 
on one vote, one value principles, or there was a radical realignment of 
the regions in order to remove vote weighting.
It was also acknowledged at this time that the government would require an 
absolute majority of 18 votes to pass its proposed electoral reforms. This was 
11 The legislative council’s 34 members were made up of 13 Labor, five Greens, 12 Liberal, one Nationals and 
three One Nation. The Greens effectively held the ‘balance of power’.
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due to the ‘entrenchment’ provision (Section 13) of the Electoral Distribution 
Act 1947, which requires an absolute majority of both houses for amendments 
to that Act to be made. In June 2001 it was announced that Labor was planning 
to amend legislation, if the Greens members were supportive, to allow the 
president to have a deliberative vote—a change that required only a simple 
majority to pass the council. This would then allow the government to make 
the electoral reforms it was planning, using an absolute majority of council 
members, assuming that it could win the Greens’ support. 
The Greens MLCs adopted a consensus approach in determining their position, 
which allowed for Dee Margetts’ (Greens’ Agricultural Region MLC) opposition 
to a blanket application of the one vote, one value principle. This was achieved 
by making concessions to allow for a special provision for remote (that is, 
geographically large) electorates. In July 2001, the Greens agreed to a model 
that would bring about voting equality for the assembly, with the exception 
of the special consideration for remote electorates (similar to the Queensland 
model). For the council, however, the Greens’ model retained the existing level 
of malapportionment between metropolitan and non-metropolitan council 
regions—another concession to Margetts. The Greens’ model also included an 
increase of council members from 34 to 36, based on three metropolitan and 
three non-metropolitan regions, each with six members. 
The community debate on the merits of voting equality that ensued as a result of 
the Gallop Government’s push for electoral reform was largely influenced by the 
public arguments put forward by the political parties and the consequent media 
commentary. Similar to most parliamentary political environments, however, 
here, negotiations and strategies that are not necessarily obvious to outside 
observers were being played out, particularly between Labor and the Greens. 
It was generally agreed during parliamentary debates that Labor’s proposed 
reforms would result in a shift of eight legislative assembly seats from country 
regions into the metropolitan area. In the non-metropolitan regions, the Greens’ 
requirement of a consideration for geographically large electorates meant that 
the Mining and Pastoral Region would lose only two assembly seats, rather than 
the three seats it would lose under a system based strictly on voting equality. 
A probable impact of this provision would result in Labor being able to retain 
a seat at the expense of a Coalition seat in the other non-metropolitan regions. 
Labor acknowledged that this special exemption from one vote, one value 
would be to its own advantage, but argued that the exemption was included 
in the legislation due to the Greens’ insistence, ‘based on an argument more for 
remoteness and biodiversity type…[Labor] didn’t go in seeking that’.
Overall, the eight seats to be shifted from non-metropolitan regions to 
metropolitan regions were primarily Coalition seats, with an estimation that 
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only one or two non-metropolitan Labor seats would be lost in the proposed 
change. The most severe negative impact would be to the National Party, with 
an anticipated loss of three seats, primarily as a result of its concentrated voting 
support in the Agricultural Region and lack of support in metropolitan regions. 
On balance, the Greens’ council model appeared to disadvantage themselves, 
especially when the party’s primary vote is taken into account. The Greens 
have never achieved a quota with their primary vote and thus have always had 
a reliance on preferences to win seats. This was particularly the case in the 
Agricultural and Mining and Pastoral regions in 2001, where the Greens’ primary 
vote was little more than one-quarter of a quota. It is anticipated that preference 
arrangements will remain a significant factor in the Greens’ prospects at future 
elections. In determining a model, the Greens sought a balanced position that 
neither seriously advantaged nor disadvantaged the party, and it appears they 
were successful in achieving that objective. The following comments illustrate 
the Greens’ views on the model: 
The electorate suicide model…when we were going through the process 
of devising that, I got advice that the six-by-six model was roughly 
neutral. There were academic people that made contact with me to 
suggest that it was actually a very bad model for the Greens…I’m 
not so altruistic as to want to advocate a position that was suicidal for 
the Greens but nor did we want to come up with a position that was 
blatantly self-interested. We actually wanted to come up with a position 
that we could sit comfortably with ethically. 
In drafting its legislation, the Labor government reluctantly accepted 
maintenance of malapportionment for the legislative council, including the 
Greens’ ‘six by six’ model, and adopted the special provision for remote areas. 
The government did not, however, include the increase in council numbers, 
which the Greens made clear was necessary if they were to support the reforms. 
This meant that the Greens were forced to initiate amendments to increase 
the number of members from 34 to 36, and take the force of public and media 
criticism for imposing the costs of two additional members of parliament. 
Simultaneously, the government was able to state opposition to the imposition 
of the added costs, and claim they were being forced into supporting the change 
in order to have their electoral reforms passed. This stance enabled the Labor 
government to deflect public and media criticism of the Greens’ ‘six by six’ 
model, despite having privately agreed to it, albeit reluctantly. The Greens 
erred strategically, allowing themselves to be exposed to public criticism by 
not requiring that Labor include the entire Greens model in its legislation. The 
Greens’ perspective was that ‘the Labor Party brought this in cold, and let us 
take the heat, as it were’. The Labor perspective was:
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Our proposal was not to have that exception; the Greens insisted on that 
exception as a condition of their support. The Bill made no impact on 
malapportionment in the upper house. The original Bill was structured 
knowing that the Greens would amend it this way in the upper house as 
their requirement, but it was our clear understanding that that’s what 
they’d do and we’d cop it. The Bill was structured such as to allow the 
Green amendment in the upper house to do that. We understood that we 
would accept an amendment along those lines. 
Labor was also aware they would face heavy criticism, particularly from the 
opposition and rural interest groups, by reducing representation in country 
areas. This was exacerbated by the adoption of an exemption from one vote, 
one value that could be construed as manipulation of the system to their own 
advantage. Labor was, however, able to ensure that during the parliamentary 
debates on the Bills, the Greens would be blamed for the proposed change in 
legislative council numbers, regardless of maintaining the malapportionment 
that Labor’s opponents were supporting. As a result, media commentary centred 
negatively on the Greens’ role, with headlines such as ‘Greens Threat to Vote 
Reform’, ‘Vote Reform Comes at a Cost’, and ‘Reform Move Simplistic, Selfish 
and Undemocratic’.12 Public awareness of the Greens’ ‘balance of power’ role 
was, however, clearly increased by the media debate, subsequently allowing the 
party to more effectively publicise its position on other legislation. 
On 1 August 2001, Labor’s Minister for Electoral Affairs (and Attorney-General), 
Jim McGinty, introduced his party’s electoral reform legislation, the Electoral 
Distribution Repeal Bill 2001 (the Repeal Bill) and the Electoral Amendment Bill 
2001 (the Amendment Bill), into the legislative assembly. The primary purpose of 
the Repeal Bill was to repeal the Electoral Distribution Act 1947, which provided 
the basis for the system of vote weighting for non-metropolitan regions and 
electorates. The Amendment Bill primarily sought to apply the principle of one 
vote, one value to assembly elections. This was to be done by transferring the 
relevant sections of the (to be) repealed Electoral Distribution Act 1947 into an 
amended Electoral Act 1907, with the major modification being that the division 
of enrolments into electorates would be on a State-wide basis. For electorates of 
less than 100 000 sq km, projected enrolments were to be within a plus or minus 
10 per cent tolerance from the State average district enrolment. Electorates with 
an area of 100 000 sq km or more would be weighted by adding an ‘additional 
large district number’—0.5 per cent of the electorate’s area in square kilometres 
(‘notional’ enrolments)—to the number of actual enrolments, and with a broader 
tolerance of projected enrolments (notional and actual) to be allowed, within 
plus 10 per cent or minus 20 per cent of the State average district enrolment.
12 West Australian, 19 September 2001; 30 November 2001; 14 December 2001.
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McGinty stated that the legislation did not represent absolute principles of one 
vote, one value—referring to the special provisions for large electorates and 
the lack of reform of the legislative council—because it reflected a compromise 
position that took into account the Greens’ requirements. Importantly, in the 
context of the ensuing debate, by repealing the Electoral Distribution Act 1947, 
Labor also expected to be able to avoid the Act’s Section 13 provision requiring 
amendments to that Act to be passed by an absolute majority. The Bills were 
passed unamended by the assembly in August–September 2001. 
Although it was stated that there was a unanimous decision within the Liberal 
Party Caucus to oppose Labor’s Bills,13 indications are that a significant number 
of Liberal members were supportive of one vote, one value and would cross the 
floor and vote with the government if not bound by party discipline. As one 
interviewee described it: 
If they were given a free vote on the issue, there were a number of 
Liberals who would cross the floor and I suspect the majority of their 
members in the upper house would be in that position to cross the floor 
and vote with the Labor Party, but it was introduced in such a way 
that it polarised views from the outset. Almost half of the parliamentary 
Liberal Party were in favour of the change. 
The Liberal Party has historically required National Party support to form 
government, so it is important for the Liberal Party to retain a reasonable 
working relationship with its Coalition partner. Some members of the Liberal 
Party, however, would appreciate not having to accommodate the Nationals, 
and see electoral reform as a way to achieve this, provided there is no overall 
loss of conservative seats. As one interviewee stated:
There is a strain of opinion within the Liberal Party that sees one of the 
great advantages of ending malapportionment is ending the existence 
of the National Party, who they see as a major nuisance and that if 
eight seats go to the city, the Liberal Party may only get four out of the 
eight, but the National Party will get none, and that’s seen as a distinct 
advantage.
The National Party is the only party clearly advantaged by the malapportionment 
existing in the WA system. Thus, it is not surprising that the party has fought 
vehemently against the introduction of voting equality. The combination of 
geographically concentrated voting support, and the effect of malapportionment 
providing a greater number of rural electorates in comparison with an equally 
apportioned system, has allowed the Nationals to remain a significant political 
13 Dan Barron-Sullivan MLA. 2001. ‘Electoral Amendment Bill 2001—Second Reading Speech.’ Hansard, 
22 August 2001. Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, pp. 2731–40.
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party in WA State politics. An indication of the Nationals’ motives is evident in 
its strategy to amend the legislation in two ways. First, the party considered an 
amendment to return the legislative council to single-member electorates, with 15 
metropolitan electorates and 15 non-metropolitan electorates. This amendment 
would have had the effect of removing proportional representation, and probably 
eliminating the Greens from the parliament, but leaving the Nationals able to 
win two or three seats in their agricultural heartland. The second proposal was 
to broaden zonation for assembly electorates, with metropolitan, regional and 
remote zones. Under this proposal, weighting would be allowed for regional 
and remote electorates. Although not ultimately moved in parliament, these 
proposals give an indication of the National Party’s preferred electoral system. 
The legislative council referred both Bills to the Standing Committee on 
Legislation. The standing committee’s membership for the inquiry was three 
Labor, two Liberal, a Green and a One Nation member. The committee’s report 
included 31 recommendations, but apart from recommending that the existing 
weighting in favour of non-metropolitan council regions be maintained, the 
committee was unable to agree on any other issues relating specifically to 
electoral reform. This was not surprising, given the positions of the different 
parties. Of particular importance though was Recommendation 5, supported 
by the Liberal, Greens and One Nation members, which recommended that the 
council take action to obtain a Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the Bills 
being presented for Royal Assent in the event that they were passed without 
an absolute majority. This indicated that there would be a willingness for the 
council to pursue clarification from the Supreme Court on the ‘absolute majority’ 
question. 
The possibility of amending Section 14 of the Constitution Acts Amendment 
Act 1899 to give the president a deliberative vote was raised at the time of 
the standing committee inquiry in 2001. The Greens came to a view that an 
existing right to a deliberative vote existed, and encouraged the president to 
vote. Following the tabling of the standing committee report, the Clerk of the 
Parliaments, Laurie Marquet, informed the president that in the event that the 
Repeal Bill was passed by the council without an absolute majority, he intended 
to seek a declaratory statement from the Supreme Court as to whether he could 
present the Bill for Royal Assent. The major contention in this aspect of the 
debate was whether the repeal of the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 actually 
constituted an ‘amendment’ of the Act, which would therefore require it to be 
passed with an absolute majority, as per Section 13 of the Act. The president 
informed the council of the clerk’s position on 28 November 2001. The Bills 
were subsequently passed by the council in December 2001, with simple, but 
not absolute, majorities.
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Within less than five months, the Labor government had been able to pass 
its electoral reform legislation, with the support of the five Greens members 
in the legislative council. Despite a standing committee inquiry, and lengthy 
and heated debates in both houses, the legislation passed without any major 
changes to the original model that had been agreed to between the government 
and the Greens prior to the legislation being introduced. Before the legislation 
could become law through receiving Royal Assent, however, the question of 
whether the Repeal Bill was bound by the ‘absolute majority’ provision of the 
Electoral Distribution Act 1947 was still to be answered by the WA Supreme 
Court. Following the passing of the legislation, Marquet sought a declaratory 
statement from the Supreme Court on the validity of the Bills. Although the 
clerk’s action in seeking a declaratory statement from the Supreme Court was 
taken with the support of the council, it was viewed by the government as 
thwarting its agenda. Labor only supported the Supreme Court action under 
sufferance, knowing that the Bills would be defeated if a declaratory statement 
was not sought. The following Labor comment illustrates this: 
The Greens said there was some doubt about the legality of the Bills 
and it all looked a bit shonky…they were not willing to pass the Bill 
at the third reading unless we can assure them that they’re legally in 
order. They were not satisfied with respect to [the] Solicitor-General’s 
opinions and basically without this device it looked as though the 
Greens would defeat it at [the] third reading. This was concurred under 
much sufferance by the government…because at least it effected the 
passage of the Bills and we had some chance in the courts.
The five-member full bench of the Supreme Court heard the case in April 
2002. The government put forward three main arguments in support of the 
legislation, being that: repealing an Act is not the same as amending it, and 
therefore Section 13 of the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 did not apply; it is not 
competent for a parliament to bind a future parliament in the way that Section 
13 of the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 does; and Section 13 of the Electoral 
Distribution Act 1947 had been repealed implicitly by Section 2(3) of the Acts 
Amendment (Constitution) Act 1978.14 In a four-to-one decision, the court stated 
that an absolute majority was required to pass the legislation in the council.15 
In summary, the ruling stated that: parliament intended that the word ‘amend’ 
encompassed a repeal of the Act; parliament is able to enact a manner and form 
provision that requires a particular majority to amend or repeal legislation; 
and the legislation was captured by Section 73(1) of the Constitution Act 1899, 
irrespective of the later subsections of Section 73. 
14 Section 2(3) of the Acts Amendment (Constitution) Act 1978 added new subsections to Section 73 of the 
Constitution Act 1899, stipulating specific actions that required an absolute majority.
15 Marquet v the Attorney-General of Western Australia [2002], Supreme Court of Western Australia, 2002.
8 . One Vote, One Value
125
This meant that the Bills could not be presented for Royal Assent and represented 
an emphatic win for the opponents of the government’s electoral reforms. It also 
shifted attention to the issue of amending Section 14 of the Constitution Acts 
Amendment Act 1899 to give the president a deliberative vote in the legislative 
council. If the Greens were to support such a change, the government could 
achieve the absolute majority that was required, as ruled by the Supreme Court. 
A month after the Supreme Court decision, Premier Geoff Gallop announced 
that the government would appeal the decision to the High Court, stating that 
the government’s legal advice was that an appeal ‘should succeed’. A week 
after the premier’s announcement, the High Court action became even more 
critical when the Greens stated that they would not support legislation giving 
the president a deliberative vote, arguing that their legal advice had stated 
that Section 73 of the Constitution Act 1899 already provided the president 
with a deliberative vote on constitutional matters, and that further legislation 
to provide a deliberative vote would affect the impartiality of the president’s 
position.16 The interests of political parties became further apparent with the 
appeal attracting legal intervention from the Labor governments of Queensland 
and New South Wales, and the federal Attorney-General. 
The Supreme Court decision confirmed that the Labor government would 
need an absolute majority to pass its electoral reforms. The Greens’ preferred 
position was for legislation to be amended to clarify the president’s voting 
rights, but, in doing so, the Greens felt that the implications of such a change 
needed investigating (such as the increased likelihood of deadlocked votes, and 
therefore the need for a casting vote). Additionally, the Greens believed that 
broader issues of reforming the WA Constitution should be addressed at the 
same time. Following the Supreme Court decision, Labor was unwilling to have 
the president exercise a deliberative vote, as it believed that such an action 
would inevitably be subject to a legal challenge, and that the Supreme Court 
may look upon the government unfavourably given the previous history of the 
legislation. 
Following the Supreme Court decision, the government was left with three 
choices: accept the decision and not pursue the reforms any further; challenge 
the decision in the High Court; or pursue changes to the legislation that would 
win the support of an absolute majority. While the first option was not seriously 
considered given the importance Labor placed on the reforms, the government 
used its High Court appeal as a bargaining point in attempting to win Liberal 
support, arguing that the Liberal Party risked ‘losing everything’. 
We offered to cut a deal…the Libs would have extracted a high price 
for their cooperation. Whether we could have paid that in the end 
16 Ben Harvey. 2002. ‘Greens Sink Votes Bid.’ West Australian, 18 November 2002.
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is a different matter. The price was the destruction of proportional 
representation, reintroduction of a staggered term…it destroys minor 
representation.
The reintroduction of staggered terms would mean that members of the 
legislative council would be elected for two terms (eight years), with only half of 
the council seats up for election at each general election. This would effectively 
double the quota required for election; however, before the High Court made 
its decision, the WA Electoral Distribution Commissioners published their 
decision on the redistribution of electoral boundaries, which was seen to favour 
the Liberal Party.17 Following this, the issue of a compromise was not pursued 
further, prior to the High Court decision. As observed by one interviewee: 
‘People like Dan [Sullivan, Liberal Deputy Leader], the man who had a very 
nice 62 per cent Leschenault seat, decided they had no interest in overturning 
this draft redistribution.’
The High Court delivered its decision in November 2003,18 upholding the 
Supreme Court decision, and therefore ruling the electoral reform legislation 
invalid, by a five-to-one majority. The decision addressed all aspects of the 
Supreme Court ruling, and agreed with the Supreme Court that the term ‘amend’ 
included ‘repeal’. Additionally, the court argued that with the repealing of 
electoral boundaries there is an implicit and required redrawing of boundaries 
for an election to be held, and therefore the legislation constituted a repeal and 
simultaneous amendment of boundaries. In his dissenting judgment, Justice 
Kirby argued that the word ‘amend’ is usually used in reference to partial repeals, 
where words or sections of an Act may be deleted, whereas the total repeal of 
an Act should not be referred to as an amendment. The High Court decision 
brought to a conclusion the three-year battle that the first Gallop Government 
had waged to introduce the one vote, one value principle to Western Australia’s 
electoral laws. 
The Supreme Court and High Court deliberations necessarily concentrated 
on the constitutionality of the legislative process, and it should be noted that 
the High Court has been reluctant to interfere with the parliament’s role of 
determining electoral distribution and administration. In a number of cases,19 
the High Court has supported deviations from voting equality on the basis that 
the Constitution provides for parliament to be the primary decision maker of 
the electoral system that provides representative government. In contrast, Labor 
argues that the US Supreme Court provides more relevant interpretations of the 
17 Redistributions are held after every second election. The 2003 redistribution reduced mining and 
pastoral assembly seats from six to five, and increased south-west seats from 10 to 11.
18 Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet [2003], High Court of Australia, 2003.
19 For example, Attorney-General (Cwlth) ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975); and McGinty v Western 
Australia (1996).
8 . One Vote, One Value
127
meaning of election ‘by the people’.20 The US examples are, however, based 
on explicit constitutional rights, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
provides equal rights. Such protections and rights are absent in the Australian 
Constitution. 
In June 2004, Alan Cadby, a Liberal member of the legislative council, resigned 
from his party as a result of a preselection process that placed him in an 
unwinnable position for the upcoming State election. This breathed new life 
into the electoral reform debate, with the possibility that Labor could obtain 
Cadby’s vote, thereby achieving an absolute majority for its legislation, with the 
Greens’ support. Alternatively, it was suggested that Cadby could be offered the 
president’s position, giving Labor an absolute majority, again with the Greens’ 
support. The Greens stated that they would support the legislation if it were 
reintroduced; however, the premier ruled out this option in response to media 
questioning, and apparently without consulting his party, as explained by the 
Greens:
That’s why we were really dirty on Gallop when Cadby resigned, there 
it was, on a plate…and it would have gone through…we’ve seen Gallop 
do this before, he gets put on the spot, he doesn’t consult because at 
that stage we’d been talking for about a week with [council president] 
Cowdell, and McGinty through Cowdell, and we had been relayed 
Cadby’s position and there it was…the Labor Party was devastated. 
The premier’s statement brought an end to Labor’s efforts for reform prior to 
the 2005 general election (held on 26 February). While the Labor Party was 
easily returned to power, the overall legislative council result maintained the 
ideological balance that existed before the election.21 This meant that Labor and 
the Greens could not achieve an absolute majority on the floor of the house; 
however, newly elected councillors do not take up their seats until 22 May 
every four years, so the government had a window of opportunity of almost 
three months to put through legislation if it could win the support of the Greens 
and former Liberal Alan Cadby. 
During the election campaign, Labor promised that none of the five existing 
mining and pastoral assembly electorates would be lost in any redistribution 
brought about by its proposed electoral reforms. Following the election, 
however, the Greens insisted that the only exemption from voting equality for 
the assembly should be on the grounds of remoteness, as had been proposed in 
the earlier legislation. For the legislative council, the Greens maintained their 
20 See Jim McGinty MLA. 2001. ‘Electoral Amendment Bill 2001—Second Reading Speech.’ Hansard, 1 
August 2001. Perth: Parliament of Western Australia.
21 Labor won an additional three seats, while the Greens lost three seats. The Liberal Party won a further 
three seats, while One Nation lost three seats.
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position of enlarging the chamber to six six-member regions, giving metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan regions a total of 18 members each. The government was 
in a difficult position. It had to either break its election promise to protect the 
five seats or find an alternative to retain them. Labor also had to defend itself 
against accusations of acting out of self-interest, protecting seats where they 
had strong support, while removing seats from the Nationals’ heartland in the 
agricultural region. 
Labor introduced its reform Bill22 on 30 March 2005, which included the provision 
for five guaranteed seats in the Mining and Pastoral region. The Bill also increased 
the size of the council from 34 to 36, and aimed to reduce malapportionment 
by having 21 metropolitan and 15 non-metropolitan members (this was later 
amended to 18/18, due to the Greens’ insistence). Without the guarantee, the 
Mining and Pastoral region stood to lose one of its five assembly seats. The 
legislation’s passage in the council was slowed due to the differences between 
Labor and the Greens (and Cadby); however, Labor negotiated an agreement by 
suggesting a small increase in the number of assembly seats. Simply by enlarging 
the size of the assembly from 57 to 59 seats, the average electorate enrolment 
(based on 2005 election figures) reduces by almost 10 per cent, from 22 092 to 21 
343. Combined with the special provision for geographically large electorates, 
this ensures that the Mining and Pastoral region retains five assembly seats. 
This satisfied the Greens’ demands while keeping Labor’s election commitment 
intact. 
The ‘one vote, one value’ legislation progressed, passing its final parliamentary 
stage on 17 May 2005, only five days before the newly elected council members 
took their seats. On 4 May, the government had introduced separate legislation23 
to increase the assembly numbers, which was also passed in the old council’s 
final week of sitting. 
Once the electoral distribution commissioners conducted the redistribution 
process, the metropolitan area had gained eight seats (from 34 to 42), while the 
Agricultural and South West regions each lost three seats (seven to four, and 11 
to eight, respectively). Under a system of full ‘one vote, one value’, the Mining 
and Pastoral region would have been reduced to three assembly seats; however, 
it retained its five seats, as intended (and promised) by Labor. 
It is no surprise that the electoral impacts of these reforms, based on 2005 election 
results, clearly advantage Labor. In the non-metropolitan regions, which lost a 
total of six seats, Labor would only lose two seats, while the Liberals would lose 
one or two. The major loser was the National Party, who stood to lose two or 
three seats and, as a result, parliamentary party status. In the metropolitan area, 
22 One Vote One Value Bill 2005, later renamed the Electoral Amendment and Repeal Bill 2005.
23 Constitution and Electoral Amendment Bill 2005.
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Labor notionally gained an additional five seats, while the Liberals picked up 
another three seats. The impacts for the assembly are summarised in Table 8.4. 
It can be seen that in overall terms Labor picked up three seats while the 
Coalition parties lost one seat. 




Pastoral Agricultural South West
Labor 24–9 4–4 1–0 3–2 32–5
Liberal 8–11 1–1 2–2 7–6 18–20
Nationals - - 4–2 1–0 5–2
Independents 2–2 - - - 2–2
Total 34–42 5–5 7–4 11–8 57–9
Note: 2005 election results are shown first. Post-reform figures are estimates based on 2005 election results 
and are subject to the results of the redistribution process. 
In the legislative council, it is theoretically easier for minor parties to win seats, 
on the basis that the quota reduces from 16.7 to 14.3 per cent in four regions 
(but increases from 12.5 to 14.3 per cent in the other two regions). Once again, 
however, based on 2005 election results, the council reform will benefit Labor, 
giving the party an increased chance of winning half of the council seats. 
The Greens will struggle to retain or win seats, and will continue to rely on 
preferences, especially from any unused Labor overflow.
Of course, the above estimations are based on the 2005 election result. In reality, 
at the 2008 general election, there was a significant swing of 6 per cent away from 
Labor, most of which went to the Coalition. As a result, Labor lost government, 
losing four assembly seats and five council seats. 
Conclusion 
It can be seen that an ingenious solution to the impasse between Labor and the 
Greens was found, one that had nothing to do with voting equality principles 
and everything to do with political expediency and self-interest. There are 
reasonable arguments for (and also arguments against) making special provisions 
for remote electorates, and in this sense the new WA legislation largely replicates 
that of Queensland, which has similar issues of remoteness; however, increasing 
the size of the parliament to accommodate political self-interest makes a 
mockery of consultation processes and principles of representation. In the past 
105 years, the assembly has increased in size only from 50 to 59 seats. It is a pity 
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that a rational public debate (as occurred with the Commission on Government 
inquiry in the 1990s, then subsequently ignored) on the appropriate size of 
parliament was not held prior to this legislation being passed. 
In assessing the merits of the Gallop Government’s electoral reforms, it is 
definitely a major step towards voting equality for the legislative assembly. 
Malapportionment of about 2:1 will continue to exist—however, this will only 
be in relation to the five Mining and Pastoral region seats—compared with a 
similar degree of malapportionment for the 23 non-metropolitan seats under the 
previous system. Unfortunately, the inherent soundness of the new system is 
tainted by the political self-interest that was the driver of change.
It is not possible to argue, however, that the reform of the legislative council is in 
the best interests of voting equality, as the reform actually increases the previous 
level of malapportionment. Because the new legislation retains geographically 
distinct non-metropolitan council regions irrespective of population, the level 
of malapportionment increased in the worst-case scenario from 4.1:1 to 4.6:1.24 
It is remarkable that this legislation, which Labor purports is based on voting 
equality, actually increases inequality for one house of parliament. Labor has, 
however, repeatedly made it clear that it is the reform of the assembly, the house 
of government, that it is really concerned about.
Labor is the clear political winner in these electoral reforms, despite the 2008 
election result. It has been able to protect its assembly seats in the Mining 
and Pastoral region, while severely weakening the Nationals in their areas of 
support. The Liberal Party will also benefit from the increase in the number of 
metropolitan seats, and by having a weaker Coalition partner in the Nationals. 
The Greens have probably been neither big winners nor big losers, but are 
responsible for increasing the council’s level of malapportionment. While 
political scientists and theorists might lament the lack of democratic principle 
applied to these reforms, until such electoral reforms can be determined by 
impartial and independent processes, the political realities of partisanship and 
self-interest will be the prime movers of reform. 
24 Based on the number of voters enrolled per member, comparing the Mining and Pastoral region (68 240 
enrolled, increasing from five to six members) with the North Metropolitan region (388 999 enrolled; this will 




Australia’s major political parties regularly use their numbers in parliament to 
change electoral laws. Often such amendments are made in line with modern 
electoral administrative practice, with no obvious partisan benefits. There are, 
however, several occasions when either Labor or the Coalition ignore electoral 
‘best practice’ and fairness and use their powers over the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 to bring about a political advantage—either for a direct 
partisan advantage over opposition parties or when opposition numbers are 
needed for passage of the reforms, for mutual benefit and acting as a party cartel. 
Usually these reforms have at least the tacit support of the Australian Electoral 
Commission (AEC). There are times, however, when the Labor and Coalition 
parties’ cartel is united in opposing the AEC’s efforts to operate a fairer and 
more independent electoral administration regime. One such area of electoral 
management that has been subject to legislative reforms throughout the past 
30 years, since the major Commonwealth reforms of 1983, is the administration 
of postal voting application (PVA) forms. The Australian administration of this 
aspect of the voting process highlights the conflict between internationally 
accepted norms for fair elections and governing-party self-interest. 
In recent times postal voting has become more prominent in many modern 
democracies. It is seen as a way of encouraging and increasing voter turnout, 
especially among travellers, the elderly and the infirm. Postal voting therefore 
promotes fairer elections by increasing the opportunity for participation by all 
groups in society. Typically, as with other aspects of electoral administration, the 
electoral management body is responsible for providing postal vote application 
forms and processing applications; however, a search of the ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network database did not reveal any instances where political 
parties are as intricately involved in the promotion and administration of the 
postal voting process as in Australia. In the United Kingdom, however, when 
postal voting rules were relaxed in 2001 (but not to the extent that allowed 
party involvement as in Australia), it was accompanied by significant fraud 
by Labour and Conservative candidates who saw the advantages in controlling 
postal ballots.1 
While there is little in the way of specific direction on this aspect of electoral 
administration, international best-practice literature consistently refers to the 
need for parties and candidates not to interfere with election processes. The 
handbook of electoral standards of the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), while concentrating on polling-
1 Richard Mawrey. 2010. ‘Easy Voting Means Fraudulent Voting.’ Quadrant 54(4).
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day behaviour, also refers to the need for parties not to ‘handle any official 
election material’.2 The emphasis is on parties observing rather than being 
involved in the conduct of an election. 
It is also widely accepted that, to ensure free and fair elections, electoral 
management bodies should be independent, both of the government of 
the day and of any political partisan connections. In IDEA’s handbook on 
electoral management design, Wall et al. identify seven aspects of independent 
electoral management. Particularly pertinent to the discussion on postal voting 
applications are the three aspects of: institutional arrangements—is the electoral 
management body institutionally independent from the executive branch of 
government; implementation—does the electoral management body exercise 
full responsibility for implementation of election processes; and powers—does 
the electoral management body have powers to develop the electoral regulatory 
framework independently under the law? 
IDEA goes on to argue that the legitimacy of election results is enhanced if 
electoral authorities are perceived to be impartial and not subject to political 
interference or control.3 This argument stresses the importance of a ‘perception’ 
of independence, irrespective of the organisational framework that an electoral 
management body operates in. 
The increased use of postal voting
There has been a steady increase in the use of postal voting in Australian federal 
elections during the study period, from 2.83 per cent in 1993 to 6.15 per cent at 
the 2010 election.4 There have been a number of reasons for this increase. The 
1983 reforms to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 introduced a category 
of ‘general postal voter’; a 1990 amendment allowed employment reasons as 
grounds to apply for a postal vote; parties and candidates were allowed to 
include PVAs in their campaigning material following a 1998 amendment; and 
further amendments in 2000 and 2001 facilitated the electronic provision of 
postal voter information to parties. 
The growth in postal voting raises three important questions in regard to the 
integrity of elections. First, are there sufficient safeguards to ensure that postal 
votes (which are, by their nature, cast in an uncontrolled environment) have 
been made freely, without coercion or undue influence? Second, can election 
2 IDEA [Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance]. 2002. International Electoral Standards: Guidelines 
for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 85–6.
3 Alan Wall et al. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook. 
4 Senate figures. Prior to the 1993 election, postal voting was about 4–6 per cent; however, pre-poll voting 
was introduced for the 1993 election, resulting in a significant initial drop in the rate of postal voting. 
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officials have confidence that a postal vote has been cast by the person stated 
on the accompanying application forms (and has that person had a legitimate 
reason for applying for the postal vote)? Finally, because of the ability for 
political parties to be intricately involved in the distribution and collection of 
PVA forms, does this corrupt the process and increase the possibility of also 
disenfranchising some voters?5
In answer to the first two questions, it is impossible to ascertain or control the 
conditions in which postal voters cast their votes, and whether an application 
has been forged. With an accurate electoral roll, however, and the electronic 
availability of signatures from enrolment forms for crosschecking PVA signatures, 
there can be a good degree of confidence that identities are correct. The answer 
to the question of whether voters have legitimate reasons to lodge a postal vote 
is less clear. Schedule 2 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 specifies several 
circumstances when an application for a postal vote may be made—namely, 
when the voter: will be outside the State or Territory; will not be within 8 km 
of a polling booth; will be travelling throughout polling hours; is ill, infirm 
or approaching childbirth (or caring for someone in these conditions); is in a 
hospital without polling facilities; has religious beliefs that preclude attending a 
polling booth; is in prison; is a silent elector; or has work conditions preventing 
attendance at a polling booth. In 2010, eligibility was further broadened to 
anyone who will be outside their electorate on polling day.6
As applicants only need to specify that they are eligible for a postal vote, 
without indicating the particular reason (at least, at the federal level), there is a 
relaxed onus of proof. Electoral commissions understandably do not investigate 
applicants’ eligibility in the middle of conducting an election, but a doubling 
of applicants in recent years suggests that more voters are using postal voting 
as a convenience rather than a necessity. If voters were required to provide the 
reason they were applying for a postal vote, it would not only strengthen the 
onus of proof, it would also provide the AEC with valuable data on how it could 
better adapt to voters’ needs.
Party involvement in postal voting
Part XV of the Act details the process of applying for a postal vote. As a result of 
the amendments in the past 30 years, political parties can now actively solicit for 
electors to lodge postal votes. Such solicitation is commonly carried out by the 
parliamentary representatives of the major parties, who can use both taxpayer-
5 Norm Kelly. 2011. ‘Australian Electoral Administration and Electoral Integrity.’ In Electoral Democracy: 
Australian Prospects, eds Tham, Costar and Orr. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
6 Schedule 8 of the Electoral and Referendum (Modernisation and Other Measures) Act 2010.
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funded and party resources, such as elector databases and printing allowances, 
to mail postal vote applications to enrolled voters. It is also standard practice 
for the mail-outs to include a return envelope to the member or party, which 
then forwards the application on to the AEC. AEC figures show that of all PVAs 
received indirectly from electors (that is, through party agents and others), 98.7 
per cent were forwarded by the Labor and Coalition parties (see Table 9.1). This 
is an indication that the governing or major parties have an advantage over less-
resourced parties in influencing electors. 
Table 9.1 PVAs Received by the AEC for the 2010 Election:  
Period Between Witness Signature and AEC Receipt of PVA 







Same day 15 013 792 24 607 212
1 day later 36 619 6094 299 9222 228
2 days later 33 215 9572 594 13 896 237
3 days later 28 152 10 268 639 13 664 334
4 days later 22 955 10 793 773 13 433 305
5 days later 14 581 9529 758 10 962 270
6 days later 9214 7478 638 8987 257
7 days later 5884 5883 610 6942 219
8 days later 3391 4258 417 4309 92
9 days later 2020 2842 287 2964 57
10 days later 1616 2508 315 2636 67
11 days later 1399 2371 281 2429 39
12 days later 1120 2109 350 2360 18
13 days later 947 1914 314 2304 15
14+ days later 3996 6315 392 5016 50
Total 180 122 82 726 6691 99 371 2400
1 Includes Country Liberal Party 
Source: AEC submission to JSCEM, 21 February 2011, p. 84.
The AEC’s figures also show that 49 per cent of all PVAs are returned by electors 
directly to the AEC. This leaves more than 51 per cent being returned via a third 
party (usually Labor or the Coalition, as shown above). For the 2010 election, 
this amounted to more than 191 000 applications that were delayed in being 
received by the AEC due to them being sent on a circuitous route. This is a 
substantial number, roughly equivalent to two House of Representatives seats, 
and is an increase of more than 87 000 on 2007 figures.
9 . Postal Voting
135
Over the past 20 years, the AEC has consistently criticised the practice of such 
overt party involvement in the conduct of an election. The AEC’s arguments 
include the following:
•	 There is a potential for voters to become confused, thinking that the parties 
are the ones who are responsible for postal voting, rather than the AEC.
•	 Delays occur, due to applications not being returned directly to the AEC, 
resulting in possible disenfranchisement.
•	 Electors often receive more than one PVA, sometimes resulting in multiple 
applications being received by the AEC, adding to its administrative burden.
•	 There is unnecessary use of postal voting, increasing costs and delaying the 
finalisation of results.
•	 Political parties stockpile PVAs before sending them to the AEC, resulting 
in processing delays and, at times, disenfranchisement. Stockpiling is an 
offence under Section 197 of the Act.
•	 The secrecy and integrity of the ballot might be compromised, as votes are 
cast in an uncontrolled environment.
•	 Parties attempt to obscure the fact that the PVA is returned to a party address, 
by using terms such as ‘Returning Officer’.
•	 Party officials ‘correct’ details on PVAs before sending them to the AEC. 
Despite the AEC’s ongoing concerns, the JSCEM and successive governments 
have chosen to support the continued involvement of parties in the PVA process. 
At times, the JSCEM has shifted blame to the AEC for some of the problems, 
stating that it ‘is possible that some [voters] were disenfranchised as a result of 
administrative errors by the AEC’.7 The general thrust of JSCEM reports is that 
the parties are providing a public service in distributing PVA material—for 
example:
The Committee is of the view that distribution of PVAs by candidates 
provides an important and now well-established service to electors, and 
that it is important for candidates and political parties to be confident 
that a service initiated by them has been successfully concluded. 
The relatively high rate of return experienced in many electorates 
demonstrates the helpfulness and popularity of the service. Breaking 
with this practice at future elections may lead to significant voter 
inconvenience and possibly disenfranchisement.8
7 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 60.
8 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2003. The 2001 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2001 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, p. 149.
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This view was supported by both Labor and Liberal party members during a 
2008 JSCEM hearing:
We are liaising with a number of voters about their rights to vote. We are 
making sure that, if they have not got their postal ballot, they ring us—
they do not ring [the AEC]…Their relationship is with their political 
party, not the AEC.9 
The elector who has dealt with the party does not ring [the AEC], the 
elector rings us…These [PVAs] go out with big Labor Party and Liberal 
Party stamps on them. I do not think they are confused where this 
information is coming from.10 
Thanks to the parties, most voters, within a couple of days of the election 
being called, have got a PVA in their hot little hands. If the parties have 
no incentive to send that out they probably will not, therefore voters 
probably will not have the PVA in their hot little hands in that first week 
of the election.11 
Under the Commonwealth system, parties can, either accidentally or deliberately, 
delay a PVA from reaching the AEC, meaning that eligible voters might be 
prevented from casting a vote. During JSCEM’s inquiry into the 1998 election, 
the AEC identified 174 electors who were disenfranchised through apparent 
delays in parties returning PVAs. In reporting this, JSCEM attempted to spread 
the blame by stating in their report that:
It is not entirely clear from the evidence that the political parties are 
wholly responsible for the 174 disenfranchised postal voters. It is 
possible that some were disenfranchised as a result of administrative 
errors by the AEC. In the absence of further evidence, the Committee 
urges both the AEC and the political parties to improve their processing 
of postal vote application forms.12
The AEC has raised its concerns since at least 1993 about the delays created 
by parties stockpiling PVAs, and evidence in its 2008 submission to JSCEM 
suggests the practice is continuing, with a surge in the number of applications 
being received more than 14 days after the witness signature on the PVA (see 
Table 9.1). The proportion of all PVAs received was far higher for the parties 
9 Jon Sullivan MP. 2008. Official Committee Hansard. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Friday, 
27 June 2008. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, p. 11.
10 Scott Morrison MP. 2008. Official Committee Hansard. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 
Friday, 27 June 2008. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, p. 14.
11 Senator Simon Birmingham. 2008. Official Committee Hansard. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters, Friday, 27 June 2008. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, p. 13.
12 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, pp. 59–60.
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(Labor, 7.6 per cent; Liberal, 5.1 per cent) for this category (more than 14 days 
after signing) than for those sent directly to the AEC (2.2 per cent of all PVAs). 
This indicates delays from the double mailing involved in sending a PVA to 
the AEC via a party address, and possibly from the parties stockpiling PVAs 
prior to sending them to the AEC. In both cases, the possibility of voters being 
disenfranchised increases.
A test was conducted during the 2007 election period to gauge the service from 
the parties and their attitude to dealing with PVAs. The author received PVAs in 
the mail from the Labor and Liberal parties, as outlined below.
Labor 
The Labor package (see excerpt at Figure 9.1) was received in an envelope 
marked ‘Important Voter Information Enclosed—From Bob McMullan MP 
Federal Member for Fraser’. On one side of a folded A3-size pamphlet was 
the PVA and early voting information from the AEC. The other side contained 
party campaign material (including three photos of Bob McMullan and Labor 
mentioned 11 times). On three panels, reference is made to a ‘Postal Voting 
Hotline—6257 7575’. The number is that of McMullan’s campaign office. A 
reply-paid envelope was enclosed for the voter to send the PVA: it was addressed 
to Bob McMullan MP.
Figure 9.1 Labor Postal Voting Information Leaflet (excerpt)
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Figure 9.2 Liberal Postal Voting Information Leaflet (excerpt)
Liberal
The Liberal Party’s Senator Gary Humphries sent a personally addressed A4-
size campaign letter, at the end of which was the text: ‘PS: I enclose a postal vote 
application in case you are unable to vote on polling day.’ The enclosed PVA (see 
excerpt at Figure 9.2) was on a slightly larger than A4 folded pamphlet. The PVA 
and associated AEC information were displayed on seven of the eight panels, 
with the remaining panel containing party campaign material. At the bottom of 
one panel of AEC material was a message in large font: ‘Need more information? 
Ph (02) 6247 6444.’ This is Senator Humphries’ electorate office number. 
A reply-paid envelope was enclosed, addressed to the Canberra Liberals.
In both cases, the parties provided official AEC information, including the AEC’s 
phone number (in small font), while promoting their own phone numbers in a 
much larger font. To gauge how willing the parties were to give out AEC contact 
details, a call was made to each of the printed party numbers, asking for the 
address to send the PVA directly to the AEC. The responses were:
Labor: You want to send it straight to them, OK. It’s GPO Box 2867, 
Canberra City.
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Liberal: I’ll just grab it for you. Here it is. It’s GPO Box 2867, Canberra 
City.
A call was made to the AEC information line, also seeking their postal address:
AEC: What is your postcode?
Caller: 2602. 
AEC: So you’re in New South Wales. 
Caller: No, I’m in the ACT. 
AEC: There’s only one electorate in Canberra, isn’t there? 
Caller: [Explained that there are two electorates in the ACT.] 
After a pause, the postal address was given. The call took three minutes.  
These calls give the impression that the parties are better equipped to respond to 
electors’ inquiries. It appears, however, that the parties’ proficiency in dealing 
with PVA inquiries has developed in response to the fact that a significant 
number of electors probably believe that it is the parties’ responsibility to deal 
with these matters—a perception that is encouraged by the parties themselves. 
In terms of fairness and equity, it is apparent that the Coalition and Labor parties 
are the only ones that have the financial and database resources to engage in 
mass mail-outs to electors. 
With the incumbency benefit of having electronic databases of electors, these 
mail-outs can be designed in a personalised format. The databases and tracking 
systems that have been developed by the major parties also include information 
that indicates whether an elector is a possible party supporter. Although there 
is no evidence that this practice occurs, it is conceivable that a party might 
delay forwarding a completed PVA to the AEC if the elector is identified as 
a non-supporter. For example, in 2009 the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) observed a political party lodging PVAs the day prior to a by-election—
too late for postal ballots to be issued—despite these being completed by the 
applicant and received by the party well before the election.13 The question is 
whether this was a case of party administration incompetency or deliberate 
disenfranchisement of non-party supporters. The ANAO recommended that all 
PVAs should be required to be delivered directly to the AEC. 
13 Australian National Audit Office. 2010a. The Auditor-General Audit Report No. 28 2009–10 Performance 
Audit: The Australian Electoral Commission’s Preparation for and Conduct of the 2007 Federal General Election. 
Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, p. 154.
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Australian Electoral Commission action
Despite continuing evidence of voters being disenfranchised due to the delays 
in parties returning PVAs to the AEC, the AEC has been reluctant to initiate 
prosecutions against the parties.14 This reluctance might be due in part to 
the AEC’s need to keep the parties ‘on side’, as the parties’ support is needed 
if legislative change is to occur. While the AEC is limited by its legislation, 
the recent history of the PVA issue indicates that the AEC does not operate 
as an independent body, and that it falls short in terms of IDEA’s criteria on 
institutional arrangements, implementation and powers. 
The fact that the AEC in its submission to JSCEM in 2008 did not argue for 
the removal of political party PVAs suggests that the commission is aware 
of the political realities and has chosen not to fight the main issue, instead 
concentrating on administrative problems related to this political involvement 
in the election process. In particular, the AEC reiterated its previous concerns 
that political party PVAs were delayed in reaching the AEC, due to them being 
sent to a party address for forwarding. The AEC provided a simple solution 
to this problem, suggesting that the Commonwealth Act could be amended 
by adding a provision that already exists for postal voting applications in the 
Australian Capital Territory. The Australian Capital Territory’s Electoral Act 
provides for an offence to induce a person ‘to return the completed form to an 
address that is not an address authorised by the Commissioner’ (Section 143[2] 
of the Electoral Act 1992 [ACT]). The JSCEM, however, chose to reject the 
AEC’s recommendation, stating that delays were ‘relatively minor’ and ‘may be 
influenced by other factors’.15 The JSCEM’s report did not explain what ‘other 
factors’ might be involved. 
The JSCEM’s 2009 report into the conduct of the 2007 election also identified 
that the receipt of political party PVAs resulted in multiple voting in ‘quite a 
few’ cases, where voters used a postal vote and then voted again on election day. 
This was particularly common with voters from culturally and linguistically 
diverse backgrounds. This seemingly critical aspect of the impacts of political 
party involvement in the PVA process is not discussed in any greater detail 
anywhere in the committee’s report; however, the parties’ knowledge of which 
electors have applied for a postal vote allows for possible electoral fraud. If a 
14 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the 
Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, pp. 59–60; JSCEM [Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2003. The 2001 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the 
Conduct of the 2001 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto, pp. 147–8. 
15 JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2009. Report on the Conduct of the 2007 Federal 
Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 213.
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party official is aware that someone is unlikely to attend a polling booth (in 
this case, because they have applied for a postal vote), it becomes easier to 
fraudulently vote for them at a polling station on election day.
An added advantage for parties in government is the ability to send out PVAs 
(with campaigning material) to coincide with the announcement of the election 
date. As Australia does not have fixed dates for its general elections, it is the 
prime minister who recommends the election date to the governor-general. 
This provides a strategic advantage for governing parties to plan their election 
campaigns and book their advertising, while opposition and minor parties need 
to be prepared for several possibilities. According to the author’s sources, in 
2007, with Labor in opposition, it took three days after Prime Minister John 
Howard announced the election date to send out their PVAs. In 2010, with 
Labor in government, PVAs were sent out on Friday 16 July, prior to the formal 
announcement of the election the following day. The Liberal Party had mailed 
90 per cent of their PVAs by the Sunday night. 
As stated earlier, a search of an international electoral law database failed to find 
other instances of party involvement in the PVA process. This does not mean 
that there are not cases where this does occur, simply that an initial search has 
failed to identify examples. It does appear, however, that where the availability 
of postal voting increases, through the relaxation of rules for attending a polling 
booth, parties see benefits in increasing and influencing the use of postal voting. 
This has been evident in the increase in postal voting in Australia since the 
1980s. 
More recently in the United Kingdom, electoral laws have been amended to 
allow postal voting ‘on demand’, leading a British electoral commissioner to 
state that postal voting on demand is ‘lethal to the democratic process’.16 The 
British reforms have led to a significant increase in electoral offences and other 
allegations of fraud. 
Recent developments 
In 2010, the Rudd Labor Government proposed several changes to postal voting 
regulations.17 Several of these could be considered relatively non-contentious, 
such as allowing for the electronic lodgement of PVAs. In addition, the Rudd 
Government was not suggesting that political parties be removed from the 
postal voting process entirely, but did put forward amendments to require 
16 Stuart Wilks-Heeg. 2008. Purity of Elections in the UK: Causes for Concern. York: The Joseph Rowntree 
Reform Trust Limited.
17 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Modernisation and Other Measures) Bill 2010.
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PVAs to be returned directly to the AEC—as had been recommended by the 
AEC (repeatedly) and the ANAO—and to prohibit written material from being 
attached to PVAs. These two reforms were, however, opposed by the Liberal–
Nationals Coalition. In opposing these reforms, the Coalition argued that 
it strongly suspects that this has been done in a cynical attempt to 
undermine the extremely successful Postal Voting processes of the 
Coalition parties. Even a simple reading of the voter returns shows that 
the Coalition consistently polls higher with postal votes than with any 
other type of declaration vote.18
Opposition Shadow Minister Andrew Robb argued in a similar vein, and chose 
to ignore the AEC’s and ANAO’s arguments:
This is a totally cynical move and the motives of the Labor Party on these 
aspects of the bills need to be very seriously questioned…which appear 
to have no merit other than that of being an attack on the coalition…it is 
very clear that without any arguments, good or bad, being advanced in 
support of it, the Labor government has sought to sneak this measure in.
These arguments highlight the political nature of the postal voting issue, and 
suggest that both sides of politics might be more interested in the political 
advantage that can be gained from the regulation of postal voting, rather than 
issues of fairness and equity. The Bill was debated in June 2010, and the Labor 
government (coincidentally, the first day of the Gillard Labor Government) 
agreed to the removal of these provisions, arguing that it would forgo these 
reforms for the sake of achieving the other measures contained in the legislation. 
As Independent Senator Nick Xenophon stated, ‘this is an opportunity lost’. 
Following the passing of the legislation, the AEC again recommended that PVAs 
be required to be returned directly to the AEC. 
The fact that Labor and the Coalition combine application forms with their 
own campaigning literature is indicative of the political advantage in being the 
source of ‘official’ information. By requiring these applications to be sent to 
a party office rather than directly to the AEC, the parties are provided with 
information that is added to their databases on individual constituents (which, 
incidentally, constituents are not able to access, due to the parties’ exemption 
under the Privacy Act 1988). Political parties are not altruistic by nature; there is 
a political advantage in undertaking this work. With the knowledge of the date 
18 Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee. 2010. Report into the Electoral and 
Referendum Amendment (How-to-Vote Cards and Other Measures) Bill 2010 and the Electoral and Referendum 
Amendment (Modernisation and Other Measures) Bill 2010. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
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they lodge PVAs with the AEC, parties are able to calculate when electors will 
receive their ballot papers and will send party campaign material to coincide 
with this. 
There is strong and ongoing evidence in Australia that political parties’ 
involvement in the PVA process leads to delays in the AEC sending out ballot 
papers. This inevitably means that some intending electors will miss out on 
making a vote. This, combined with the stated instances of multiple voting, 
might easily lead to a British-style scandal in a tight contest at a future election. 
What is assured is that while political parties continue to be allowed to be 
involved in the postal voting process, the integrity of Australia’s ‘independent’ 
electoral administration is undermined.
In addition, there is significant waste of human and physical resources. For the 
2007 general election, MPs and senators printed 16.5 million PVAs, which is 2.9 
million more PVA forms than the number of voters enrolled for the election. At 
least 97.6 per cent of these forms were not used. In two cases, MPs printed four 
times as many PVAs as the number of people enrolled in their electorates.19
Finally, it should be remembered that Section 219 of the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 states that ‘[a] candidate shall not in any way take part in the conduct 
of an election’. While this part of the Act relates to ‘The Polling’, meaning 
election-day activities, why should postal voting, which is part of the polling, 
be treated any differently? 
19 Australian National Audit Office. 2009. Auditor-General Report no. 3 2009–10 Audit Report: Administration 
of Parliamentarians’ Entitlements by the Department of Finance and Regulation. Canberra: Australian National 
Audit Office, pp. 147–8.
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10. The Size of Parliament
One of the concepts of the fairness of electoral systems is equality of 
representation—sometimes defined as ‘one vote, one value’. Another aspect of 
fairness is that citizens have reasonable access to their elected representatives. 
In 1983, the incoming Hawke Labor Government established the Joint Select 
Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER) to progress Labor’s substantial electoral 
reform agenda. Following its first inquiry, the JSCER put forward equality of 
representation and accessibility as reasons why the size of parliament should be 
increased. On the first issue of representativeness, the committee argued that due 
to the constitutional guarantee of a minimum of five House of Representatives 
seats for each State, Tasmania’s seats were malapportioned in their favour, and 
an increase in the overall number of seats would dilute this disparity. On the 
second issue—accessibility of members—the committee noted that the number 
of voters had grown considerably since the last significant increase in seats, 
which had occurred in 1949. As a result, a decrease in voters per electorate was 
required so that members could more effectively serve their electorates. The 
parliament supported the committee’s view. 
The 1983 Federal Parliament increase in size
An interesting question in relation to the 1983 increase in the size of the House 
of Representatives, from 125 to 148 seats, is whether it had an impact on the 
representativeness of the House in proportional terms. While acknowledging 
that voting behaviour influences results, Table 10.1 indicates that there has been 
little, if any, impact on proportionality based on the increase in seats. Using 
Gallagher’s Least Squares Index (LSI), there was an average index score of 10.98 
for the six elections prior to the increase (1972–83), and a similar average score 
of 10.37 in the 10 elections since the change (1984–2010). This is understandable 
as the reform was primarily a correction for the growth in the number of 
voters enrolled in each electorate, rather than a change in the majoritarian, 
single-member voting system. Therefore, the single-member majority system, 
combined with the strong two-party system that exists across Australia, makes 
it difficult for the proportionality of the House to be significantly improved by 
providing opportunities for lesser parties that gain small but significant levels 
of support, such as, in the past, the Democrats and One Nation and, currently, 
the Greens.
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Table 10.1 Proportionality in the House of Representatives 



















Notes: The smaller the index figure, the more proportional is the result. Data in Appendix D. 
What is more significant in terms of the representative nature of the House is 
the increase in support for geographically dispersed minor parties, for whom 
winning seats is extremely difficult under the single-member electorate system. 
Table 10.1 shows the levels of support for the major parties (Labor and the 
Coalition) prior to and throughout the study period. Although major-party 
support has recovered in recent elections from its low of 79.6 per cent in 1998, 
it remains significantly lower than the levels experienced in the 1970s and 
1980s. This is largely a reflection of voting behaviour rather than the impact 
of reforms. As WA political scientist David Charnock notes, the impact of the 
increase in the number of seats has diminished over time as enrolment numbers 
have steadily increased. In comparison, Charnock argues that the redistribution 
methods introduced in 1983 are possibly a more significant factor in terms of 
any partisan bias from the reforms.1 
Section 24 of the Australian Constitution requires that for every seat in the House 
of Representatives there ‘shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of 
senators’. An increase in the size of the House of Representatives requires an 
increase in the size of the Senate to retain the approximate 2:1 ratio. The 1983–
1 David Charnock. 1994. ‘Electoral Bias in Australia 1980–1993: The Impact of the 1983 Electoral 
Amendments.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 29(3): 498–9.
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84 reforms therefore included an increase in the size of the Senate from 64 to 76 
seats. As the Senate is based on a proportional representation voting system, an 
increase in seat magnitude has the potential to impact on the ability of minor 
parties to win seats, and therefore on the proportionality of representation. The 
increase in seats resulted in a reduction in the quota required to win a State 
Senate seat in an ordinary half-Senate election from 16.7 per cent (for five seats) 
to 14.3 per cent (six seats). For the less-common full-Senate elections, the quota 
reduced from 9.1 per cent (10 seats) to 7.7 per cent (12 seats). The impacts of this 
change on proportionality are shown in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Proportionality in the Senate



















1 Full-Senate election: 10 seats per State. 
2 Seven senators elected from each State to increase the overall size of the Senate to 76. 
3 Full-Senate election: 12 seats per State.
Note: Data in Appendix E.
It can be seen from these figures that proportionality has actually decreased since 
1983, although there was greater proportionality in the only double-dissolution 
election since the increase in seats—2.93 in 1987—than the average of 3.84 in 
the three double-dissolutions in the decade prior to the change (in 1974, 1975 
and 1983). The most obvious impact has been the decreased proportionality 
in the five most recent elections (1998–2007)—a period that has also seen the 
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highest non–major-party vote in history. The voting figures suggest that the 
increased disproportionality is a combination of the major parties becoming 
more over-represented and some minor parties winning significant support 
without winning seats. In fairness terms, the reduced quotas required to win 
Senate seats improve the ability for the Senate to be more representative of 
voters’ choices; however, while the reform is an improvement on the fairness 
of election outcomes, voter behaviour (that is, who voters actually choose) has 
resulted in less proportional results. 
As for the reasons behind the increase in the size of the parliament, current ACT 
Electoral Commissioner, Phillip Green, noted in 1986 that a major concern of the 
JSCER was how an increase in the Senate size would impact on the possibility of 
a major party having control of the Senate. Green suggests that the committee 
might have preferred to increase the Senate to 88 (14 senators per State, plus 
four from the Territories) to maintain the pattern of each State electing an odd 
number of senators at half-Senate elections (seen by some as advantageous for 
the major parties). Such an increase was, however, considered to be too extreme, 
especially with the 2:1 requirement for the House of Representatives.2 
Green goes on to argue that the real impetus for reform came from the National 
Party, which had suggested the increase to the JSCER as a way to consolidate 
and possibly expand their House of Representatives seats in rural Australia. 
Meanwhile, the Labor Party thought such an increase might be a way to reduce 
the impact of the Democrats, who had gained the balance of power in the Senate 
in 1981. The reforms were passed by Labor with National Party support, with 
the Liberals and Democrats opposing the measure.
The Tasmanian case: reform for political 
advantage
Tasmania’s Parliamentary Reform Act 1998 was the culmination of almost two 
decades of public debate on reducing the size of the legislative assembly. From 
the early 1980s—virtually from the time the Greens first won representation in 
the Tasmanian Parliament in 1982—there had been suggestions that the house 
of assembly should be reduced in size from 35 members. Associated with this 
debate were calls for a complementary reduction in the size of the 19-member 
legislative council, in keeping with the tradition of having the upper house 
roughly half the size of the lower house. Table 10.3 details the various attempts 
to bring about change during this period. It is interesting to note that the Greens 
2 Phillip Green. 1986. ‘The Australian Labor Party and the Commonwealth Electoral System 1972–1986.’ 
Unpublished Litt. B. sub-thesis. Canberra, p. 96.
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held the balance of power in the assembly from 1989 to 1992, and again from 
1996 to 1998. It can be seen in the table that it was during this second period 
of balance of power, when the Liberal Party was in minority government, that 
efforts to reduce the size of the assembly increased. 
Table 10.3 Reduction in Size of Tasmanian Parliament: Reform Process 
Year Reform action Proposal and outcome Election outcome (assembly) Liberal–Labor–Greens
1982 General election 19–14–1 (Independent 





1986 General election 19–14–2 (Independent 
Greens)
1989 General election 17–13–5
1992 General election 19–11–5




reduction from 35 to 
30 MHAs. Proposal 
lapses
1994 Board of inquiry—
Morling Report
Recommends against 
a reduction but, if 
size is to be reduced, 
it should be a 
unicameral parliament 
of 44: four x seven-
member electorates; 
16 x single-member 
electorates
1995 Labor opposition 
legislation 
Recommends bicameral 
parliament of 25 MHAs 
and 15 MLCs. Proposal 
lapses
1996 General election 16–14–4
(+ 1 Independent)
1997 Tasmanian Chamber 












of 27: three x nine-
member electorates
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Year Reform action Proposal and outcome Election outcome (assembly) Liberal–Labor–Greens









1997–98 Various attempts at 
reducing the size of 
parliament
Nixon Report not 
supported; Liberal 
government wants 
28 MHAs, based on 
Morling Report, Labor 
opposition wants 25 
MHAs
May 1998 Labor opposition 
introduces Bill; Liberal 
Premier Rundle recalls 
parliament in July to 
debate Bill 
Proposal for bicameral 
parliament: 25 MHAs 
and 15 MLCs. Bill 
passes in two days 
with Labor and Liberal 
support
1998 General election 
Assembly size reduced to 25 members
10–14–1 
2002 General election 7–14–4 
2006 General election 7–14–4 
2010 General election 10–10–5 
Note: Greens were first elected in 1982. 
The reduction in assembly electorates in 1998 from seven to five members 
increased the required quota from 12.5 per cent to 16.7 per cent, making it 
far more difficult for minor parties such as the Greens to win seats. This was 
evident in the election held a month after the reform was implemented, in which 
the Greens managed to retain only one of their four seats. In the subsequent 
elections of 2002 and 2006, however, the Greens recovered to win four seats on 
both occasions. Political commentary at the time of the reform made it clear that 
the change was primarily designed by the two major parties to remove, or at 
least reduce, the influence of the Greens. Comments from interviewees support 
this popular view. Comments from Tasmanian politicians included:
[NK: Was that simply a matter of diminishing the role of the Greens?]
Yep, that’s my view—to increase the quota from about 11 per cent to 16. 
It worked the first time and didn’t work the second. It was politically 
expedient at the time.
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The real reason was that some idiot had told [Premier] Rundle and 
[Opposition Leader] Bacon that this would be the way to make it very 
difficult for the Greens to win seats. We’ve got a ridiculously small 
parliament. It’s not working. It hasn’t got the numbers to work.
The impact of the reduction in size of the assembly can be observed using 
Gallagher’s Least Squares Index, as illustrated in Table 10.4. The proportionality 
index for the five general elections prior to the reform averaged 4.14, while the 
average increased to 5.65 at the four elections since the reform. This indicates 
that the reform has had a negative impact on representation. 
Table 10.4 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly: Gallagher’s Least Squares Index 











Note: Data in Appendix F.
While voter behaviour will also have an impact on proportionality, an increase 
in the quota makes it more likely that such negative impacts will occur. 
Furthermore, as noted in an interviewee’s comment earlier, this partisan-driven 
reform has reduced the capacity of the parliament to effectively carry out its 
functions of legislative review and executive scrutiny, and to act as a channel 
for community participation—a result of the 26 per cent overall decrease in the 
size of the parliament from 54 to 40 members. 
The Australian Capital Territory
Since the inception of the ACT Assembly, there has been regular debate on its 
size. Partisan advantage is at the heart of these debates on whether, and to what 
level, the size of the assembly should be increased. A 1998 governance inquiry, 
the Pettit Review, recommended that the assembly be increased from 17 to 21 
members. Democratic arguments put forward in support of an increase included 
that ‘an increase in the size of the Assembly is important just to provide a 
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greater pool of people for the Ministry and the non-executive element’.3 In 
the following year, an assembly committee inquiry recommended against an 
increase, noting that the proposed change was unpopular with the public. 
Proposals to increase the size of the assembly—implying more politicians and 
therefore increased costs—always tend to be unpopular with the wider public, 
and the tone of the committee report indicates concern for a voter backlash if 
such an increase occurred.
The dominance of partisan advantage is more clearly expressed in a dissenting 
report from a 2002 inquiry: ‘It is painfully obvious that Members who support 
this minor increase [to 21 members] do so from an ill-conceived intention to 
protect personal and party interests.’4 The Australian Democrats, Greens and 
the Liberal Party all supported a model of 21 members (three electorates of 
seven members). Labor, however, supported an increase to 25 members (five 
electorates of five members). There is a clear advantage for Independents and 
minor parties such as the Greens and Democrats in having electorates with a 
greater magnitude, as this increases proportionality and improves their chances 
of winning seats. Labor sees advantages in having five-member electorates. The 
political reasons for this were explained by one interviewee:
Labor thinks it has a much better chance of getting three out of five seats 
than it has of getting four out of seven seats, so it thought it had a better 
chance of getting majority government with a five-by-five than three-
by-seven and the Liberals probably thought that, more so, and thought 
that’s why they’d rather have three-by-seven. The Greens and Democrats 
would prefer seven than five because they’re more likely to get seats so 
that’s where it potentially bogged down, because they couldn’t agree.
Due to the constraints of the Commonwealth self-government legislation, 
any increase in the size of the assembly needs to be approved by the Federal 
Government. This was a restriction for the Stanhope Labor Government. Despite 
enjoying an absolute majority in the assembly from 2004 to 2008, the Stanhope 
Government was unable to get support from the Liberal federal minister, 
possibly due to the Liberal Party’s concerns that an increase could advantage 
Labor. The recommendation of the 1998 Pettit Review, and the acknowledgment 
that the current size of the assembly creates logistical problems for cabinet and 
committee structures, appears to be overlooked in the concern about partisan 
advantage.
3 Philip Pettit, Tim Keady and Bill Blick. 1998. Review of the Governance of the Australian Capital Territory. 
Canberra: Chief Minister’s Department, p. 39.
4 Standing Committee on Legal Affairs. 2002. The Appropriateness of the Size of the Legislative Assembly for 
the ACT and Options for Changing the Number of Members, Electorates and Any Other Related Matter. Report 
no. 4. Canberra: Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory, p. 63.
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11. Conclusion
It should be clear, and unsurprising, that political parties will endeavour 
to adjust the electoral rules to their own advantage. Political parties are not 
altruistic entities; they compete in a highly contested arena, and it is natural 
that they will seek whatever advantage they can get. Parties in control of a 
legislature, either in their own right or by acting as a cartel, have benefited from 
having control over Australia’s electoral systems, as these chapters have shown.
The institutional structure for electoral administration in Australia—primarily 
the relationships between parliaments, political parties and commissions—
allows governing parties to control the electoral system to their own benefit. This 
power to control arises from the ability to legislate, and from having majorities 
on committees inquiring into electoral matters. Legislation is typically heavily 
prescriptive, providing commissions with little scope to independently adopt 
reforms based on non-partisan ideals of fairness and equity. 
The analysis of the independence of electoral management bodies demonstrates 
that Australian electoral commissions are non-partisan, or neutral, rather 
than being truly independent in the internationally accepted meaning of 
the concept. While Australian electoral commissions have a good degree of 
autonomy in carrying out their functions of enrolling voters, registering parties 
and conducting elections, they lack the true independence that would enable 
them to structure the regulatory framework in accordance with international 
standards for fair elections and independent electoral management. 
A frequently occurring theme in interviews conducted with commissioners was 
that they lacked the power to publicly criticise weaknesses in their governing 
legislation. This was largely due to the ongoing need to carry out the functions 
of their commissions as dictated by parliament. Electoral commissions are, 
therefore, only able to make suggestions for reform, rather than being advocates 
for specific changes to occur. Accordingly, the commissions are servants of their 
political masters—administering the laws they are given—rather than being 
truly independent and ensuring the electoral system is regulated on the basis 
of fairness principles. 
The emerging body of inquiry by parliamentary committees is important in 
providing a forum for public debate of electoral matters issues; however, the 
value of the committees’ work is severely limited by the partisan approach that 
is often taken by committee members, particularly at the Commonwealth level. 
This is evident in the approach the JSCEM has consistently taken on postal 
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voting processes, despite the protestations of the AEC. Although not as extreme 
as the Commonwealth example, evidence of partisan behaviour on committee 
inquiries was also found at the State and Territory levels. 
The findings of this research provide evidence of party cartelisation. While the 
Labor/Coalition cartel is the dominant relationship, formation of other cartels 
occurs when it is in the interests of the participants to collude. Evidence of the 
dominant cartel is apparent in JSCEM’s approach to postal voting, and the lack 
of action from both Labor and the Coalition to address the concerns of the AEC. 
These findings support the Australian party cartelisation theory, as promoted 
by Ian Marsh, Ian Ward, Sally Young and others,1 that Labor and the Coalition 
collude to prevent other parties and candidates from being able to compete 
on equal terms. At the State level, Labor/Liberal cartel behaviour was clearly 
apparent in reducing the size of the Tasmanian Parliament in an attempt to limit 
growth of the Greens party. 
Interestingly, however, the Australian party cartel does not involve only Labor 
and the Coalition. The Australian party cartel is more fluid, with members 
joining and leaving the cartel on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, the 
National Party joined with Labor to further its own interests by agreeing to the 
increase in seats for the Federal House of Representatives in 1983. Also, while 
the Democrats have opposed electoral reforms such as party involvement in 
postal voting, they combined with Labor to support the introduction of public 
funding, against opposition from both Coalition parties. It is understandable that 
the Democrats would oppose the former measure, which it could not participate 
in equally due to a lack of resources, while supporting the latter, which would 
provide resources to the party. 
Is this cartelisation at work or is it better described as shifting ‘marriages 
of convenience’, with partisan self-interest acting as the primary driver of 
temporary coalescence? The evidence over the past 30 years suggests that, where 
possible, parties will act alone in instigating reform in their own interests. An 
example is Labor’s treatment of party registration in the Northern Territory, 
where it increased the membership threshold from the recommended 20 to its 
preferred 200, to limit electoral competition. The Coalition’s reform agenda at 
the federal level, which was supported by JSCEM’s acquiescence and passed 
in 2006, provides another example of parties acting in their own self-interest. 
Australian party cartelisation behaviour is comparable with what has been 
found in other countries. In their study of party cartelisation, looking primarily 
at European and North American democracies, Katz and Mair identified the 
1 Marsh, I., ed. 2006. Political Parties in Transition. Sydney: The Federation Press; Sally Young. 2003. 
‘Killing Competition: Restricting Access to Political Communication Channels in Australia.’ AQ Journal of 
Contemporary Analysis 75(3): 9–15.
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‘emergence of a new model of party, the cartel party, in which colluding parties 
become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) 
to ensure their own collective survival’.2 This definition fits neatly with the 
Australian scenario. After much debate in the academic community over their 
original findings, Katz and Mair went on to assert that while political parties 
‘might be disinclined to rely heavily on overt deals with one another, their 
mutual awareness of shared interests [indicates] cartel-like behavior’.3
Katz and Mair go on to identify that a country’s constitutional provisions can be 
a limiting factor in the ability of parties to form cartels. They cite the example 
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany expanding access to public 
funding of political parties. Instead of such funding being available only to 
parties that obtain more than 5 per cent of the vote, the court extended funding 
to parties achieving more than 0.5 per cent. Similarly, in Canada, the Supreme 
Court overturned legislation that would have restricted party registration (and 
therefore the benefits that come with registration) to major parties that could 
field at least 50 electorate candidates.4
The examples of Germany and Canada stand in stark contrast to public funding 
and party registration in Australia, where such constitutional safeguards 
do not exist. In fact, the first mention of political parties in the Australian 
Constitution occurred only after an amendment was passed in 1977, in relation 
to Senate casual vacancies. With governing parties having firm control of 
the constitutional amending process (through parliament), the likelihood 
of constitutional amendments that enhance the rights of smaller parties and 
independent candidates is minimal.
With many of the reforms discussed in this book, the main difficulty is 
separating self-interest from genuine reform based on principles of fairness 
and international best practice. In Australia, fierce partisan divisions exist 
on a number of electoral issues, such as the timing of roll closures, donation 
disclosure and the prisoner franchise. The lack of an independent decision-
making body with the power to implement reform means that such issues will 
continue to be fought on partisan lines, with fairness remaining a secondary 
consideration. In the context of democratic outcomes, partisan advantage has 
been shown to be a far stronger driver of reform than the desire to improve the 
fairness of elections. Any advantages to voters or non-governing parties tend to 
be an incidental, or even accidental, outcome of reform rather than a motivating 
2 Richard Katz and Peter Mair. 1995. ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy.’ Party 
Politics 1(1): 5–28.
3 Richard Katz and Peter Mair. 2009. ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.’ Perspectives on Politics 7(4): 
753–66.
4 Richard Katz and Peter Mair. 2009. ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement’, p. 759.
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consideration. While some reforms have benefited other (minor) parties, this 
has largely occurred in situations where governing parties have required minor-
party support to pass legislation. 
Voters are able to express their opinions about a government’s or a party’s policy 
direction at the ballot box; however, it is electoral law that determines how these 
citizens vote, and if they can vote at all. When governing parties have control 
over such laws, this raises concerns about the legitimacy of a democracy. In 
Australia, governing-party control highlights the need for greater independence 
in the management and conduct of Australian elections. Despite the growth of 
issue-specific parliamentary committees, these do not provide a sufficiently 
powerful policy process to bring about electoral reforms based on international 
norms for electoral management and fair elections. This problem is not specific 
to Australia. Many other countries that are considered to have independent 
electoral management, such as Canada, India, Indonesia and South Africa, 
still rely on their national parliaments to provide the legislative framework to 
conduct elections. Electoral commissions in these countries have an advocacy 
role (either overt or covert) when it comes to electoral reform. 
An alternative approach would be to establish an agency independent of both 
government and parliament that has the power to regulate the manner and 
conduct of elections. Such a truly independent agency could only be achieved, 
however, if the governing parties were willing to cede their law-making powers. 
An example of the devolution of electoral law-making responsibilities can be 
found in the area of electoral boundary redistributions. Responsibility for this 
aspect of electoral law has generally been transferred in recent decades from 
parliaments (usually initiated by Labor governments) to independent boundary 
commissions (typically including an electoral administrator and government 
statistician, among others). While parliaments (and, by extension, political 
parties) retain the legislative power to change these arrangements, it would be a 
brave government that would run the gauntlet of public opprobrium to remove 
or reduce existing and established independent processes.  
The evidence provided in this book indicates that voluntary relinquishment 
of further aspects of electoral law and administration is unlikely to occur. 
Indeed, such a proposal might not be viable in terms of principles of responsible 
government and accountability. A more achievable alternative might be to 
establish a public forum to inquire into the conduct of elections. Such a forum, 
referred to in Chapter 2, could include political parties, electoral administrators, 
academics and civil society organisations, and would replace the politically 
biased work of the various electoral-matters parliamentary committees. Parties 
and other political players would still have input (and representation), but the 
voices of non-political interests would have a stronger voice on how Australians’ 
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views convert to political representation. With sufficient funding for research, 
and conducting inquiries and hearings, the forum could become the primary 
catalyst for electoral reforms.  
Pressure external to the existing electoral institutional structure is required. 
Another source of such pressure is the media. There is evidence of growing 
media interest in party donations, incumbency benefits and the political finance 
system in recent times, and it might be that the media becomes a louder voice in 
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2003 2001 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the 2001 Federal Election and 
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2003 Inquiry into Representation of the Territories in the House of Representatives
2005 The 2004 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 
Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto
2006 Funding and Disclosure: Inquiry into Disclosure of Donations to Political Parties 
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Commission
2008 Advisory Report on Schedule 1 of the Tax Laws Amendment (2008 Measures 
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Appendix B
Northern Territory Turnout and Informality: 2005 General Election







Port Darwin 4 .7 78 .2 4 .3 2
Wanguri 6 .2 87 .7 3 .3 2
Nelson 6 .3 83 .4 2 .3 3
Nightcliff 6 .3 84 .2 2 .5 5
Fannie Bay 7 .4 85 .0 4 .7 3
Casuarina 8 .6 86 .6 2 .6 4
Sanderson 8 .9 89 .4 3 .8 4
Goyder 9 .5 88 .8 3 .3 5
Johnston 9 .7 86 .9 3 .1 5
Drysdale 10 .4 82 .1 4 .7 2
Brennan 11 .3 84 .4 3 .2 3
Greatorex 12 .4 86 .3 2 .5 3
Karama 13 .3 89 .1 5 .1 2
Blain 13 .4 86 .0 3 .5 4
Millner 14 .0 83 .1 2 .8 5
Braitling 15 .9 84 .0 2 .7 3
Araluen 16 .5 82 .1 3 .0 3
Katherine 24 .0 81 .8 3 .5 2
Daly 45 .4 77 .6 5 .0 4
Nhulunbuy 51 .7 65 .1 4 .1 2
Barkly 60 .3 69 .4 3 .8 3
MacDonnell 67 .7 67 .7 7 .8 5
Arafura 77 .2 66 .2 4 .9 3
Arnhem 82 .8 64 .2 6 .4 3





Gallagher’s Least Squares Index: NSW Legislative Council
1984 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 46 .88 7 46 .67 –0 .2133 0 .05
Coalition 42 .61 7 46 .67 4 .0567 16 .46
Call to Australia 6 .09 1 6 .67 0 .5767 0 .33
Democrats 3 .15 0 0 .00 –3 .1500 9 .92
Independents & Others 1 .27 0 0 .00 –1 .2700 1 .61
100 .00 15 28 .37
Halve 14 .19
Sq . root 3 .77
1988 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 37 .51 6 40 .00 2 .4900 6 .20
Coalition 46 .15 7 46 .67 0 .5167 0 .27
Democrats 2 .70 1 6 .67 3 .9667 15 .73
Call to Australia 5 .71 1 6 .67 0 .9567 0 .92
Independent Enterprise, Freedom 
and Family 2 .42 0 0 .00 –2 .4200 5 .86
Environment Group 1 .60 0 0 .00 –1 .6000 2 .56
Independents & Others 3 .91 0 0 .00 –3 .9100 15 .29
100 .00 15 46 .82
Halve 23 .41
Sq . root 4 .84
1991 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 37 .29 6 40 .00 2 .7100 7 .34
Coalition 45 .34 7 46 .67 1 .3267 1 .76
Greens 3 .32 0 0 .00 –3 .3200 11 .02
Democrats 6 .70 1 6 .67 –0 .0333 0 .00
Call to Australia 3 .58 1 6 .67 3 .0867 9 .53
Independents & Others 3 .77 0 0 .00 –3 .7700 14 .21
100 .00 15 43 .87
Halve 21 .93
Sq . root 4 .68
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1995 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 35 .25 8 38 .10 2 .8452 8 .10
Coalition 38 .49 8 38 .10 –0 .3948 0 .16
Greens 3 .72 1 4 .76 1 .0419 1 .09
Democrats 3 .21 1 4 .76 1 .5519 2 .41
Call to Australia 3 .01 1 4 .76 1 .7519 3 .07
A Better Future For Our Children 1 .28 1 4 .76 3 .4819 12 .12
Shooters 2 .84 1 4 .76 1 .9219 3 .69
Independents & Others 12 .20 0 0 .00 –12 .2000 148 .84
100 .00 21 179 .47
Halve 89 .74
Sq . root 9 .47
1999 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 37 .27 8 38 .10 0 .8252 0 .68
Coalition 27 .39 6 17 .14 –10 .2471 105 .00
One Nation 6 .34 1 4 .76 –1 .5781 2 .49
Democrats 4 .01 1 4 .76 0 .7519 0 .57
Christian Democratic Party 3 .17 1 4 .76 1 .5919 2 .53
Greens 2 .91 1 4 .76 1 .8519 3 .43
Shooters 1 .67 0 0 .00 –1 .6700 2 .79
Progressive Labor Party 1 .58 0 0 .00 –1 .5800 2 .50
Marijuana Smokers Rights 1 .24 0 0 .00 –1 .2400 1 .54
Reform Legal System 1 .00 1 4 .76 3 .7619 14 .15
Independents & Others 13 .42 2 9 .52 –3 .8962 15 .18
100 .00 21 150 .86
Halve 75 .43
Sq . root 8 .69
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2003 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 43 .54 10 47 .62 4 .0790 16 .64
Coalition 33 .30 7 33 .33 0 .0333 0 .00
Greens 8 .60 2 9 .52 0 .9238 0 .85
Christian Democratic Party 3 .03 1 4 .76 1 .7319 3 .00
One Nation 1 .49 0 0 .00 –1 .4900 2 .22
Democrats 1 .57 0 0 .00 –1 .5700 2 .46
Shooters 2 .05 1 4 .76 2 .7119 7 .35
Hanson 1 .92 0 0 .00 –1 .9200 3 .69
Unity 1 .42 0 0 .00 –1 .4200 2 .02
Fishing-Horse-4WD 1 .06 0 0 .00 –1 .0600 1 .12
Independents & Others 2 .02 0 0 .00 –2 .0200 4 .08
100 .00 21 43 .44
Halve 21 .72
Sq . root 4 .66
2007 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 39 .14 9 42 .86 3 .7171 13 .82
Coalition 34 .22 8 38 .10 3 .8752 15 .02
Greens 9 .12 2 9 .52 0 .4038 0 .16
Christian Democratic Party 4 .42 1 4 .76 0 .3419 0 .12
Democrats 1 .78 0 0 .00 –1 .7800 3 .17
Unity 1 .21 0 0 .00 –1 .2100 1 .46
Shooters 2 .79 1 4 .76 1 .9719 3 .89
Fishing 1 .53 0 0 .00 –1 .5300 2 .34
Australians Against Further 
Immigration 1 .64 0 0 .00 –1 .6400 2 .69
Independents & Others 4 .15 0 0 .00 –4 .1500 17 .22
100 .00 21 59 .89
Halve 29 .94
Sq . root 5 .47
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2011 NSW Legislative Council





Australian Labor Party 24 .05 5 23 .81 –0 .24 0 .06
Coalition 48 .57 11 52 .38 3 .81 14 .52
Greens 11 .11 3 14 .29 3 .18 10 .11
Christian Democratic Party 3 .01 1 4 .76 1 .75 3 .06
Shooters 3 .64 1 4 .76 1 .12 1 .25
Fishing 1 .30 0 0 .00 –1 .30 1 .69
No Parking Meters 1 .18 0 0 .00 –1 .18 1 .39
Family First 1 .41 0 0 .00 –1 .41 1 .99
Independents & Others 5 .73 0 0 .00 –5 .73 32 .83
100 .00 21 66 .90
Halve 33 .45
Sq . root 5 .78
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Gallagher’s Least Squares Index: House of Representatives
2007 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 43 .38 83 55 .33 11 .9533 142 .88
Liberal–Country Liberal Party 36 .60 55 36 .67 0 .0667 0 .00
The Nationals 5 .49 10 6 .67 1 .1767 1 .38
The Greens 7 .79 0 0 .00 –7 .7900 60 .68
Family First 1 .99 0 0 .00 –1 .9900 3 .96
Independents & Others 4 .75 2 1 .33 –3 .4167 11 .67
100 .00 150 220 .59
Halve 110 .29
Sq . root 10 .50
2004 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 37 .64 60 40 .00 2 .3600 5 .57
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 40 .81 75 50 .00 9 .1900 84 .46
The Nationals 5 .89 12 8 .00 2 .1100 4 .45
The Greens 7 .19 0 0 .00 –7 .1900 51 .70
Family First 2 .01 0 0 .00 –2 .0100 4 .04
Democrats 1 .24 0 0 .00 –1 .2400 1 .54
Independents & Others 5 .22 3 2 .00 –3 .2200 10 .37
100 .00 150 162 .12
Halve 81 .06
Sq . root 9 .00
2001 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 37 .84 65 43 .33 5 .4933 30 .18
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 37 .40 69 46 .00 8 .6000 73 .96
The Nationals 5 .61 13 8 .67 3 .0567 9 .34
The Greens 4 .96 0 0 .00 –4 .9600 24 .60
Democrats 5 .41 0 0 .00 –5 .4100 29 .27
One Nation 4 .34 0 0 .00 –4 .3400 18 .84
Independents & Others 4 .44 3 2 .00 –2 .4400 5 .95
100 .00 150 192 .14
Halve 96 .07
Sq . root 9 .80
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1998 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 40 .10 67 45 .27 5 .1703 26 .73
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 34 .21 64 43 .24 9 .0332 81 .60
The Nationals 5 .29 16 10 .81 5 .5208 30 .48
The Greens 2 .14 0 0 .00 –2 .1400 4 .58
Democrats 5 .13 0 0 .00 –5 .1300 26 .32
One Nation 8 .43 0 0 .00 –8 .4300 71 .06
Independents & Others 4 .70 1 0 .68 –4 .0243 16 .20
100 .00 148 256 .97
Halve 128 .48
Sq . root 11 .34
1996 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 38 .75 49 33 .11 –5 .6419 31 .83
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 39 .04 76 51 .35 12 .3114 151 .57
The Nationals 8 .21 18 12 .16 3 .9522 15 .62
The Greens 1 .74 0 0 .00 –1 .7400 3 .03
Democrats 6 .76 0 0 .00 –6 .7600 45 .70
Independents & Others 5 .50 5 3 .38 –2 .1216 4 .50
100 .00 148 252 .25
Halve 126 .12
Sq . root 11 .23
1993 House of Representatives





Australian Labor Party 44 .92 80 54 .42 9 .5018 90 .28
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 37 .10 49 33 .33 –3 .7667 14 .19
The Nationals 7 .17 16 10 .88 3 .7144 13 .80
Democrats 3 .75 0 0 .00 –3 .7500 14 .06
Independents & Others 7 .06 2 1 .36 –5 .6995 32 .48
100 .00 147 164 .81
Halve 82 .41
Sq . root 9 .08
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1990 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 39 .44 78 52 .70 13 .2627 175 .90
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 35 .04 55 37 .16 2 .1222 4 .50
The Nationals 8 .42 14 9 .46 1 .0395 1 .08
Democrats 11 .26 0 0 .00 –11 .2600 126 .79
Independents & Others 5 .84 1 0 .68 –5 .1643 26 .67
100 .00 148 334 .94
Halve 167 .47
Sq . root 12 .94
1987 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 45 .83 86 58 .11 12 .2781 150 .75
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 34 .55 43 29 .05 –5 .4959 30 .21
The Nationals 11 .52 19 12 .84 1 .3178 1 .74
Democrats 6 .03 0 0 .00 –6 .0300 36 .36
Independents & Others 2 .07 0 0 .00 –2 .0700 4 .28
100 .00 148 223 .34
Halve 111 .67
Sq . root 10 .57
1984 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 47 .55 82 55 .41 7 .8554 61 .71
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 34 .38 45 30 .41 –3 .9746 15 .80
The Nationals 10 .63 21 14 .19 3 .5592 12 .67
Democrats 5 .45 0 0 .00 –5 .4500 29 .70
Independents & Others 1 .99 0 0 .00 –1 .9900 3 .96
100 .00 148 123 .84
Halve 61 .92
Sq . root 7 .87
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1983 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 49 .48 75 60 .00 10 .5200 110 .67
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 34 .36 33 26 .40 –7 .9600 63 .36
The Nationals 9 .21 17 13 .60 4 .3900 19 .27
Democrats 5 .03 0 0 .00 –5 .0300 25 .30
Independents & Others 1 .92 0 0 .00 –1 .9200 3 .69
100 .00 125 222 .29
Halve 111 .15
Sq . root 10 .54
1980 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 39 .44 78 52 .70 13 .2627 175 .90
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 35 .04 55 37 .16 2 .1222 4 .50
The Nationals 8 .42 14 9 .46 1 .0395 1 .08
Democrats 11 .26 0 0 .00 –11 .2600 126 .79
Independents & Others 5 .84 1 0 .68 –5 .1643 26 .67
100 .00 148 334 .94
Halve 167 .47
Sq . root 12 .94
1977 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 39 .65 38 30 .65 –9 .0048 81 .09
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 38 .09 67 54 .03 15 .9423 254 .16
The Nationals 10 .01 19 15 .32 5 .3126 28 .22
Democrats 9 .38 0 0 .00 –9 .3800 87 .98
Independents & Others 2 .87 0 0 .00 –2 .8700 8 .24
100 .00 124 459 .69
Halve 229 .84
Sq . root 15 .16
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1975 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 42 .84 36 28 .35 –14 .4935 210 .06
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 41 .80 68 53 .54 11 .7433 137 .91
National Country Party 11 .25 23 18 .11 6 .8602 47 .06
Democratic Labor Party 1 .32 0 0 .00 –1 .3200 1 .74
Independents & Others 2 .79 0 0 .00 –2 .7900 7 .78
100 .00 127 404 .56
Halve 202 .28
Sq . root 14 .22
1974 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 49 .30 66 51 .97 2 .6685 7 .12
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 34 .95 40 31 .5 –3 .4539 11 .93
Country Party 9 .96 21 16 .54 6 .5754 43 .24
Democratic Labor Party 1 .42 0 0 .00 –1 .4200 2 .02
Australia Party 2 .33 0 0 .00 –2 .3300 5 .43
Independents & Others 2 .04 0 0 .00 –2 .0400 4 .16
100 .00 127 73 .89
Halve 36 .95
Sq . root 6 .08
1972 House of Representatives 





Australian Labor Party 49 .59 67 53 .60 4 .0100 16 .08
Liberal/Country Liberal Party 32 .04 38 30 .40 –1 .6400 2 .69
Country Party 9 .44 20 16 .00 6 .5600 43 .03
Democratic Labor Party 5 .25 0 0 .00 –5 .2500 27 .56
Australia Party 2 .42 0 0 .00 –2 .4200 5 .86
Independents & Others 1 .26 0 0 .00 –1 .2600 1 .59
100 .00 125 96 .81
Halve 48 .40




Gallagher’s Least Squares Index: Senate
2007 Senate





Australian Labor Party 40 .30 18 45 .00 4 .7000 22 .09
Coalition 39 .94 18 45 .00 5 .0600 25 .60
Democrats 1 .29 0 0 .00 –1 .2900 1 .66
The Greens 9 .04 3 7 .50 –1 .5400 2 .37
Family First 1 .62 0 0 .00 –1 .6200 2 .62
Pauline’s United Australia Party 1 .12 0 0 .00 –1 .1200 1 .25
Independents & Others 6 .69 1 2 .50 –4 .1900 17 .56
100 .00 40 73 .16
Halve 36 .58
Sq . root 6 .05
2004 Senate





Australian Labor Party 35 .02 16 40 .00 4 .9800 24 .80
Coalition 45 .09 21 52 .50 7 .4100 54 .91
Democrats 2 .09 0 0 .00 –2 .0900 4 .37
The Greens 7 .67 2 5 .00 –2 .6700 7 .13
Family First 1 .76 1 2 .50 0 .7400 0 .55
One Nation 1 .73 0 0 .00 –1 .7300 2 .99
Independents & Others 6 .64 0 0 .00 –6 .6400 44 .09
100 .00 40 138 .84
Halve 69 .42
Sq . root 8 .33
2001 Senate





Australian Labor Party 34 .32 14 35 .00 0 .6800 0 .46
Coalition 41 .84 20 50 .00 8 .1600 66 .59
Democrats 7 .25 4 10 .00 2 .7500 7 .56
The Greens 4 .94 2 5 .00 0 .0600 0 .00
One Nation 5 .54 0 0 .00 –5 .5400 30 .69
Independents & Others 6 .11 0 0 .00 –6 .1100 37 .33
100 .00 40 142 .64
Halve 71 .32
Sq . root 8 .45
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1998 Senate





Australian Labor Party 37 .31 17 42 .50 5 .1900 26 .94
Coalition 37 .68 17 42 .50 4 .8200 23 .23
Democrats 8 .45 4 10 .00 1 .5500 2 .40
The Greens 2 .72 0 0 .00 –2 .7200 7 .40
One Nation 8 .99 1 2 .50 –6 .4900 42 .12
Christian Democratic Party 1 .09 0 0 .00 –1 .0900 1 .19
Independents & Others 3 .76 1 2 .50 –1 .2600 1 .59
100 .00 40 104 .87
Halve 52 .43
Sq . root 7 .24
1996 Senate





Australian Labor Party 36 .15 14 35 .00 –1 .1500 1 .32
Coalition 43 .97 20 50 .00 6 .0300 36 .36
Democrats 10 .82 5 12 .50 1 .6800 2 .82
The Greens 1 .66 1 2 .50 0 .8400 0 .71
Call to Australia 1 .08 0 0 .00 –1 .0800 1 .17
Australians Against Further 
Immigration 1 .26 0 0 .00 –1 .2600 1 .59
Australian Shooters Party 1 .05 0 0 .00 –1 .0500 1 .10
Independents & Others 4 .01 0 0 .00 –4 .0100 16 .08
100 .00 40 61 .15
Halve 30 .57
Sq . root 5 .53
1993 Senate





Australian Labor Party 43 .50 17 42 .50 –1 .0000 1 .00
Coalition 43 .04 19 47 .50 4 .4600 19 .89
Democrats 5 .31 2 5 .00 –0 .3100 0 .10
The Greens 2 .96 1 2 .50 –0 .4600 0 .21
Call to Australia 1 .02 0 0 .00 –1 .0200 1 .04
Independents & Others 4 .17 1 2 .50 –1 .6700 2 .79
100 .00 40 25 .03
Halve 12 .51









Australian Labor Party 38 .41 15 37 .50 –0 .9100 0 .83
Coalition 41 .92 19 47 .50 5 .5800 31 .14
Democrats 12 .63 5 12 .50 –0 .1300 0 .02
The Greens 2 .80 1 2 .50 –0 .3000 0 .09
Independents & Others 4 .25 0 0 .00 –4 .2500 18 .06
100 .00 40 50 .13
Halve 25 .07
Sq . root 5 .01
1987 Senate





Australian Labor Party 42 .83 32 42 .11 –0 .7247 0 .53
Coalition 42 .03 34 44 .74 2 .7068 7 .33
Democrats 8 .47 7 9 .21 0 .7405 0 .55
Nuclear Disarmament Party 1 .09 1 1 .32 0 .2258 0 .05
Independents & Others 5 .58 2 2 .63 –2 .9484 8 .69
100 .00 76 17 .14
Halve 8 .57
Sq . root 2 .93
1984 Senate





Australian Labor Party 42 .17 20 43 .48 1 .3083 1 .71
Coalition 39 .55 20 43 .48 3 .9283 15 .43
Democrats 7 .62 5 10 .87 3 .2496 10 .56
Nuclear Disarmament Party 7 .23 1 2 .17 –5 .0561 25 .56
Independents & Others 3 .44 0 0 .00 –3 .4400 11 .83
100 .00 46 65 .10
Halve 32 .55
Sq . root 5 .71










Australian Labor Party 45 .49 30 46 .88 1 .3850 1 .92
Coalition 39 .96 28 43 .75 3 .7900 14 .36
Democrats 9 .57 5 7 .81 –1 .7575 3 .09
Independents & Others 4 .98 1 1 .56 –3 .4175 11 .68
100 .00 64 31 .05
Halve 15 .53









Australian Labor Party 42 .25 15 44 .12 1 .8676 3 .49
Coalition 43 .48 15 44 .12 0 .6376 0 .41
Democrats 9 .25 3 8 .82 –0 .4265 0 .18
Independents & Others 5 .02 1 2 .94 –2 .0788 4 .32
100 .00 34 8 .40
Halve 4 .20









Australian Labor Party 36 .76 14 41 .18 4 .4165 19 .51
Coalition 45 .57 18 52 .94 7 .3712 54 .33
Democrats 11 .13 2 5 .88 –5 .2476 27 .54
Independents & Others 6 .54 0 0 .00 –6 .5400 42 .77
100 .00 34 144 .15
Halve 72 .07









Australian Labor Party 40 .91 27 42 .19 1 .2775 1 .63
Coalition 51 .70 35 54 .69 2 .9875 8 .93
Democratic Labor Party 2 .67 0 0 .00 –2 .6700 7 .13
Liberal Movement 1 .07 1 1 .56 0 .4925 0 .24
Independents & Others 3 .65 1 1 .56 –2 .0875 4 .36
100 .00 64 22 .29
Halve 11 .14











Australian Labor Party 47 .29 29 48 .33 1 .0433 1 .09
Coalition 43 .89 29 48 .33 4 .4433 19 .74
Democratic Labor Party 3 .56 0 0 .00 –3 .5600 12 .67
Australia Party 1 .39 0 0 .00 –1 .3900 1 .93
Independents & Others 3 .87 2 3 .33 –0 .5367 0 .29
100 .00 60 35 .73
Halve 17 .86









Australian Labor Party 42 .22 14 43 .75 1 .5300 2 .34
Coalition 38 .18 13 40 .63 2 .4450 5 .98
Democratic Labor Party 11 .11 3 9 .38 –1 .7350 3 .01
Australia Party 2 .90 0 0 .00 –2 .9000 8 .41
Independents & Others 5 .59 2 6 .25 0 .6600 0 .44
100 .00 32 20 .17
Halve 10 .09




Gallagher’s Least Squares Index: Tasmanian Legislative Assembly
1982 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 36 .86 14 40 .00 3 .1400 9 .86
Liberal 48 .52 19 54 .29 5 .7657 33 .24
Democrats 5 .39 1 2 .86 –2 .5329 6 .42
Independents & Others 9 .23 1 2 .86 –6 .3729 40 .61
100 .00 35 90 .13
Halve 45 .07
Sq . root 6 .71
1986 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 35 .14 14 40 .00 4 .8600 23 .62
Liberal 54 .20 19 54 .29 0 .0857 0 .01
Democrats 2 .06 0 0 .00 –2 .0600 4 .24
Independents & Others 8 .60 2 5 .71 –2 .8857 8 .33
100 .00 35 36 .20
Halve 18 .10
Sq . root 4 .25
1989 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 34 .71 13 37 .14 2 .4329 5 .92
Liberal 46 .92 17 48 .57 1 .6514 2 .73
Tasmanian Greens 17 .13 5 14 .29 –2 .8443 8 .09
Independents & Others 1 .24 0 0 .00 –1 .2400 1 .54
100 .00 35 18 .27
Halve 9 .14
Sq . root 3 .02
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
180
1992 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 28 .85 11 31 .43 2 .5786 6 .65
Liberal 54 .11 19 54 .29 0 .1757 0 .03
Tasmanian Greens 13 .23 5 14 .29 1 .0557 1 .11
Advance Tasmania 2 .55 0 0 .00 –2 .5500 6 .50
Independents & Others 1 .26 0 0 .00 –1 .2600 1 .59
100 .00 35 –100 15 .88
Halve 7 .94
Sq . root 2 .82
1996 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 40 .47 14 40 .00 –0 .4700 0 .22
Liberal 41 .20 16 45 .71 4 .5143 20 .38
Tasmanian Greens 11 .14 4 11 .43 0 .2886 0 .08
Nationals 2 .20 0 0 .00 –2 .2000 4 .84
Independents & Others 4 .99 1 2 .86 –2 .1329 4 .55
100 .00 35 30 .07
Halve 15 .04
Sq . root 3 .88
1998 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 44 .79 14 56 .00 11 .2100 125 .66
Liberal 38 .06 10 40 .00 1 .9400 3 .76
Tasmanian Greens 10 .18 1 4 .00 –6 .1800 38 .19
Tasmanian First 5 .10 0 0 .00 –5 .1000 26 .01
Independents & Others 1 .87 0 0 .00 –1 .8700 3 .50
100 .00 25 197 .13
Halve 98 .56
Sq . root 9 .93
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2002 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 51 .88 14 56 .00 4 .1200 16 .97
Liberal 27 .38 7 28 .00 0 .6200 0 .38
Tasmanian Greens 18 .13 4 16 .00 –2 .1300 4 .54
Independents & Others 2 .61 0 0 .00 –2 .6100 6 .81
100 .00 25 28 .71
Halve 14 .35
Sq . root 3 .79
2006 Tasmanian Legislative Assembly





Australian Labor Party 49 .26 14 56 .00 6 .7400 45 .43
Liberal 31 .81 7 28 .00 –3 .8100 14 .52
Tasmanian Greens 16 .63 4 16 .00 –0 .6300 0 .40
Independents & Others 2 .30 0 0 .00 –2 .3000 5 .29
100 .00 25 65 .63
Halve 32 .82
Sq . root 5 .73








Australian Labor Party 36 .88 10 40 .00 3 .12 9 .73
Liberal 38 .99 10 40 .00 1 .01 1 .02
Tasmanian Greens 21 .61 5 20 .00 1 .61 2 .59
Independents & Others 2 .52 0 0 .00 –2 .52 6 .35
100 .00 25 19 .69
Halve 9 .85




ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 2007. EMB Independence and the Origin of 
Independent Election Administrations. URL: <http://aceproject.org/electoral-
advice/archive/questions/replies/156664001>
AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2001. Submission to the Senate Public 
Finance and Administration Inquiry into Bills Concerning Political Honesty 
and Accountability. Submission no. 14. Canberra: Australian Electoral 
Commission.
AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2004. ‘Over 13 Million Australians Have 
the Right to Vote in the 2004 Federal Election.’ Media release, 10 September. 
Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission.
AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2008. Submission to the Inquiry by the 
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters into the 2007 Federal Election. 
Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
AEC [Australian Electoral Commission]. 2011. Analysis of Informal Voting: House 
of Representatives, 2010 Federal Election. Research Report no. 12, 29 March. 
Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission.
Alport, Kate and Lisa Hill. 2008. ‘Voting Attitudes and Behaviour Among 
Aboriginal Peoples: Reports from 29 Anangu Women.’ Refereed paper 
delivered at the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, 
Brisbane, 6–9 July.
Austin, Reginald and Maja Tjernstrőm, eds. 2003. Funding of Political Parties 
and Election Campaigns. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2007. ‘4705.0—Population Distribution, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 2006.’ Canberra: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. URL: <http://www.abs.gov.au>
Australian Labor Party. 2002. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
Inquiry into the 2001 Federal Election: Submission by the Australian Labor 
Party. Submission no. 153. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Australian National Audit Office. 2009. Auditor-General Report no. 3 2009–10 
Audit Report: Administration of Parliamentarians’ Entitlements by the 
Department of Finance and Regulation. Canberra: Australian National Audit 
Office.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
184
Australian National Audit Office. 2010a. The Auditor-General Audit Report 
no. 28 2009–10 Performance Audit: The Australian Electoral Commission’s 
Preparation for and Conduct of the 2007 Federal General Election. Canberra: 
Australian National Audit Office.
Australian National Audit Office. 2010b. The Australian Electoral Commission’s 
Preparation for and Conduct of the 2007 Federal General Election. Report 
28/10. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Bean, Clive. 2005. ‘Young People’s Voting Patterns.’ Paper prepared for the Youth 
Electoral Study Workshop, Old Parliament House, Canberra, June.
Benoit, Ken. 2004. ‘Models of Electoral System Change.’ Electoral Studies 23(3): 
363–89.
Byrne, N. F. 1959. ‘A Historical Survey of the Western Australian Electoral 
System, 1917–1956.’ Master of Arts thesis. Perth: University of Western 
Australia.
Campbell, Ian. 2006. ‘Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation 
Committee hearing.’ Hansard, 7 March. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Charnock, David. 1994. ‘Electoral Bias in Australia 1980–1993: The Impact of 
the 1983 Electoral Amendments.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 29(3): 
484–500.
Costar, Brian. 2006. Submission to the Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Committee Inquiry. Submission no. 2. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Costar, Brian. 2009. ‘Democracy Under Siege for the Sake of a Few Pennies.’ The 
Age, 29 May.
Dacey, Paul. 2005. ‘What do “Impartiality’, “Independence” and “Transparency” 
Mean?—Some Thoughts from Australia.’ Paper delivered at the Improving 
the Quality of Election Management Conference of Commonwealth Chief 
Election Officers, New Delhi, India.
Dario, Gina. 2005. Analysis of Informal Voting During the 2004 House of 
Representatives Election. Research Report no. 7. Canberra: Australian 
Electoral Commission. URL: <http://www.aec.gov.au/pdf/research/papers/
paper7/research_paper7.pdf>, retrieved 24 June 2007.
Dundas, Carl W. 1994. Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections: Frameworks, 




Duverger, Maurice. 1951. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the 
Modern State. New York: Wiley. 
Election Funding Authority. 2007. Annual Report 2006–2007. Sydney: Election 
Funding Authority. 
Electoral Matters Committee. 2008. Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2006 Victorian 
State Election and Matters Related Thereto: Report to Parliament Electoral 
Matters Committee. Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer.
Elkins, David J. 1992. ‘Electoral Reform and Political Culture.’ In Comparative 
Political Studies: Australia and Canada, eds M. Alexander and B. Galligan. 
Melbourne: Pitman. 
Ellis, Andrew, Maria Gratschew, Jon H. Pammett and Erin Thiessen. 2006. 
Engaging the Electorate: Initiatives to Promote Voter Turnout from Around 
the World—Including Voter Turnout Data from National Elections Worldwide 
1945–2006. Stockholm: International IDEA. 
Ewing, Keith and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh. 2006. ‘Donations to Political Parties 
in the United Kingdom.’ Paper prepared for the Political Finance and 
Government Advertising Workshop, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, 25 February.
Garber, Larry. 1994. ‘Election Commissions: Responsibilities and Composition.’ 
Paper presented at the NDI-sponsored African Election Colloquium, Victoria 
Falls, Zimbabwe.
Goot, Murray. 1985. ‘Electoral Systems.’ In Surveys of Australian Political 
Science, ed. D. Aitken. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin.
Green, Antony. 2003. Prospects for the 2003 Legislative Council Election. 
Background Paper no. 3/03, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service. 
Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales.
Green, Phillip. 1986. ‘The Australian Labor Party and the Commonwealth 
Electoral System 1972–1986.’ Unpublished Litt. B. sub-thesis. Canberra.
Harris, Paul. 1997. An Electoral Administration: Who, What and Where. Paper 
prepared at IDEA for the South Pacific Electoral Administrators’ Conference 
in Fiji, October. 
Harvey, Ben. 2002. ‘Greens Sink Votes Bid.’ West Australian, 18 November 2002.
Harwin, D. 2007. ‘Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding: 
Establishment.’ Hansard, 27 June. Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 
p. 1807. URL: <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
186
Hasen, Richard L. 2004. Ending Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States: 
Litigation or Legislation? Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia, The 
Australian National University. URL: <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/
papers/20040913_hasen_felon_disenfranch.pdf>, retrieved 23 September 
2007. 
Hill, Lisa and Cornelia Koch 2011. ‘The Voting Rights of Incarcerated Australian 
Citizens.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 46(2): 213–28.
House of Assembly. 1986. General Elections 1985. Adelaide: Government Printer.
Hughes, Colin. 1977. A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965–
1974. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
Hughes, Colin. 1986. Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1975–
1984. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
Hughes, Colin. 2001. ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity.’ In Elections: Full, 
Free & Fair, ed. Marian Sawer. Sydney: The Federation Press.
Hughes, Colin. 2007. The Importance of Boundaries. Research Paper 1. Canberra: 
Democratic Audit of Australia, The Australian National University. URL: 
<http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/20071102hughesrespapredist.
pdf>, retrieved 5 December 2007.
Hughes, Colin and Brian Costar. 2005. ‘Fiddling the Ballot Books.’ The Age, 3 
November.
Hughes, Colin and Brian Costar. 2006. Limiting Democracy: The Erosion of 
Electoral Rights in Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press. 
IDEA [Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance]. 2002. International 
Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of 
Elections. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Johnston, Michael. 2005. Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and 
Practical Perspectives: Political Finance Policy, Parties, and Democratic 
Development. Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs. 
JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 1994. Financial 
Reporting by Political Parties: Interim Report from the Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters on the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1993 
Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Bibliography
187
JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2005. Official Committee 
Hansard, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Wednesday 6 July, 
Brisbane. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2009. Report on the 
Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia.
JSCEM [Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters]. 2011. Report on the 
Funding of Political Parties and Political Campaigns. Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia.
Jupp, James and Marian Sawer. 2001. ‘Political Parties, Partisanship and 
Electoral Governance.’ In Elections: Full, Free & Fair, ed. M. Sawer. Sydney: 
The Federation Press.
Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. ‘Changing Models of Party Organization 
and Party Democracy.’ Party Politics 1(1): 5–28.
Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 2009. ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.’ 
Perspectives on Politics 7(4): 753–66.
Kelly, Norm. 2006. ‘The Howard Government’s Electoral Reforms—A Blight on 
Democratic Principles.’ Paper delivered at the Australasian Political Studies 
Association Conference, Newcastle. 
Kelly, Norm. 2011. ‘Australian Electoral Administration and Electoral Integrity.’ 
In Electoral Democracy: Australian Prospects, eds Tham, Costar and Orr. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-
Seven Democracies 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
López-Pintor, Rafael. 2000. Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of 
Governance. New York: Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations 
Development Programme. URL: <www.undp.org/governance/docs/
Elections-Pub-EMBbook.pdf>, retrieved 3 July 2008. 
McAllister, Ian, Toni Makkai and Chris Patterson. 1992. Informal Voting in the 
1987 and 1990 Australian Federal Elections. Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service. 
Mackenzie, William James Millar. 1967. Free Elections. London: George Allen 
& Unwin.
Marsh, Ian, ed. 2006. Political Parties in Transition. Sydney: The Federation 
Press. 
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
188
Mason, Anthony. 2001. ‘The Constitutional Principle of Representative 
Government.’ In Speaking for the People: Representation in Australian Politics, 
eds Sawer and Zappala. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Massicotte, Louis, André Blais and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2004. Establishing the 
Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.
Mawrey, Richard. 2010. ‘Easy Voting Means Fraudulent Voting.’ Quadrant 54(4).
Medew, Rod. 2003. Informal Vote Survey, House of Representatives, 2001 
Election. Research Report no. 1. Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission. 
URL: <http://www.aec.gov.au/pdf/research/papers/paper1/res_rep_01.
pdf>, retrieved 16 April 2007.
Minter Ellison Consulting. 2003. Independent Review of the Northern Territory 
Electoral System: Final Report and Recommendations. Canberra: Minter 
Ellison Consulting.
Miskin, Sarah and Greg Baker. 2006. Political Finance Disclosure under Current 
and Proposed Thresholds. Research Note 27, 2005–06. Canberra: Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia. 
Mozaffar, Shaheen and Andreas Schedler. 2002. ‘The Comparative Study of 
Electoral Governance—An Introduction.’ International Political Science 
Review 23(1): 5–27.
Nelson, Paul. 2007. Electoral Division Rankings: Census 2006 First Release. 
Research Paper 12 2007–08. Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
Australia.
Northern Territory Electoral Commission. 2007. 2005 Legislative Assembly 
General Election Report: Part 1 of 2. Darwin: Northern Territory Electoral 
Commission.
Offe, Claus. 1996. ‘Designing Institutions in East European Transitions.’ In 
The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. R. E. Goodin. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Orr, Graeme. 1998. ‘Ballotless and Behind Bars: The Denial of the Franchise to 
Prisoners.’ Federal Law Review 26(1): 56–82.
Orr, Graeme. 2007. Constitutionalising the Franchise and the Status Quo: The 
High Court on Prisoner Voting Rights. Discussion Paper 19/07. Canberra: 
Democratic Audit, The Australian National University. 
Bibliography
189
Orr, Graeme. 2010. The Law of Politics: Elections, Parties and Money in Australia. 
Sydney: The Federation Press. 
Orr, Graeme, Bryan Mercurio and George Williams. 2003. ‘Australian Electoral 
Law: A Stocktake.’ Election Law Journal 2(3): 383–402.
Parliament of Australia. 2004. ‘Referendum Results 1974.’ Parliamentary 
Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia. Parliament of Australia web 
site, URL: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/handbook/referendums/r1974.
htm>
Pettit, Philip, Tim Keady and Bill Blick. 1998. Review of the Governance of the 
Australian Capital Territory. Canberra: Chief Minister’s Department.
Phillips, Harry. 1991. ‘The Modern Parliament, 1965–1989.’ In The House on the 
Hill: A History of the Parliament of Western Australia 1832–1990, ed. Black. 
Perth: Parliament of Western Australia.
Phillips, Harry and Kirsten Robinson. 2006. The Quest for ‘One Vote One Value’ 
in Western Australia’s Political History. Perth: Western Australian Electoral 
Commission.
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. 2006. Report On—A Legislative 
Framework for Independent Officers of Parliament. Melbourne: Parliament of 
Victoria.
Rae, Douglas. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Clinton, Mass.: 
Colonial Press.
Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. ‘Political Engineering and Party Politics in Papua New 
Guinea.’ Party Politics 8(6): 701–18. 
Reilly, Benjamin, Per Nordlund and Edward Newman. 2008. Political Parties 
in Conflict-Prone Societies: Encouraging Inclusive Politics and Democratic 
Development. Policy Brief no. 2. Tokyo: United Nations University.
Reynolds, Andrew and Benjamin Reilly. 2002. The International IDEA Handbook 
of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Sawer, Marian, ed. 2001. Elections: Full, Free and Fair. Sydney: The Federation 
Press.
Sawer, Marian. 2006. Damaging Democracy? Early Closure of Electoral Rolls. 
Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia, The Australian National University. 
URL: <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/20060308_sawer_dam_
dem.pdf> Retrieved 16 June 2007.
Directions in Australian Electoral Reform 
190
Sawer, Marian, Norman Abjorensen and Phil Larkin. 2009. Australia: The State 
of Democracy. Sydney: The Federation Press.
Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding. 2008a. Electoral and 
Political Party Funding in New South Wales. Report no. 1. Sydney: Legislative 
Council, Parliament of New South Wales.
Select Committee on Electoral and Political Party Funding. 2008b. Hearing 
Transcript, 3 March. Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, p. 21. URL: 
<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/02C2
B246F4664981CA2573D8000D1077>
Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee. 2002. Charter 
of Political Honesty Bill 2000. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee. 2010.Report 
into the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (How-to-Vote Cards and 
Other Measures) Bill 2010 and the Electoral and Referendum Amendment 
(Modernisation and Other Measures) Bill 2010. Canberra: Parliament of 
Australia.
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee. 2004. State Elections (One 
Vote, One Value) Bill 2001 [2002]. Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Snowdon, Warren. 2004. ‘Senate Victory Used to Silence Voters.’ Media release, 
20 December.
Standing Committee on Legal Affairs. 2002. The Appropriateness of the Size of 
the Legislative Assembly for the ACT and Options for Changing the Number of 
Members, Electorates and Any Other Related Matter. Report no. 4. Canberra: 
Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory.
State Electoral Office. 2007. Election Report: South Australian Election: 18 March 
2006. Adelaide: State Electoral Office.
Tham, Joo-Cheong. 2010. Money and Politics: The Democracy We Can’t Afford. 
Sydney: UNSW Press. 
Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas, Joram Rukambe and 
Sara Staino. 2006. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA 
Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Whitlam, Gough. 2003. ‘One Vote One Value.’ The Whitlam Institute 




Wilks-Heeg, Stuart. 2008. Purity of Elections in the UK: Causes for Concern. York: 
The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Limited.
Young, Sally. 2003. ‘Killing Competition: Restricting Access to Political 
Communication Channels in Australia’. AQ Journal of Contemporary Analysis 
75(3): 9–15.
Young, Sally and Joo-Cheong Tham. 2006. Political Finance in Australia: 
A Skewed and Secret System. Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia, 
The Australian National University.

